United States v. Wittie

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 93-2245

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STEVEN KURT WITTIE,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

(June 23, 1994)

Before HIGGINBOTHAM and WIENER, Circuit Judges, KAUFMAN,*
District Judge.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant the United States (the government) appeals

the district court's dismissal of its two-count indictment that

charged Defendant-Appellee Steven Kurt Witte1 with conspiracy and

attempt to import 1,091 kilograms of cocaine into the United

States. The district court dismissed the indictment on grounds

*
District Judge of the District of Maryland, sitting by
designation.
1
Witte, not Wittie, is the correct spelling.
that punishment for the indicted offense would violate the multiple

punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Eighth

Amendment through inclusion of the indicted offense in relevant

conduct at sentencing for a related offense to determine Witte's

base offense level. We disagree with the district court's

conclusion that Witte would be subjected to impermissible multiple

punishments for the same offense and therefore reverse and remand.

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In August 1989, undercover DEA Agent Roger Norman negotiated

with Dennis Mason in Tucson, Arizona to transport marijuana from

Mexico into the United States. The negotiations were unsuccessful,

but discussions between Norman and Mason resumed in Houston in June

1990. At that time, Witte, Mason, and Tom Pokorny planned to

import marijuana from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala. Both the

Mexico deal and the Guatemala deal were going on simultaneously.

Norman's job would be to fly the contraband into the United States.

In July 1990, the Mexican marijuana source advised that

cocaine might be added to the shipment if there were room on the

plane or if marijuana were not available. The following month,

Norman was told that the Mexicans were ready with 4,400 pounds of

marijuana. Once Norman learned the coordinates of the airstrip,

arrangements were made to have the participants arrested in Mexico.

On August 12, 1990, Mason and four others were apprehended.

Instead of marijuana, 591 kilograms of cocaine were seized. The

following day, while still undercover, Norman met Witte to explain

2
that the pilots had been unable to land in Mexico because police

had shown up at the airstrip.

Witte, Mason, and Pokorny were not charged with conspiracy and

attempt to import cocaine at the time because Mason was

incarcerated in Mexico and Pokorny's whereabouts were under

investigation. All contact between Witte and Norman ceased until

January 1991.

Norman next contacted Witte in January 1991 and asked Witte if

he were interested in purchasing 1000 pounds of marijuana from

Norman. Witte answered affirmatively, and said that he would call

Norman to tell him whether he could raise the $50,000 downpayment.

Witte telephoned three days later from Denver, Colorado stating

that he had the downpayment. Witte asked NormanSQwho still had

possession of Witte's horse trailer from the prior activitiesSQto

return the trailer so that it could be used as a load vehicle for

the marijuana. Witte stated that he would bring from Denver a

motor home owned by Sam Kelly to use as a second load vehicle.

On February 7, 1991, Witte met Norman in Houston and informed

him that he could only come up with half of the downpayment.

Norman agreed to give Witte 1000 pounds of marijuana for $25,000 in

downpayment and to allow Witte three days to obtain the balance.

Witte introduced Norman to Kelly and showed Kelly's motor home and

its various hidden compartments to Norman. Fellow undercover

officers took the motor home and trailer to load the marijuana, at

which time Witte and Kelly took Norman to Witte's hotel room to

view the money. The two vehicles arrived loaded with approximately

3
375 pounds of marijuana.2 Witte and Kelly took possession and were

promptly arrested.

The government indicted Witte for (1) conspiring to possess

with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana3 and

(2) aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute

marijuana (collectively, the marijuana offense).4 The charges

resulted from the January-February 1991 "reverse-buy" of marijuana.

Facing a statutory range of 5-40 years,5 Witte entered a Rule

11(e)(1)(B) plea agreement with the government.

Witte pleaded guilty to the substantive count of aiding and

abetting possession with intent to distribute marijuana and agreed

to cooperate with the government by providing truthful and complete

information concerning the charged offense as well as any others

about which he might be questioned. The government agreed to

dismiss count one of the indictmentSQconspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute in excess of 100 kilos of marijuana from

January 25, 1991 through February 8, 1991SQand to file a §5K1.1

motion if Witte's cooperation amounted to substantial assistance.

Although not expressed in the recitation of terms of the agreement,

the government states that Witte was also promised a recommendation

to a three-year cap if he brought in Pokorny, who was involved in

2
The vehicles were actually loaded with approximately 1,000
pounds of marijuana, but the government stipulated to the lesser
quantity.
3
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 846.
4
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2.
5
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

4
the cocaine offense. Although Witte did not assist the government

in locating Pokorny, Witte's cooperation did cause his co-defendant

in the marijuana offense, Sam Kelly, to plead guilty.

