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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Aug. 28, 2008
No. 08-10404 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-20308-CR-JEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SANTOS DOMINGO CASTILLO-ROMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 28, 2008)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Santos Domingo Castillo-Roman appeals his sentences of 21 months’
imprisonment imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of making false
statements in an application for a passport with the intent to secure the issuance of
a passport for his own use, 18 U.S.C. § 1542, and one count of making a false
representation of United States citizenship by presenting a fraudulently-obtained
passport as proof of identity, 18 U.S.C. § 911.1
In the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the probation officer
calculated the adjusted offense level to be 10, and Castillo-Roman’s criminal
history category to be IV based on several prior convictions for conspiracy, a
controlled substance offense, and money laundering. This category did not,
however, take into consideration Castillo-Roman’s prior convictions for armed
robbery, murder, and attempted robbery, all of which occurred more than fifteen
years before the instant offenses. The PSI also noted that Castillo-Roman was
currently imprisoned following a racketeering conviction. The resulting guidelines
range was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment.
At sentencing, there were no objections to the PSI. The government
recommended a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range in light of Castillo-
Roman’s criminal history, and Castillo-Roman requested the low end of the
guidelines range. After considering the parties’s arguments, the advisory
guidelines range, and the sentencing factors, the court sentenced Castillo-Roman to
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Castillo-Roman was also charged with aggravated identity theft. This count was
dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
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21 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to the term Castillo-Roman was
already serving on racketeering charges.
On appeal, Castillo-Roman argues that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable because the district court improperly focused on Castillo-Roman’s
criminal history, while ignoring the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, and failed to give an explanation for the sentence, which was
higher than that requested by the government and Castillo-Roman. Castillo-
Roman also argues that the 21-month sentence was substantively unreasonable
because it was “greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of sentencing
set forth in § 3553(a)(2).
We review a final sentence imposed by a district court for reasonableness.
United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2007). The reasonableness
of a final sentence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Williams, 526 F.3d1 312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district court must
impose a sentence that is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United
States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1182 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court has explained that a sentence may be procedurally
unreasonable if the district court improperly calculates the guideline range, treats
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the guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors,
bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain its
reasoning. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. The Court also suggested that review for
substantive reasonableness involves an inquiry into whether the factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) support the challenged sentence. See id. at 600; United States v.
Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). We will remand if we are “left with
the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Pugh,
515 F.3d at 1191 (citations omitted).
Pursuant to § 3553(a), the sentencing court shall impose a sentence
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of
sentencing listed in § 3553(a)(2), namely, to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
conduct, protect the public from future criminal conduct by the defendant, and
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical
care. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The sentencing court must also consider the
following factors in determining a particular sentence: the nature of the
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,
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the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
“[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the
defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient.” United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court is not
required to explicitly state that it has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors. See
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). The burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
§ 3553(a) factors lies with the party challenging the sentence. See Talley, 431 F.3d
at 788.
After a thorough review of the record, we find no reversible error. The
district court properly considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), along
with the mitigating factors presented by Castillo-Roman, adequately explained the
chosen sentence, and imposed a sentence no greater than necessary to comply with
the purposes of sentencing in § 3553(a)(2). Thus, we conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Castillo-Roman. Accordingly, the sentence is
reasonable and due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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