NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN YAGMAN, No. 21-55453
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02722-DMG-JEM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC MICHAEL GARCETTI; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 12, 2022**
Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Stephen Yagman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 640
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Yagman’s excessive fines and
intrastate travel claims because Yagman failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)
(explaining that a fine is unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment
if its amount is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense); Yagman v.
Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that because plaintiff failed
to allege a violation of his constitutional rights, “he cannot maintain derivative
constitutional claims based on that conduct,” including conspiracy and Monell
claims); Nunez ex rel. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 n. 7 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has recognized
a protected right to intrastate travel); cf. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th
Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “minor burdens impacting interstate travel” do not
constitute a violation of the right to interstate travel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would
be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is
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particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yagman’s motions
to impose service costs because Yagman did not show that he sent defendants
waiver requests that complied with Rule 4(d)(1) and because defendants had good
cause to not sign and return a waiver. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Estate of Darulis v.
Garate, 401 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005) (standard of review).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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