At sentencing, the district court found that the marijuana and

cocaine offenses were part of the "same course of conduct." Over

objections by both Witte and the government, the court included the

cocaine in relevant conduct to determine Witte's base offense

level.6 The government urged the court to accept the parties'

position that the cocaine deal was not relevant to the marijuana

deal. The government argued against inclusion of the cocaine

because it planned to indict Witte later for the cocaine offense.

If the cocaine were not included in relevant conduct, the

government could seek consecutive sentences for the cocaine and

marijuana offenses. On the other hand, Witte objected to inclusion

of the cocaine because he hoped for a shorter sentence: if only

the 375 pounds of marijuana were considered, the Guideline range

would be 63 to 78 months rather than 292 to 365 months.

Witte's base offense level was pegged at 40, with a Guideline

range of 292 to 365 months. From that base offense level, Witte

received a 2-level increase for his aggravating role in the offense

and an offsetting 2-level decrease for acceptance of

responsibility. The court granted the government's §5K1.1 motion

6
It is not clear whether the court determined the quantity
of drugs involved in the cocaine offense to be 591 kilos (the
amount seized) or 1,091 kilos (the amount seized plus an
additional 500 kilos discussed). But inclusion of either
quantity in relevant conduct results in a Guideline range of 40
(500-1500 kilos of cocaine).

5
for downward departure based on Witte's substantial assistance. By

virtue of that departure, Witte was sentenced to 144 monthsSQ148

months below the minimum sentence of 292 months under the pre-

departure Guideline range. Witte appealed, but the appeal was

dismissed due to Witte's failure to file a brief.

The government then indicted Witte and co-defendant Pokorny on

two additional counts: (1) conspiring to import cocaine7 and (2)

aiding and abetting in the attempt to import cocaine8

(collectively, the cocaine offense).9 The indictment alleges

that, between August 1989 and August 1990, Witte tried to import

about 1,091 kilograms of cocaine from Central America. Witte moved

to dismiss, arguing that he had already been punished for the

cocaine offense because the cocaine was included in relevant

conduct at sentencing for the marijuana offense. Witte also argued

that the indictment breached the plea agreement.

The district court dismissed the indictment on grounds that

punishment for the indicted offense would violate the multiple

punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Eighth

Amendment because the indicted offense had been included in

relevant conduct at sentencing for the marijuana offense to

determine Witte's base offense level. The court's conclusion on

7
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(2)(B), 963.
8
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(2)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
9
Although the "cocaine offense" involved the importation of
cocaine and marijuana, it is referred to as the cocaine offense
to distinguish it from the 1991 activities involving
marijuanaSQthe "marijuana offense."

6
the breach of the plea agreement issue is not so clear, but it does

not appear that the indictment was dismissed on that basis.10 The

government timely appealed the dismissal of the indictment.

II

ANALYSIS

1. Double Jeopardy

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the dismissal of the cocaine indictment on

grounds of double jeopardy.11

B. Multiple Punishments Prohibited?

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no one shall "be

subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb."12 The Supreme Court has left no doubt that the clause

protects defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple

punishments for the "same offense."13 Witte argues that the

government's present attempt to punish him for the cocaine offense

violates double jeopardy's multiple punishments prong: he has

10
The court stated that "[t]he effect of permitting such
carving also defeats the spirit and intent of the plea bargaining
process. While the government may give a benefit during the plea
bargaining process, only the courts are permitted to take it
away." The minute entry reads, "[T]he motion to dismiss on the
basis of double jeopardy is granted."
11
United States v. Vasquez-Rodriguez, 978 F.2d 867, 870 (5th
Cir. 1992); Baker v. Metcalfe, 633 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 974, 101 S. Ct. 2055, 68 L. Ed. 2d 354
(1981).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct.
711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969).

7
already been "punished" for the cocaine offense charged in the

subject indictment.

At the outset, we note the importance of distinguishing double

jeopardy's prohibition of multiple prosecutions from its protection

against impermissible multiple punishments. Although multiple

prosecutions, i.e., more than one prosecution by the same sovereign

for the same offense, always violate double jeopardy,14 multiple

punishments for the same offense may or may not violate double

jeopardy. That is because Congress (or a state legislature)

determines the scope of the constitutional protection in the

multiple punishments context. If the legislature intended to

impose multiple punishments for the same offense, imposition of

such sentences does not violate the Constitution.15 The purpose of

the Double Jeopardy Clause in the multiple punishments context is

to ensure that the punishment assessed does not exceed that

authorized by the legislature (either the length of the sentence or

the number of times that the sentence is imposed).16

14
We emphasize that the indictment or the prosecution does
not run afoul of the prohibition against multiple prosecutions.
Witte is not subject to multiple prosecutions for the cocaine
offenseSQhe was never placed in jeopardy for that offense. Our
concern is with the punishment that would result if Witte were to
be prosecuted for the cocaine offense: he is potentially subject
to multiple punishments for the cocaine offense.
15
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367, 103 S. Ct. 673, 74
L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 450 U.S.
333, 344, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981)).
16
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 109 S. Ct. 2522, 105
L. Ed. 2d 322 (1989); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773,
778, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 85 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1985); Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-68, 103 S. Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535
(1983); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 711; United States v. Martinez, 931

