(after stating the facts). 1. It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellants that the act of February 13, 1899, under which the proceedings complained of were instituted, is unconstitutional. No useful purpose can be served either by discussing the reasons given by learned counsel in support of their contention, or in reviewing the authorities cited by them; for this court has heretofore deliberately decided that that part of the act which makes it the duty of certain officers to issue a warrant for the seizure and destruction of intoxicating liquors when, after notice to and hearing of claimants, it shall be established that the liquors seized were illegally kept for sale, is not unconstitutional. Ferguson v. Josey, 70 Ark. 94; Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171; Osborne v. State, 77 Ark. 439.
2. Counsel for appellants also insist that the license issued to the appellants were properly granted. The record shows that the old public school house, -mentioned as the center of the circular area of the prohibitory order of 1905, and the new public school house, named as the center of the prohibitory order of 1908, are only a quarter of a mile distant from each other. Therefore, counsel argue that, because the areas embraced in the two prohibitory orders overlap each other, the order made in 1908 was of no effect, and that, the order of 1905 having been revoked, the county-court properly granted to appellants licenses for the sale of liquor. We can not agree with their contention.
In the cases of Robinson v. State. 38 Ark. 641, and Edgar v. State, 45 Ark. 356, this court held that the retailing of spirituous liquors is not a natural right, and that persons engaging in it must submit to such terms, regulations, and burdens as the Legislature may impose for the public good.
Sec. 5129 of Kirby’s Digest provides in effect that the adult inhabitants residing within three miles of any school house, by complying with the terms imposed by the act, may put in force the statute that prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors'within three miles of. such school house. Thus it will be seen that the act contemplates that the whole State may be covered by orders putting in force the three-mile statute. Manifestly, this could not be done unless the circular areas could overlap each other. There is nothing in the opinion in the case of Williams v. Citizens, 40 Ark. 290, that contravenes this construction of the statute. It was held in that case that it was a statutory proceeding, and that it could not be extended beyond its prescribed limits. The opinion,' in effect, holds that it was the legislative intent, as plainly expressed by the terms of the act, to prohibit the sale of liquor within a territory covered by radii extending in all directions three miles from a center marked by a school house or other institution of learning, or by a church house; and that the designation of two points as centers in the same order could not be done because it would either lessen or make greater the area.
The object of the statute, as plainly expressed by its terms, was to prohibit the liquor traffic within certain defined areas in any part of the State. It was the evident intention of the Legislature to make the act applicable to all parts of the State alike. Obviously, the act could not be put in force in all parts of the State if the circular areas could not overlap each other. The revoking of one prohibitory order by the county court in compliance with the petition of a majority of the adult inhabitants residing within the limits of that territory does not revoke a separate prohibitory order which puts in force the statute in a part of the territory embraced in the former. In other words, an order of the court revoking a prohibitory order only means that the particular prohibitory order annulled no longer puts in force the three-mile statute, but it does not affect another prohibitory order putting in force the three-mile statute, although a part of the same area may have been embraced in both prohibitory orders. It follows, then, that the prohibitory order made in April, 1908, not having been revoked or annulled, is still in force, and by its terms extends over the territory in which the appellants had their place of business for the sale of liquors, and they are not protected by the license granted to them by the county court.
3. The record shows that the school house named as the central point of the area in which the sale of liquor was prohibited in the order made in April, 1908, was only three-fourths of a mile' distant from the boundary line between the States of Arkansas and of Missouri; and that a majority of the adult inhabitants residing within the three-mile radii extending in all directions from the central point resided in the State of Missouri, and were not taken in account in making the prohibitory order which put the statute in force. Hence counsel argue that the statute was not put in force by the order.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that it is not'the order of the county court, but the act of the Legislature, which prohibits the sale of the liquor within the prescribed area; and for this reason, in the case of Wilson v. Thompson, 56 Ark. 110, it was held that county lines would not be considered in the proceeding for putting the statute in operation. Here the case is different. It is not a question of county lines but of State boundaries.
“Statutes derive their force from the authority of the Legislature which enacts them; and hence, as a necessary consequence, their authority as statutes will be limited to the territory or country to which the enacting power is limited. It is only within these boundaries that the Legislature is lawmaker, that its laws govern people, that they operate of their own vigor on any subject.” 1 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 13, and cases cited.
It follows, therefore that the Legislature of the State of Arkansas could not pass an act prohibiting the sale of liquors in the State of Missouri.
“It is so unusual for a Legislature to intend that its acts shall have such world-wide effect that courts are never justified in putting such construction upon them if their language admits of any other reasonable interpretation.” State v. Lancashire Insurance Co., 66 Ark 476.
Section 7792 of Kirby’s Digest provides that “all general provisions, terms, phrases and expressions used in any statute shall be liberally construed, in order that the true intent and meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out.” Applying these canons of construction, it will be readily seen that the Legislature only intended that the three-mile law should be effective in the State of Arkansas, and that the territory embraced within the radii extending in all directions from the central point should be territory embraced within the boundaries of the State of Arkansas. The areas thus formed, except when the central point is at or within the three miles of the State boundary, are in the form of circles, but the form is merely descriptive of the territory embraced in the prohibited limits. When the point which marks the center is less than three miles from the State boundary, only that segment of the circle within the limits of the State is affected by the order, and the adult inhabitants of this State only should be considered in determining whether the petition, either for putting in force the three-mile law or for revoking such prohibitory order, contains the requisite majority.
It is also insisted that the order of April, 1908, is not effective because the new stone school house named as the central point was described as being on block 23, instead of block 22, where it is in fact situated. The school house is described as being situated in the town of Mammoth Spring in Fulton County, Arkansas; and it is further described as a new stone public school house. It was not necessary to mention the number of the block on which it was situated. It was sufficient to describe it in the language of the statute with such reasonable certainty as to identify it as the point marked from which the radii were to extend in designating the territory to be embraced in the order. Blackwell v. State, 36 Ark. 178.
The case having been submitted and decided upon its merits, it is not necessary to pass upon the rights of appellant for a restraining order, pending the appeal, which was also submitted.
The judgment will be affirmed.