NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-1388
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GREGORY A. JONES,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-16-cr-00516-001)
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal as Untimely and on
Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Affirmance
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 26, 2022
Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 18, 2022)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Gregory Jones, a federal prisoner who has served approximately half of a 240-
month sentence for bank robbery and firearms convictions, filed a motion for
compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that his medical
conditions and age made him susceptible to complications from COVID-19. The District
Court denied his motion, concluding that Jones did not show extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release, but that, even if he had, release was not appropriate upon
consideration of the traditional sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). Jones appeals.
The Government initially moved to have this appeal dismissed as untimely, while
requesting, in the alternative, that we summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
The Government has since asked that we summarily affirm instead of ruling on the non-
jurisdictional timeliness issue. Because no substantial issue is presented by this appeal,
we grant the Government’s motion to summarily affirm, and we affirm the District
Court’s judgment entered on February 4, 2022. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011); 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6 (2018).
We review the District Court’s denial of compassionate release, including its
weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Andrews,
12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir.
2020). Under that standard, “we will not disturb the court’s determination unless we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment in the
conclusion it reached.” Andrews, 12 F.4th at 259 (quotation marks and alteration
omitted).
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We need not review the District Court’s conclusion that Jones did not show
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, because the conclusion that release is
not warranted upon review of the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient to support the District
Court’s ruling in this case. See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1238-39 (11th
Cir. 2021) (per curiam). In weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the District Court
relied on Jones’s criminal history, the serious nature of his crime, the length of the
sentence remaining to be served, and the need to promote respect for the law and provide
just punishment for the offense. The Court also noted that, when sentencing Jones, it had
departed downward substantially—ten years below the bottom of the Guidelines range—
in consideration of his age and the medical conditions detailed in his motion for
compassionate release. These were relevant considerations, see Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at
330-31; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(6); United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008
(6th Cir. 2020) (noting that sentence reduction was not warranted where, among other
factors, “the court had already varied downward by five years from Ruffin’s guidelines
range when imposing [a] lengthy sentence”), and we cannot say that the District Court
erred in relying on them. For these reasons, the Government’s motion for summary
affirmance is granted, and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
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