8
 For purposes of double jeopardy, the drugs involved in the

"same offense"SQconspiring and attempting to import cocaineSQwere

included in relevant conduct to sentence Witte for the marijuana

offense and are the subject of the dismissed indictment.17 The

pertinent issues are (1) whether inclusion of the cocaine in

relevant conduct at sentencing for the marijuana offense punished

Witte for the cocaine offense, and if so, (2) whether Congress has

authorized single or multiple punishment for the cocaine offense.

This double jeopardy issue is res nova in this circuit, but the

Second and Tenth Circuits have considered it.18 Both have concluded

that a defendant's acts included as relevant conduct in calculating

punishment for one offense may not later form the basis of another

indictment without violating double jeopardy.19

F.2d 851, 853 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct.
268, 116 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1991).
17
Thus both parties assume that the "same offense" element
is satisfied under the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
But clearly the statute under which Witte was convicted and the
statutes under which he is now indicted proscribe different
offenses, i.e., aiding and abetting possession of a controlled
substance (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2), and conspiring
to import, and aiding and abetting in the attempt to import, a
controlled substance (21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963; 18 U.S.C. § 2).
Cf. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367; United States v. Cruce, 21 F.3d 70,
75-76 (5th Cir. 1994). We address the issues in this case,
however, as they were presented by the parties.
18
Since this appeal was argued and taken under submission,
another panel of this court has addressed the same issue that is
now before us and has concluded, as we do, that double jeopardy
does not preclude the subsequent prosecution and conviction of
conduct that was earlier included in relevant conduct. See
Cruce, 21 F.2d 70.
19
United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1695, 118 L. Ed. 2d 406

9
 In United States v. Koonce,20 the defendant was convicted of

distributing 443 grams of methamphetamine that he had mailed to his

cohort. The district court sentenced him, however, for 7,869

grams. That quantity included 443 grams proved at trial, 963 grams

found in his home, and 6,463 grams that Koonce was purported to

have sold on other occasions. Inclusion of the additional grams in

"relevant conduct" increased Koonce's offense level under the

Guidelines from 32 (range: 188 to 235 months) to 34 (range: 235-

293 months). Unlike Witte, Koonce received the maximum statutory

sentence for all of the drugs (240 months).21

The government then brought a second indictment charging

Koonce with the 963 grams of methamphetamine found in his home.

The Tenth Circuit employed a three-step analysis to determine

whether double jeopardy was thereby violated: First, had Koonce

been punished for the methamphetamine found at his residence?

Second, if so, did Congress intend that an accused in Koonce's

position receive cumulativeSQalthough not necessarily consecutiveSQ

and U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1705, 118 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1992);
United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993).
20
Id. Koonce was relied on by the district court in
dismissing the indictment.
21
This fact does not distinguish Koonce from the case before
us for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. If, like Koonce,
Witte had received the statutory maximum sentence for all of the
drugs (365 months), it might appear wastefulSQthough not a
violation of double jeopardySQto prosecute him for the cocaine
offense. But as Witte's counsel admitted at oral argument, the
government does recognize some benefit from a second conviction:
it receives a $50 cost assessment to balance the budget, and more
importantly, the second conviction serves as a predicate for
enhanced punishment under recidivist statutes. That second
conviction reflects Witte's actual recidivist status.

10
sentences from two separate proceedings if both sentences punish

the accused for exactly the same conduct? Finally, if the first

two inquiries are answered affirmatively, does the second

punishment constitute "double" punishment even though the sentence

derived therefrom is specified to run concurrently with the first

sentence?

In answering the initial inquiry, the court concluded that

Koonce had been punished for the drugs found at his residence

because his base offense level would have been lower had they not

been included via the relevant conduct provisions of the

Guidelines. The "real offense" approach of the Guidelines required

that Koonce be punished for the acts included in relevant conduct;

therefore, concluded the Koonce court, he was punished.22

Second, the Koonce court found that the government had failed

to point out "any authority holding that Congress intended to

punish a defendant a second time for conduct that [had] previously

been aggregated into the base offense level for a related sentence

in an earlier prosecution."23 The court relied on (1) §3D1.2's

grouping requirement, which mandates that a defendant's base

offense level be determined by aggregating drug quantities from

multiple counts in a single proceeding, and (2) the Sentencing

Commission's announced goal of preventing prosecutorial charge

22
Id. (emphasis added).
23
Id., 945 F.2d at 1151.

11
manipulation,24 to determine that Congress intended only one

punishment rather than multiple punishments. The purpose of

grouping is to ensure that an accused receives the same sentence

that he would have received had he been charged and convicted of

one narcotics count based on the same totality of facts.

