IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 3, 2009
Nos. 08-10250
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
JESSE B. RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, San Angelo Division
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
JENNIFER W. ELROD, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Jesse B. Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea
to counts one and two of a three-count indictment charging him with conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of
marijuana and possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of
marijuana. Rodriguez reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence seized in the traffic stop that led to his arrest. The district
court sentenced Rodriguez to two concurrent terms of 262 months’
imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised release, on each of the two
counts. He now appeals the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Jesse B. Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea on two counts: (1)
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or
more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and (2) possession with intent
to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(C). In his plea agreement, Rodriguez reserved the right
to appeal the district court’s oral order denying his motion to suppress the
evidence seized in the stop and search of a vehicle he was driving. Rodriguez
filed a notice of appeal pro se without his counsel’s knowledge, and his counsel
filed another notice of appeal the following day. We consolidated the appeals for
purposes of argument and we now consolidate them for disposition. See Fed. R.
App. P. 3(b)(2).
Agents Cody R. Hardin and Telefonso Coronado of the United States
Border Patrol (USBP) testified at the suppression hearing, and their reports
from the investigation were admitted into evidence. The district court did not
specify which evidence it was relying on when it ruled on Rodriguez’s
suppression motion. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, as the prevailing party in the district court.1
A. Agent Hardin’s Account
Agent Hardin advised that at approximately 6:45 am on September 27,
2007, he observed a dark maroon Chevrolet SUV (Chevy SUV) heading north on
Highway 1024. Highway 1024 is in a very remote, rural area. Hardin lived in
the area and was familiar with the traffic. He did not recognize the Chevy SUV
as being local traffic, and “knew it to be of the type commonly used to smuggle
aliens.” Hardin declined to follow the vehicle, however, deciding to assist a
1
United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001).
2
disabled school van instead. He reported to work at the Comstock, Texas USBP
station. Around 9 a.m., he received a tip from a local rancher who was also
familiar with traffic on Highway 1024. The rancher informed Hardin that he
had observed a maroon vehicle, perhaps a Chevrolet Suburban, traveling north
and south on Highway 1024, and that the rancher suspected the vehicle to be
involved in illegal activity. Hardin stated that the rancher’s “description
matched exactly with the description of the vehicle I [Hardin] had observed
earlier.” Hardin and his supervisor drove up and down Highway 1024 searching
for the Chevy SUV but did not find it. At approximately 9:45 a.m., another
agent discovered footprints of roughly four suspected illegal aliens crossing the
drag road 2 bordering Highway 90 west of Comstock. Hardin assisted that agent
in tracking the suspected aliens, and informed his supervisor that the Chevy
SUV he had spotted had probably picked up the individuals in question.
At this time, Hardin first reported seeing a “small silver colored Ford
sedan ahead of me [Hardin] traveling north on Highway 1024.” Hardin noted,
with respect to the sedan: “There were two occupants . . . . I did not recognize
this vehicle as being ‘local traffic,’ and mentally noted that there seemed to be
a great deal of unusual traffic today.” Hardin continued searching for the Chevy
SUV, and next observed it traveling south on Highway 1024 past his location;
he immediately followed it. He observed as the Chevy SUV stopped abruptly on
the highway; three individuals ran from the brush towards the Chevy SUV and
entered it; and then it sped off southward.
Hardin relayed his observations to other USBP agents, and another agent
who was driving a marked patrol unit (Hardin’s was unmarked) stopped it. The
2
A drag road, created by USBP by churning up dirt with tractor tires, is
designed to preserve the footprints of suspected aliens for tracking purposes.
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driver of the Chevy SUV was identified as Juan Goitia, a U.S. citizen; the three
other occupants were Mexican nationals who were in the United States illegally.
