(after stating the facts.) This is an appeal from a decree ordering the specific performance of a contract to sell and convey land. The'evidence is amply sufficient to support the finding of the chancellor that the plaintiff did contract to sell this land to the plaintiff, and that the lumber company, which afterwards bought the land from her, had notice of his purchase, at the time it purchased. But the contract of the plaintiff with Mrs. Cross was not in writing, and the main question in the case is whether the facts in proof are such as to take the contract out of the statute of frauds. The plaintiff paid fifty dollars on the purchase when the contract was made, and he took immediate possession of the land, and commenced to clear and improve the land. Plaintiff, it is true, was already in possession of the cleared land, as a tenant, but there was only an acre or two of this cleared land, and the plaintiff had no control of the uncleared land until his purchase. If the only possession shown had been that he continued to remain in possession of the land that he already held as tenant, that would not have been sufficient: but the evidence shows that he not only held the cleared land, but, after the purchase and in pursuance of his contract, plaintiff took possession of the uncleared land, and commenced to make improvements upon the same by clearing the same and getting it ready for cultivation. He had no authority as tenant to cut timber and clear the land, and these acts of plaintiff show that he had taken possession of the land as owner thereof. As the evidence shows that this was done under the contract of purchase, we think that this, in connection with the part payment of the price, was sufficient to take the case out of the statute, and to authorize the decree rendered by the court. Morrison v. Peay, 21 Ark. no; Pomeroy, Contracts, § 115.
By some oversight the decree of the court made no reference to the deed of Mrs. Cross to the Pearson Lumber Company, but, unless this deed is canceled, it is evident that a deed from Mrs. Cross to the plaintiff will be of no avail. As this was probably a mere oversight, the case, if plaintiff desires, may be remanded so that the decree can be corrected in that respect; but if that is done, the additional cost must be paid by the plaintiff. In other respects the decree is affirmed.