Recognizing that Koonce had received the statutory maximum sentence

possible for the total quantity of drugs, the Tenth Circuit

concluded that Congress could not have intended a larger punishment

if a defendant were prosecuted in two proceedings.

Third, the Koonce court concluded that even if the defendant's

second sentence were specified to run totally concurrent with the

first, a second sentence would violate double jeopardy. The court

relied on Ball v. United States.25 Ball, a previously convicted

felon, was convicted in one proceeding for (1) the "receipt" of a

firearm and (2) the "possession" of a firearm. He was sentenced to

consecutive terms of imprisonment. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit

remanded with instructions to modify the sentences to make them

concurrent. The Supreme Court concluded that, as both offenses

were established by the same criminal act, Congress had not

intended to subject Ball to two convictions. Thus "one of the

convictions, as well as its concurrent sentence, [was] unauthorized

24
Id., 945 F.2d at 1151-52; United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A.4(a), policy
statement (1993).
25
470 U.S. 856, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 84 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1985).

12
punishment for a separate offense."26 In Koonce, the Tenth Circuit

relied upon these statements to posit that a concurrent sentence

can be "punishment."27 As the Tenth Circuit had already decided

that Congress had authorized only one punishment for that criminal

act, the court concluded that this second punishment violated

double jeopardy.

In United States v. McCormick,28 the Second Circuit adopted

Koonce's analytical framework. It affirmed the dismissal of bank

fraud charges for acts that were used in a prior case as relevant

conduct to compute the defendant's base offense level. McCormick

was charged with bank fraud in Connecticut that resulted in a

$75,000 loss. Subsequent to that indictment, McCormick was charged

for bank fraud in Vermont that allegedly resulted in a $4 million

loss. He was then convicted on the Connecticut bank fraud charge.

At sentencing for the Connecticut conviction, the loss was

calculated to be in the $2.5-5 million range, a sum that obviously

included the Vermont loss. McCormick's motion to dismiss the

Vermont bank fraud charges on double jeopardy grounds was granted.

26
Ball, 470 U.S. at 864.
"A separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence,
has potential adverse collateral consequences. . . ." Id. at 865
(noting the potential for an increased sentence under a
recidivist statute, possible delays in parole eligibility, and
the societal stigma that results from the conviction itself).
27
Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1153. We do not disagree, but note
that any sentence is punishment. The issue on which we part ways
with the Tenth Circuit is whether a second punishment is
authorized by Congress, the second element of the Tenth Circuit's
analysis.
28
992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993).

13
 The Second Circuit determined that inclusion of the Vermont

amount in relevant conduct amounted to punishment for the Vermont

fraud in the Connecticut proceedings, and that a second punishment

for the Vermont loss would violate double jeopardy: The Sentencing

Guidelines' grouping provision requires that defendants in fraud

cases, like drug offenders, be assessed "a single punishment for a

set of similar acts."29 "The Guidelines achieve consistency in

sentencing for fraud cases by grouping all of the relevant conduct

and applying a single offense level to the whole course of

conduct."30 The Second Circuit concluded that Congress apparently

did not intend to allow a defendant to be prosecuted for conduct

already used to increase his or her offense level. Being skeptical

of the way that the Tenth and Second Circuits reached those

results, we now examine the double jeopardy question independently.

1. Inclusion of Cocaine in Relevant Conduct:
Punishment?

First, the government contends that inclusion of the cocaine

in relevant conduct to calculate the defendant's base offense level

is legally no different than enhancing his sentence by increasing

a base offense level to a higher level under the Guidelines because

of prior criminal activity. As increasing a base offense level by

use of prior crimes is not "punishment" for prior crimes, argues

the government, neither is using prior crimes to calculate a base

29
992 F.2d at 440; see U.S.S.G. §2F1.1, comment. (n. 6)
("The cumulative loss produced by a common scheme or course of
conduct should be used in determining the offense level,
regardless of the number of counts of conviction.").
30
992 F.2d at 440.

14
offense level punishment for those prior crimes. Thus, concludes

the government, Witte has not been "punished" for the cocaine

offense. Witte counters that although enhancement of a sentence

may not be punishment, counting the cocaine to determine his base

offense level, with a corresponding 287-month increase in the

maximum possible length of his sentence, is punishment.

It is well-settled that using prior crimes to "enhance" a

sentence does not impinge on double jeopardy, because defendants

are not "punished" for crimes so considered.31 Pre-Guidelines,

uncharged criminal conduct could be "considered" at sentencing as

aggravating circumstances and could still form the basis of a later

indictment, conviction, and sentence without violating double

jeopardy.32 The "real offense" approach to relevant conduct,

however, may well lead to the conclusion that Witte was "punished"

for the cocaine offense.