The fact that the individuals lacked food, water, or extra clothes, and that some
had scratch-marks and chafed skin on their shoulders, led the agents to believe
that they were involved in drug-smuggling. Hardin reported that Goitia
admitted to USBP Agent Bud Kimzey that Goitia and the aliens with whom he
was traveling had loaded the drugs into a gray or silver Ford Tempo. Goitia’s
wallet contained a piece of paper identifying a car. The slip of paper contained
what appeared to be a car’s Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), the words “‘92
Ford Tempo” and “4D” (shorthand perhaps for “four doors”), and what appeared
to be two license plate numbers.
Although Rodriguez was driving a silver or gray four-door Ford Tempo
when he was stopped, it was not the Ford Tempo identified on the slip of paper;
Rodriguez’s Tempo contained a completely different VIN number and license
plate, and was a 1991 model. Hardin attempted to explain this inconsistency at
the suppression hearing. He testified that he had asked Goitia whether the
vehicle identified on the piece of paper was the load vehicle for the drugs. Goitia
had responded that it was not, but that it was in fact a second gray Ford Tempo.
Hardin stated he had “f[ou]nd it hard to believe that we’re—we saw a gray Ford
Tempo traveling north on 1024 earlier and that that’s the load vehicle, and now
you [Goitia] have the vehicle’s VIN number and license plates in your wallet.”
He further stated that he “didn’t believe him [Goitia] at the time” he was
questioning him. Hardin stated, however, that Goitia “swore to me . . . that this
is a different Ford Tempo. He said, it looks just the same.”
Hardin stated that he was informed (he did not say by whom) that one of
the aliens in custody had confessed his involvement in narcotics trafficking to
Kimzey, and that “the contraband had already been loaded into a little grey Ford
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car.” Hardin reported that “[t]his description matched the vehicle I had observed
traveling north on 1024 earlier.” Based on the fact that the driver of the Chevy
SUV had a San Angelo, Texas address, and that the direction of travel might
have been towards San Angelo,3 Hardin concluded that the Ford’s likely
destination was San Angelo. Hardin relayed this information to San Angelo
USBP agents and to a local sheriff’s office in the form of a “be-on-the-lookout”
alert, or BOLO. Hardin testified that the BOLO was for a “little gray or silver
four-door Ford Tempo with two occupants in it. Driver has on a straw hat,
heading north.” It is unclear from the record whether the BOLO also contained
the inconsistent information from the slip of paper regarding a Ford Tempo with
a different VIN number, license plate, and model year.
B. Agent Coronado’s Account
Coronado advised that the “local traffic pattern” for Highway 163, one of
the highways where the agents spotted the Ford Tempo, was “basically oil-field
workers, ranchers, and semi-trucks.” He added that it was a good route for
smuggling aliens and narcotics because there is very little law enforcement in
the area, and no immigration checkpoints. He further stated that smugglers
would commonly switch from Highway 1024 to Highway 163 to continue their
smuggling.
Coronado stated that he had received a BOLO for an “older model,”
“four-door gray Ford Tempo” with two Hispanic male occupants, likely headed
to San Angelo and containing marijuana. Based on the BOLO, he believed the
car would be traveling on Highway 163 and then 67 towards San Angelo.
Coronado stated that the Tempo was not the type of vehicle he typically saw in
3
Hardin’s report suggests the Tempo was headed towards San Angelo, but is not
completely clear on the point.
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the traffic he observed on Highway 163.
Coronado further stated that the “grey Ford Tempo observed by Agent
Hardin traveling north on Highway 1024, just before the [Chevy SUV] was
observed traveling south, was suspected as the possible load vehicle, which
contained the contraband. Comstock [USBP] Agents relayed this information
to the San Angelo Agents who conducted surveillance on road commonly used for
alien/narcotics smuggling north from the Comstock region.” Coronado specified
that “just being a gray or silver Ford would not [in itself] make a vehicle unique
or distinctive.”
At about 2:30 p.m. that day, Coronado observed a grey 1991 Ford Tempo
northbound at Highway 163 and Highway 190. (It was subsequently determined
that Rodriguez was the driver of that Tempo.) Coronado advised that the
Tempo’s occupants looked at Coronado as they passed his vehicle, an unmarked
Ford pickup. After looking at Coronado, the Tempo passenger turned to the
driver, then slouched in his seat. Coronado stated that the driver of the Tempo
was nervous at his presence (though his vehicle was unmarked, Coronado was
in a uniform and Coronado stated he would have been visible from the Tempo).
