delivered the opinion of the Court:
The matter first assigned as error is, “ that the court below permitted the plaintiffs to enter, or enroll, or re-instate the judgment previously rendered in the case, without any authority in law, and without any notice to the defendant.” This assignment is contradicted by the record, which shows affirmatively that the assignment was regularly recorded at the time when it was given, instead of the entry, enrolment, or re-instating of a judgment previously pronounced, and therefore it presents no question to be decided by this court.
The second and only remaining assignment of error, is general, that judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs, whereas, by the law, it should have been for the defendants. The defendant insists, that by the statute regulating the practice in the Supreme Court, in cases brought before it by appeal or writ of error, and (he rule of practice adopted by it, such general assignment is not authorized; and that the court should not therefore examine the record, for the purpose of discovering and correcting the errors which may exist therein; and this, we have no doubt, is the better practice, although it has never been expressly ruled or implicitly observed by the court. There certainly would not be any very great hardship in the rule requiring the appellant or plaintiff in error to specify, and set out particularly, the errors whereby he thinks himself aggrieved, by which the court would be relieved from the labor of investigating the whole record, to ascertain whether any error to his prejudice exists in it. Yet, in the present case, we do not deem it necessary to make the rule imperative, or rigidly observe its injunctions, as the result would not be changed by it; and therefore we purposely avoid expressing any opinion as to the legal consequences of such general assignment of errors, and will proceed to consider the point mentioned in the briefs, and presented by the record, which is simply this: “that the court erred in refusing to dismiss the suit, on the motion of the plaintiffs in error, for insufficiency of the' bond for costs.” This motion could only have been predicated on the ground, that Dudley was a non-resident of this state, when the suit was instituted; because, if the fact was otherwise, 'there was no necessity for his filing such bond prior to the commencement thereof, or indeed at any time, unless ruled to give security for the costs of suit; and no such rule appears to have been made in this case, and, therefore, we must regard the motion to dismiss, as based upon the fact of the non-residence, and his failure to give a sufficient bond and security for the costs of suit, before it was instituted, which, under the provisions of the Revised Statutes ©f this state, (which were in force, and furnished the rule of decision when this motion was made), would, if admitted or established by competent legal proof, have been a sufficient ground to dismiss the suit, of which the plaintiffs in error could have availed themselves on motion. But they held the affirmative of the proposition, and the law cast upon them the burthen of proving, first, that Dudley was a nonresident of the state when he instituted the suit; and secondly, that he had failed to give sufficient security for the costs of suit, prior to the institution thereof, as required by the statute; and their failure to establish either, would he a sufficient ground upon which to justify the decision of the court overruling the motion; hut no question as to the sufficiency of the security given could legitimately arise, until the fact of Dudley’s non-residence was established, which could only be done by his own admission, or some other competent legal testimony. And although this fact may have been, and probably was, admitted or proved upon the hearing of the motion in the court belów, yet, however the fact may have been, we are left wholly to conjecture, for the record as to that is entirely silent; and in support of this judgment, we are bound by law to presume, that it was neither admitted or proved; and if the fact was otherwise, the plaintiffs in error could, by bill of exceptions, or otherwise, have caused it to be made a part of the record, and thereby enabled this court to revise and correct the decision of the Circuit Court, if it was erroneously given to their prejudice. But this being admitted, they have thereby subjected their case to the full operation and influence of the legal presumption in favor of the judgment against them, as well as the rule which requires of every party demanding the correction of errors, or the revision and reversal of a judgment, to prove affirmatively, by the record itself, the existence of some error by which his rights are prejudiced. The principles, and the reasons, and authority, upon which they have been established and affirmed, have, on several occasions, been discussed, examined, stated, approved, and enforced, by this court, and their application to this case appears to us manifest and conclusive upon the question. For the fact of Dudley’s non-residence is no where stated in the record, or even mentioned or recited in the. bond for costs, transcribed with it. There is nothing, therefore, in the record, which even conduced to prove the fact or raise the presumption that he was a non-resident of this state when the suit was commenced. Consequently, there does not appear to have been any necessity for a bond and security for costs, and of course no question as to the sufficiency of bond for costs, if one was actually made and on file, could have legitimately arisen on the motion, and any discussion thereupon, would be idle and useless; and for this reason, we refrain expressing opinion as to the sufficiency of the bond transcribed with the record, or whether it comprises any part of it, not being expressly made a part thereof by bill of exceptions or otherwise.
Whereupon, it is our opinion, that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Chicot county, given in this case, ought to be, and the same is hereby, in all things, affirmed, with costs.