Stepping back from the somewhat artificial distinction between

enhancement and calculation of a base offense level, we examine

whether, pre-Guidelines, the prosecution and punishment of Witte

for the cocaine offense would have been foreclosed because Witte's

31
If a defendant is convicted of murder and given a life
sentence, and is later convicted for having kidnapped the murder
victim, the sentencing court may consider the fact that the
kidnaping victim was murdered when assessing a death penalty
rather than a life sentence without violating double jeopardy.
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585-86, 79 S. Ct. 421, 3 L.
Ed. 2d 516 (1959).
32
Sekou v. Blackburn, 796 F.2d 108, 111-12 (5th Cir. 1986)
("[C]onsideration of other crimes at sentencing does not
implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant is not
actually being punished for the crimes so considered." 796 F.2d
at 112.).

15
cocaine activities were considered in imposing sentence for the

marijuana offense. Williams v. Oklahoma33 indicates that the answer

is no. As the Supreme Court noted in Williams, the sentencing

court "is authorized, if not required, to consider all of the

mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the crime."34

And in view of the obvious fact that, under the law of
Oklahoma, kidnaping is a separate crime, entirely
distinct from the crime of murder, the court's
consideration of the murder as a circumstance involved in
the kidnaping crime cannot be said to have resulted in
punishing petitioner a second time for the same offense,
nor to have denied to him due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.35

In Witte's case, the sentencing court is required by the

Guideline's relevant conduct rules to consider the circumstances

surrounding the particular offense of conviction. We find it clear

that, like the crimes of kidnap and murder of the kidnap victim in

Williams, the marijuana charge to which Witte pleaded guilty and

was sentenced is an offense separate and distinct from the cocaine

offense.36 If, in Williams, consideration of the conduct

constituting the separate offense of murder to increase the

severity of the sentence for kidnaping was not punishment for the

conduct so considered, then the use of relevant conduct to increase

the punishment of a charged offense does not punish the offender

33
358 U.S. 576.
34
358 U.S. at 585.
35
358 U.S. at 586.
36
See supra note 17.

16
for the relevant conduct. Of course, there is double use of single

acts, but Williams apparently permits this. Williams was given a

life sentence for murder and then the same murder was used to step

up his punishment for kidnaping to death.

The only ostensible missing link in this analysis lies in the

answer to the question whether, when Williams was sentenced to life

imprisonment for murder, the sentencing court considered the

kidnaping of the murder victim. Although not clear from the text

of Williams, we may fairly assume that the uncharged kidnaping was

considered when Williams was sentenced for murder. After all, the

sentencing court "[was] authorized, if not required, to consider

all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the

crime."37 If so, then Williams is this case))pre-Guidelines.

The fact that Witte's double jeopardy challenge arises post-

Guidelines does not change the analysis of the punishment issue

presented in Williams. Before adoption of the Guidelines, judges

exercised their sound discretion in determining the appropriate

level of punishment within established statutory ranges of

imprisonment. Post-Guidelines, judges are still required to

determine a sentence within an established statutory range. The

Guidelines simply provide a formulae for what used to be left to

trial court discretion. To improve consistency in sentencing, the

Guidelines attempt to accommodate multiple uses of conduct.

Specifically, the Guidelines require that when, in cases such as

Witte's, the sentencing court has considered the marijuana

37
Williams, 358 U.S. at 585.

17
conviction in determining the offense level for the cocaine

offense, the court must impose concurrent sentences.38

Even if we assume arguendo that Williams does not absolutely

dispose of this threshold punishment question, we would not end our

analysis at this juncture. Rather, we accept for purposes of our

analysis that Witte has been punished by inclusion of the cocaine

activities in relevant conduct and proceed to consider whether a

second punishment is nonetheless permitted by Congress.

2. Guidelines Authorize Multiple Punishment

We therefore turn to the Guidelines to determine the

appropriate punishmentSQsingle or multipleSQto be assessed. 39 The

Tenth Circuit's observation that grouping rules under the

Guidelines prevents double counting and thus count manipulation is

accurate. If Witte had been convicted in one proceeding of both

the cocaine and marijuana offenses, grouping of countsSQaggregation

of the drug quantitiesSQwould result in a Guideline range of 292-

365 months. The high end of the range serves as a cap to the

length of the sentence (punishment) that Witte can receive for both

offenses.40 But the question here is whether Congress intended

38
U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(b). This subsection will be discussed in
further detail in Part B, Section 2 of this opinion.
39
United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437, 442 n.1 (2d Cir.
1993) (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
properly recognized that "in the sentencing area, Congressional
intent is reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines.").
40
The same is true if Witte is convicted in two separate
proceedings for these offenses. His punishment cannot exceed 365
months in length. As we will demonstrate, this is accomplished
by imposing concurrent sentences.