As Coronado pulled in behind the Tempo to run its plates, the vehicle sped
up. When Coronado closed the distance on the Tempo, the Tempo moved over
to the shoulder of the road and slowed down. The Tempo remained at a slow
speed on the shoulder for several miles (Coronado ran the license plate before
the Tempo moved to the shoulder). The driver was looking in his rearview mirror
frequently. He swerved over the yellow dividing line in the road several times;
Coronado believed that was because he was looking backward rather than
forward. Coronado called for backup because he was in an unmarked sensor
pickup with no emergency equipment.
The record check of the Tempo’s license plate reflected that the vehicle was
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owned by a Betty A. Munoz of San Angelo, Texas. Coronado found that
suspicious because both occupants of the Tempo were males and the owner was
a woman; in his experience, education, and training, it was common for drug
traffickers to use vehicles registered in other people’s names. Coronado followed
the Tempo northbound on Highway 163 until it turned northeast on Highway
67. The Tempo abruptly turned into a convenience store and parked. The driver
entered the store and returned two or three minutes later; the passenger never
exited the vehicle. The Tempo then backed out of the parking lot and pulled onto
Highway 67. The two male occupants appeared to be visibly nervous and would
not make eye contact with Coronado. Coronado followed the Tempo for about 50
miles in total.
During this time, Coronado was in radio contact with other USBP agents
in the area, specifically Agent Corey Hodges, who was in San Angelo traveling
on Highway 67 towards Coronado. Coronado requested assistance from Hodges
in stopping the Tempo because Hodges was in a marked unit and had emergency
lights. The Tempo continued northeast on Highway 67 until it passed Agent
Hodges’ location five miles southwest of Mertzon, Texas. Coronado stated that,
on the basis of what he had observed and what Hardin had relayed, Coronado
and Hodges initiated a traffic stop of the Tempo. The Tempo continued to travel
slowly for a mile or a mile and a half after Hodges turned on his emergency
lights before it stopped. On the basis of his experience, education, and training,
Coronado stated he believed that the occupants of the Tempo had been “getting
ready to bail out of the vehicle or looking for a side road to take.” Upon his
approach to the Tempo’s driver’s-side door, Hodges observed a large bundle of
what he believed to be marijuana on the rear floorboard behind the passenger
seat. Rodriguez was placed under arrest and handcuffed, and Coronado read
him his Miranda rights. Rodriguez then consented to a search of the vehicle,
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which yielded 176.5 pounds of marijuana. Only the legality of the stop is at
issue here; Rodriguez does not challenge the validity of his consent.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence according to a
bifurcated standard: we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of
law de novo. United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1994). “A
factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the
record as a whole. Further, the evidence presented at a pre-trial hearing on a
motion to suppress is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations,
quotation marks, and punctuation omitted). The district court’s overall finding
that reasonable suspicion existed for the stop is a conclusion of law that we
review de novo. Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 721.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Reasonable Suspicion Standard
Temporary, warrantless detentions of individuals constitute seizures for
Fourth Amendment purposes and must be justified by reasonable suspicion that
illegal activity has or is taking place; otherwise, evidence obtained through such
a detention may be excluded. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “[I]n justifying
the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21; see Jacquinot, 258 F.3d at 427.
Reasonable suspicion “requires more than merely an unparticularized hunch,
but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence.” United States v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1999). Courts
determine whether the stop was reasonable by conducting a fact-intensive,
totality-of-the circumstances inquiry. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d at 427. A “divide-and-
8
conquer” approach to this analysis is not permitted. United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (finding that “[a]lthough each of the series of acts was
‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ we held [in Terry] that, taken together, they
‘warranted further investigation.’”).
