NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 19 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSA MELIDA PINEDA-MONROY, No. 15-73527
Petitioner, Agency No. A206-783-615
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 12, 2022**
Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Rosa Melida Pineda-Monroy, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing
her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social
distinction. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We
review de novo questions of law, including whether a particular social group is
cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation
of the governing statutes and regulations. Id. We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Pineda-
Monroy failed to establish her proposed social group is socially distinct. See id. at
1243 (petitioner’s proposed social group was not cognizable because of the
absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus, the BIA did not
err in concluding that Pineda-Monroy did not establish membership in a cognizable
particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016)
(in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant
must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
237 (BIA 2014))).
The BIA did not err in declining to consider Pineda-Monroy’s arguments
regarding imputed political opinion and the proposed particular social groups of
“former business owners” and “witness against gang members who robbed and
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beat her” that were raised for the first time to the BIA. See Honcharov v. Barr,
924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (BIA did not err in declining to consider
argument raised for the first time on appeal). We do not consider these claims
because the BIA did not decide the issues. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657
F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (review limited to the grounds relied on by the BIA).
Thus, Pineda-Monroy’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Pineda-Monroy failed to show it is more likely than not she would be tortured by
or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador.
See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner
did not establish the necessary “state action” for CAT relief).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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