18
Witte to be subject to multiple punishments (a second punishment)

for the cocaineSQthat had already been included in relevant conduct

for a related sentenceSQas long as the aggregate length of his

sentences did not exceed the lesser of the cap provided by the

range or the statutory maximum sentence.

The Tenth Circuit found no authority in the Guidelines that

Congress intended to punish a defendant a second time for conduct

that has previously been aggregated into the base offense level for

a related sentence in an earlier prosecution.41 But that court did

not have the benefit of the present §5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines,

which Witte concedes in his motion to dismiss would require

imposition of concurrent sentences if he were tried and convicted

of the cocaine offense. Section 5G1.3 provides in pertinent part:

Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an
Undischarged Term of Imprisonment

(b) If . . . the undischarged term of imprisonment
resulted from offense(s) that have been fully
taken into account in the determination of the
offense level for the instant offense, the
sentence for the instant offense shall be
imposed to run concurrently to the
undischarged term of imprisonment.42

The commentary to §5G1.3(b), application note 2, reflects that

Subsection (b) . . . addresses cases in which the conduct
resulting in the undischarged term of imprisonment has
been fully taken into account under §1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct) in determining the offense level for the instant
offense. This can occur, for example where a defendant
is prosecuted in both federal and state court, or in two

41
Id., 945 F.2d at 1151.
42
U.S.S.G. §5G1.3.

19
 or more federal jurisdictions,43 for the same criminal
conduct or for different criminal transactions that were
part of the same course of conduct.44

The commentary clearly permits a defendant to be prosecutedSQand

sentencedSQin more than one federal proceeding for different

criminal offenses that were part of the same course of conduct.45

More importantly, a defendant's base offense level for each offense

43
Two separate indictments were brought against Witte in the
same federal jurisdiction, the Southern District of Texas
(Houston division). Although subsection (b) discusses "two or
more federal jurisdictions," Witte does not argue that §5G1.3(b)
does not apply on this basis. A common sense approach to that
language is that subsection (b) also addresses prosecutions in
"the same federal jurisdiction twice," i.e., the Southern
District of Texas and the Southern District of Texas. Subsection
(b) probably assumes that multiple counts resulting from the same
course of conduct would be brought together if they occur in the
same federal jurisdiction. Just as there are valid reasons for
bringing two separate indictments against a defendant in two
federal jurisdictions, there are valid reasons for bringing two
separate indictments against a defendant in the same
jurisdiction. In this case, the government did not believe that
the offenses were part of the same course of conduct and had not
completed its investigation of the cocaine offense.
44
U.S.S.G. §5G1.3, comment. (n.2).
45
United States v. Cruce, 21 F.3d 70 (5th Cir. 1994). In
Cruce, this circuit indicated its disagreement with the Tenth and
Second Circuits' views in Koonce and McCormick. Therefore, in
this opinion, this panel is not free to adopt the approach of
those cases. In Cruce, as in this case, it is to be noted that
the defendants faced punishment for conduct that had not been
charged, but that had been included in relevant conduct when they
were sentenced in an earlier prosecution. Cruce expressly states
that consideration of relevant conduct does not punish defendants
for relevant conduct so considered but for the offense of
conviction. Id. at 75 n.8. Despite the temporal differences
noted by the majority in McCormick between those circumstances
and the circumstances set forth in §5G1.3(b), the court in Cruce
concluded that §5G1.3(b) applied to the defendants because "it is
clear that Congress and the Sentencing Commission anticipated the
imposition of punishment))whether concurrent or consecutive))in a
second proceeding and, thus, did not intend to preclude such
proceeding." Id. at 77 n.11. Accordingly, Cruce held that the
second punishment did not violate double jeopardy.

20
of conviction))unless the Guidelines expressly provide

otherwise))must be determined on the basis of all relevant

conduct.46 The principle that all relevant conduct be considered

in determining a defendant's base offense level is neither optional

nor hortatory; it is mandatory.

Read in pari materia, §5G1.3(b) clearly provides that the

government may convict a defendant of one offense and punish him

for all relevant conduct; then indict and convict him for a

different offense that was part of the same course of conduct as

the first offense))and sentence him again for all relevant conduct.

To repeat, this proposition merely reflects Congress's specific

intent that all relevant conduct be considered in determining a

defendant's sentence. Consequently, we find no basis for

distinguishing the situation described by §5G1.3(b) from the one

before us today.