Factors that may be considered in an analysis of reasonable suspicion
include:
(1) proximity to the border; (2) characteristics of the area; (3) usual
traffic patterns; (4) agent’s previous experience in detecting illegal
activity; (5) behavior of the driver; (6) particular aspects or
characteristics of the vehicle; (7) information about recent illegal
trafficking in aliens or narcotics in the area; and (8) the number,
appearance, and behavior of the passengers.
Jacquinot, 258 F.3d at 427. No single factor is dispositive, and each case must
be examined based on the totality of the circumstances known to the agents at
the time of the stop and their experience in evaluating such circumstances.
United States v. Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
B. Reasonable Suspicion Analysis
As stated above, the only issue in this case is whether the agents had
reasonable suspicion for the stop. Rodriguez contends that five aspects of the
exchange among the agents belie the district court’s finding of reasonable
suspicion. These are:
1. The “relatively nonspecific” nature of the BOLO report made
by Hardin and relied upon by Coronado;
2. The long period of time between when Hardin first saw the
Ford Tempo and when Coronado began to follow it, given the
short physical distance;
3. The observation that Rodriguez’s passenger crouched in his
seat and that Rodriguez failed to look at Coronado;
4. The observation that Rodriguez glanced frequently in his
rearview mirror and drifted from his lane of traffic, including
moving over to the shoulder and slowing down; and
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5. The observation that Rodriguez “abruptly” pulled into a
convenience store after being followed.
In response, the Government claims that eleven “facts and reasonable
inferences supported the investigatory stop.” These are:
1. The agents’ extensive experience and training;
2. The agents’ extensive experience patrolling the relevant areas;
3. The status of the routes involved as known narcotics
smuggling routes;
4. The prior apprehensions of narcotics smugglers on Highway
1024;
5. That Rodriguez’s vehicle did not fit the usual traffic patterns;
6. That the agents did not recognize Rodriguez as a local
resident;
7. That Rodriguez’s vehicle was initially encountered less than
10 miles from the border;
8. That the front seat passenger moved back in his seat and
crouched down upon spotting law enforcement;
9. That Rodriguez was traveling well below the posted speed
limit;
10. That Rodriguez continuously looked in his rear-view mirror
and swerved over the yellow highway dividing line; and
11. That the agents received specific information about
Rodriguez’s illegal activities, which was corroborated by eight
different aspects of the agents’ interaction with Rodriguez and
the occupants of the Chevy SUV.
Rodriguez’s claims will be assessed in turn.
1. The BOLO Report
“[A]n alert or BOLO report may provide the reasonable suspicion
necessary to justify an investigatory stop.” Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672.
Whether a particular tip or BOLO report provides a sufficient basis
for an investigatory stop may depend upon [1] the credibility and
reliability of the informant, [2] the specificity of the information
contained in the tip or report, [3] the extent to which the
information in the tip or report can be verified by officers in the
field, and [4] whether the tip or report concerns active or recent
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activity, or has instead gone stale.
Id. (“Gonzalez factors”). Rodriguez claims the BOLO report was not specific
enough to support the stop and argues that it failed to specify the vehicle’s
license plate number, state of registration, and other distinguishing information.
Review of this mixed question of law and fact is de novo.
As noted above, it is not clear whether the BOLO did contain a license
plate number, albeit one that did not match Rodriguez’s car. More importantly,
the Fourth Amendment does not require that a BOLO specifically include a
vehicle’s license plate number or registration information. The BOLO contained
a great deal of detail, even though it was brief. The BOLO’s identification of a
car by its make, model, body style, and by the number, ethnicity, sex, and attire
of its occupants, on such a sparsely traveled road, might have been sufficient in
itself to support a stop. But Rodriguez fails to acknowledge that the agents did
not stop the Ford Tempo solely as a result of the BOLO alert. In fact, Coronado
followed Rodriguez’s Tempo for approximately 50 miles before directing Hodges
to pull it over. Although he was alerted to Rodriguez’s car by the BOLO,
Coronado also articulated other specific facts and rational inferences from those
facts, detailed supra, that supported the stop. See Jacquinot, 358 F.3d at 427.
In addition, the first, third, and fourth Gonzalez factors, unchallenged by
Rodriguez, all favor the Government, even if the stop were understood to have
resulted from the BOLO alert alone. First, the “informant” was Goitia, the
person who confessed to being involved in narcotics trafficking with Rodriguez.
The slip of paper in Goitia’s wallet contained information on a similar car, but
the fact that the license plates on that slip of paper did not match Rodriguez’s
is not dispositive; as Goitia explained to the agents, the plates on the slip of
paper belonged to a different Ford Tempo that the ring was also using for
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smuggling. Even if Hardin also relayed the inconsistent information from the
slip of paper, the fact that Rodriguez’s car matched a lesser quantum of the
information would not in itself vitiate the BOLO on these facts. We emphasize
that we do not reach the question whether this BOLO itself would have been
sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for the stop.
The third and fourth Gonzalez factors clearly favor the Government: the
tip was in fact verified to a significant extent by officers in the field, who
observed the suspicious behavior of Rodriguez’s car as they followed it for over
50 miles, and the report concerned not merely “recent” but in fact
contemporaneous activity: ongoing drug-smuggling.
2. The Long Period of Time between when Hardin First Saw the Ford
Tempo and when Coronado Began to Follow it
Rodriguez next contends that the three and one half hours he claims
passed between when Hardin first saw the Ford Tempo and when Coronado first
spotted it was much longer than the period of time it would have taken to drive
the distance between these two points, which he maintains are 95 miles apart.
He contends “the passage of time increases the probability that the suspicious
vehicle followed a different route from that staked out by Agent Coronado or that
the vehicle had already passed by the intersection he was observing.”
The mere passage of time does not advance Rodriguez’s argument much,
however. There are many plausible reasons why Rodriguez might have ended
up in the place where Coronado spotted him at that time rather than earlier.
More importantly, review of this factual determination is for clear error, and
Rodriguez has failed to make out this claim with any specificity, beyond noting
the fact that Interstate Highway 10, an “acknowledged drug trafficking
corridor,” and another town (Ozona, Texas) were interposed between the two
agents’ locations. Perhaps that merely meant that Rodriguez stopped in Ozona
12
for lunch. It is irrelevant. He has cited no cases for what is, at bottom, his claim
that the district court clearly erred in finding that his taking slightly longer to
travel between points A and B than he would have had he been traveling non-
stop at the speed limit undermined the reasonableness of the stop. To call the
district court’s finding on this point “clear error” would be to deprive that term
of all meaning.
3. The Body Language of Rodriguez and His Passenger
Rodriguez next complains that the district court inappropriately
considered the body-language response of Rodriguez and his passenger to the
agents. Coronado noted, as does the Government in its brief, that Rodriguez’s
passenger crouched down in his seat after looking at Coronado, and that
Rodriguez failed to look at him when he was stopped in Barnhart, Texas.
Where, as here, the appellant challenges the visual impressions and factual
inferences of a law enforcement officer, the question is probably one of fact
reviewable for clear error rather than one of law reviewed de novo, but the two
frameworks yield the same result.
Rodriguez is correct that a suspect’s failure to look at an officer adds little,
if anything, to the reasonableness analysis. See United States v. Moreno-
Chaparro, 180 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[w]e are persuaded
that in the ordinary case, whether a driver looks at an officer or fails to look at
an officer, taken alone or in combination with other factors, should be accorded
little weight.”). In its brief, the Government does not argue otherwise: the
“failure-to-look” observation is not one of its asserted grounds of reasonable
suspicion on appeal, although it may have been considered by the trial judge.
It is unclear whether “crouching down,” the Government’s eighth asserted
ground of reasonable suspicion, should be treated differently; if it is an effort to
evade the eye of the law enforcement officer, it is conceivable that it could be.