Like it or not, we are satisfied that §5G1.3 reflects

Congress's intent to prevent punishment from being larger if the

government chooses to proceed with two different proceedingsSQand

that Congress accomplishes this intent))not by foreclosing a second

prosecution but by directing that the length of the resulting term

of imprisonment be no greater than that which would have resulted

from prosecution and conviction on both counts in a single

proceeding. Section 5G1.3(b), therefore, accomplishes in

successive proceedings what grouping of counts pursuant to §3D1.2

accomplishes in a single proceeding. Thus §5G1.3(b) is "authority

46
U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a).

21
. . . that Congress intended to punish a defendant a second time

for conduct that has previously been aggregated into the base

offense level for a related sentence in an earlier prosecution,"

authority that the Tenth Circuit))without the benefit of §5G1.3(b)

in its present form))found lacking when it analyzed Koonce's double

jeopardy challenge.47

The Second Circuit had the benefit of §5G1.3(b) but

distinguished the situation in McCormick from that described in

§5G1.3(b). That distinction concerns when the defendant will be

punished for both offenses in a single sentencing proceeding, i.e.,

whether the defendant will be punished for both offenses at

sentencing for the first offense (McCormick's situation) or at

sentencing for the second offense (the Second Circuit's view of

§5G1.3(b)). But in our view, under §5G1.3(b) and relevant conduct

principles, the defendant is punished for both offenses both at

sentencing for the first offense and at sentencing for the second

offense.

With all due respect, we believe that the Second Circuit's

analysis of §5G1.3(b) suffers from two errors: first, it

ignores))under §5G1.3(b)))the application of relevant conduct

principles to sentencing for the first offense; second, it does not

consider McCormick's situation at the relevant stage addressed by

§5G1.3(b), i.e., at the sentencing stage for purposes of the

47
Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1151.

22
instant offense.48 The McCormick court did not consider that, at

sentencing for the second offense, McCormick could be punished

again for all relevant conduct. Section 5G1.3(b) assumes that a

defendant has been prosecuted and convicted for the instant

offense))an offense that was part of the same course of conduct as

an offense for which there is already a conviction and for which an

appropriate Guidelines sentence has been assessed (hence the

application of relevant conduct at the first sentencing

proceeding)))and that it has proceeded to the sentencing stage.

Nevertheless, the Second Circuit recognized that in a case

governed by subsection (b), the Sentencing Commission would require

concurrent sentencing to avoid multiple punishments.49 Thus, two

sentences, though concurrent, have been authorized by the

legislature in this situation, and thus would not violate double

jeopardy. The significance of this analysis should be obvious: it

is not the subsequent prosecution that is affected, but the

subsequent sentence that may be pronounced and the manner in which

such sentence may be imposed, assuming that the permitted

subsequent prosecution produces a conviction.

48
992 F.2d at 441 n.3. Again, it is the punishment or the
sentence imposed for the cocaine offense, not the prosecution for
that offense, that implicates double jeopardy concerns. If
multiple punishments are impermissible, we foreclose a
prosecution for the cocaine offense not because the prosecution
would violate double jeopardy, but because it would be a waste of
judicial resources to proceed to the sentencing stage only to
have imposition of a sentence barred by double jeopardy.
49
992 F.2d at 441 n.3.

23
 C. Sentencing for the Cocaine Offense

Witte argues that the drafters of §5G1.3(b) could not have

foreseen the circumstances of this case: a 5K1.1 motion in the

first prosecution that will not pass to the second prosecution.

Witte insists that it is unfair to allow the governmentSQwhich

received substantial assistance from a defendant in its initial

prosecution of that defendantSQto seek imposition of a longer,

though concurrent, second sentence. In effect, Witte is asking

this court to adopt a per se rule that the second sentence imposed

cannot exceed the first if the first resulted from a §5K1.1 motion,

i.e., to "pass" the effect of a 5K1.1 motion from one sentencing

proceeding for one offense of conviction to a subsequent sentencing

proceeding for another offense of conviction. But Witte's

otherwise appealing argument ignores an important aspect of the

substantial assistance that he gave: It related only to the

marijuana offense, not the cocaine offense. Significantly, Witte's

argument also ignores application note 2 to §5G1.3(b) and the

background to this section, which makes clear that §5G1.3(b) is

intended to result in the appropriate incremental punishment that

most nearly approximates the sentence that would have been imposed

had both sentences been imposed at the same time.50 This is

accomplished both by (1) imposition of a concurrent sentence, and

(2) giving credit for time served.

If Witte is ultimately convicted of the cocaine offense, the

base offense level will necessarily be the same as that for the

50
U.S.S.G. §5G1.3, comment. (n.2, backg'd.).

24
marijuana offense because relevant conduct is the same for both the

marijuana and cocaine offenses. Even so, there may be still be

adjustments to the base offense level. For example, that level

could be increased for an aggravating role or decreased for

acceptance of responsibility.51 For illustrative purposes, we

assume that the offense level will again be 40, and that the

Guideline range will be 292-365 months.52 The sentencing court will

then have to determine the appropriate total punishment for both

offenses. For purposes of this illustration, we choose 292 months

as the appropriate total punishment. Witte must then receive

credit for time served. If, for example, Witte shall have served

30 months for the marijuana offense by the time of the second

sentencing, the sentencing court must credit Witte with 30 months

served, and impose a sentence of 262 months (292 minus 30) to run

concurrently with the remainder of Witte's sentence for the

marijuana offense. As the commentary to §5G1.3(b) emphasizes, the

262-month sentence is not a departure from the Guidelines, but

reflects a credit for Guidelines purposes for time that Witte has

served. Under 5G1.3(b), then, Congress allows "double punishment"

for the cocaine offense but ameliorates its harsh impact and

prevents punishment from exceeding the statutory maximum by causing

sentences for both the marijuana and cocaine offenses to run

concurrently and by giving credit for time served.