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But both these sub-claims are non-issues. The agents did not place much weight
on them in the suppression hearing (especially the “failure-to-look” claim), and
Rodriguez has provided no authority to the effect that agents are forbidden from
considering them altogether (indeed, no such authority exists). Accordingly, this
claim does not weaken the reasonable suspicion the Government claims
supported the stop.
4. Rodriguez’s Driving Behavior
Rodriguez’s fourth challenge to the reasonableness of the stop centers on
the weight the agents accorded his glancing frequently in the rearview mirror,
crossing the yellow line in the road, and moving over to the shoulder and slowing
down. This addresses the tenth ground the Government claims supported
reasonable suspicion. The single case Rodriguez cites in support of this claim,
United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998), bolsters it only superficially.
One question in Jones was whether looking at a law enforcement officer in the
rearview mirror and drifting off the road as a consequence could support a
finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 370–71. However, in that case, the officer
was tailgating the suspect; the court thus found that “when the officer’s actions
are such that any driver, whether innocent or guilty, would be preoccupied with
his presence, then any inference that might be drawn from the driver’s behavior
is destroyed.” Id. at 370. There is no allegation that any of the agents tailgated
Rodriguez or otherwise caused him to drive in the erratic manner in which he
was alleged to have driven. Therefore, Coronado’s inferences based on
Rodriguez’s frequent glancing in his rearview mirror and swerving are not
“destroyed.” They were properly part of the totality of the circumstances that led
to the stop. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273) (“divide-and-conquer” strategy not valid
against Terry totality-of-the-circumstances test). This is true under both the
clear error and de novo standards of review.
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5. Rodriguez’s “Abruptly” Pulling into a Convenience Store
Rodriguez’s final claim is that his decision to stop at a convenience store
in Barnhart, Texas “after he had been followed for approximately twenty miles
by a vehicle [driven by Coronado] that had refused to pass,” along with the fact
that Rodriguez had gone into the store for what “Agent Coronado decided was
a suspiciously short period of time,” could not “give rise to any additional
suspicious inferences.” For this proposition, and without explanation, he again
cites Jones, 149 F.3d at 369–71. The Jones court held that a number of highly
circumstantial pieces of evidence were insufficient as a basis of reasonable
suspicion. We read this citation to contend that Rodriguez’s brief stop at the
convenience store is analogous to one or all of those pieces of circumstantial
evidence. Review of this question, which goes to the totality of the
circumstances, is de novo.
In Jones, the suspect “look[ed] like a tourist, was driving northbound on
Highway 118 approximately eighty (80) miles north of the Texas-Mexico border
at 7:00 a.m., after sunrise, with his lights on in a Toyota 4 Runner with fresh
mud on it with a blue tarp over something in the rear cargo area”; the court
found that that description, even in conjunction with the SUV’s broken taillight,
was “far more consistent with [defendant] being a tourist coming from Big Bend
National Park than an alien smuggler or drug smuggler who crossed the Rio
Grande before dawn that morning.” Id. at 371.
The Government does not contend that the convenience store stop was one
of its bases for reasonable suspicion. Coronado did mention it, however, in his
report. Like many of the individual considerations the Government cites, this
fact, in isolation, would not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. In this
case, however, the Government can rely on other more probative sources of
suspicion besides the one Rodriguez attacks here. Among the sources of
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suspicion the district court could have credited were the BOLO report and
Rodriguez’s errant driving, as well as the road’s status as a recognized corridor
for narcotics and illegal alien smuggling and the agents’ own experience in anti-
smuggling operations. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that
reasonable suspicion supported the seizure, whether or not it considered
Rodriguez’s convenience store stop. Of the eight factors we mentioned in
Jacquinot, 258 F.3d at 427, in describing the totality-of-the-circumstances test
for reasonableness, only the first factor—proximity to the border—could
conceivably be of assistance to Rodriguez (the Ford Tempo appears to have been
close to the border when Hardin first saw it, but was not when it was ultimately
stopped). All the other Jacquinot factors favor a finding of reasonable suspicion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
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