51
See U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(b), comment. (n.2).
52
The sentencing court could even depart from the applicable
Guideline range in response to a §5K1.1 motion.

25
 We turn now to the alternative basis urged by Witte for

dismissal of the indictment.

2. Breach of Plea Agreement

Witte claims that the government breached the plea agreement

by "re-indicting" the "same conspiracy." Again, as part of the

plea agreement for the marijuana offense, the government dismissed

the first count against Witte, conspiring to possess with intent to

distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana from January 25,

1991 to February 8, 1991.

A. Standard of Review

Whether the government has violated the terms of the plea

agreement is a question of law, which on appeal is reviewed de

novo.53

B. No Breach

In determining whether the government has breached a plea

agreement, the court must determine "whether the government's

conduct is consistent with the defendant's reasonable understanding

of the agreement."54 The defendant must prove the underlying facts

that establish a breach by a preponderance of the evidence.55

During the sentencing hearing, Witte expressed a belief that

he would be immune from prosecution in other cases. But Witte's

53
United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 760 (5th Cir.
1993).
54
Valencia, 985 F.2d at 761 (citing United States v.
Huddleston, 929 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1991)).
55
United States v. Hernandez, 996 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir.
1993).

26
counsel immediately contradicted Witte's statement. Additionally,

his counsel asked the court not to include the cocaine because it

would deprive Witte of the opportunity to plead not guilty and go

to trial on that offense, notSQas Witte contendsSQso that he could

argue "breach of the plea agreement." Witte was expressly informed

by the court that the government wanted to indict him later on the

cocaine offense, and Witte expressed his understanding of this

advice. Finally, Witte's substantial assistance did not relate to

the cocaine offense, but only to the marijuana offense. Thus even

if Witte somehow subjectively clung to the belief that he could not

be prosecuted for the cocaine offense, that is not a reasonable

understanding of the plea agreement. The government has not

breached that agreement.

Witte nevertheless contends that the government's present

indictment charges him with the count that was dismissed pursuant

to the plea agreement. We disagree. This indictment charges Witte

with conspiring and attempting to import 1,091 kilograms of cocaine

between August 1989 and August 1990. The government dismissed a

count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess

of 100 kilos of marijuana from January 25, 1991 through February 8,

1991. Witte argues, though, that the same conspiracy underlies

both counts, and that the government is bound under either of two

doctrinesSQ(1) the law of the case, or (2) collateral estoppelSQby

a "same conspiracy" finding by the sentencing court. Witte

premises his argument on the novel idea that the sentencing court's

"same course of conduct" finding constitutes a "same conspiracy"

27
finding. This argument is unavailing.

A same conspiracy finding may be necessary to include the acts

and omissions of others as relevant conduct, but it is not

necessary to include Witte's own acts in relevant conduct.56 The

PSR Addendum refers to Witte's "agreement" (i.e., conspiracy), but

the district court never specifically stated that he adopted the

PSR or that specific finding. The only express finding by the

sentencing court on this issue is that the relevant conduct spelled

out in the PSR was "relevant conduct related to the charge to which

he pleaded guilty." Neither did the sentencing court find that the

cocaine and marijuana offenses were part of the "same conspiracy"

count that was dismissed.

Even if on dismissing the indictment the district court had

found that the marijuana and cocaine offenses were part of the same

conspiracy, we would review such a finding for clear error only.

Under the facts of this case, it is obvious that two distinct

conspiracies were involved: they were separated by time; they

involved different co-conspirators; they involved different

statutory offenses; they included different overt acts in each

offense charged; and they occurred in different geographical

locations.57 Witte clearly has not been indicted for the same

56
U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
57
United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir.
1978). In his brief, Witte demonstrates that the Guatemala
cocaine and Mexico marijuana deals were part of the same
conspiracy. Witte's comparison is inapposite: the relevant
inquiry is whether both foreign deals (the cocaine offenses) were
part of the same conspiracy as the deal that occurred in the
United States (the marijuana offenses).

28
conspiracy count that was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

III

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court

improperly dismissed the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.

Neither may the court's dismissal of the indictment be sustained on

grounds that the government breached the plea agreement. The

dismissal of the indictment is therefore REVERSED and the case

REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

29