(after stating the facts). It is contended here that the court erred in refusing to declare unconstitutional the proviso defining the term “agent” in the second section of the acts of 1907.
The proof conclusively shows that appellant was a licensed liquor dealer at Dermott, and that the order for the liquor was given to his brother Fay at Warren, in prohibition territory, with two dollars in money, to pay for the whisky. That Givens gave the order to the said Fay Van Valkinburgh, without solicitation from him, but understanding at the time that he and his brother were engaged in the sale of liquor at Dermott. The order was by him in person transmitted to appellant at Dermott, and filled and the money received in payment, the whisky being shipped in accordance with the direction of the person ordering it.
Within the definition given in said act, and under its terms, which were all given to the jury as instructions in this case, there can be no doubt but that appellant was guilty of a violation of it. Fay Van Valkinburgh, who was his employee for the sale of whisky, and who was known by the person ordering to be engaged with his brother in the sale of whisky at Dermott, was in prohibition territory, received the order for the whisky, transmitted and in person delivered it to the appellant at the saloon, who accepted and filled it.
It is true that appellant said that Fay had no authority to solicit and receive orders for whisky, and was only employed as a night bartender, for the sale of whisky over the bar in the saloon, but it could have reasonably been inferred that he was acting as agent for appellant in receiving and transmitting the order, as he unquestionably was his agent within the meaning of the term as defined in said act and also guilty of a violation of it. The object of the statute was to prevent the advertisement of liquor for sale and the soliciting and receiving orders from any person therein for the sale thereof, within prohibition territory, and to prevent the presence of liquor dealers, through agent or otherwise, in such territory, soliciting or receiving orders from persons therein, and it broadly defines the term “agent” to “mean any person who receives an order from another for intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory and transmits the same in person, by letter, telegraph or telephone, or in any other manner, to some dealer in intoxicating liquors, who accepts and fills the same.” (Actsl907,e. 135,§2.)
In State v. Earles, 84 Ark. 479, this court said:
“The statute in question makes both the liquor dealer and his agent who solicits orders in prohibition territory guilty of an offense, and it defines an “agent” to be one “who receives an order from another for intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, and transmits the same in person, by letter, telegraph or telephone, or in any other manner, to some dealer in intoxicating liquors who accepts and fills the same.
“It is not intended by this statute to punish a licensed dealer for merely selling liquor directly to a person who has solicited orders in prohibition'territory; but it is unlawful for a licensed dealer to accept and fill an order which has been solicited and received by another person in prohibition territory and transmitted to him. Such an acceptance of the order is, under the statute, tantamount to soliciting the order in prohibition territory.”
No error was committed in giving the instructions in the language of the statute.
If appellant had desired an instruction submitting a different view from that expressed as to the meaning of agency, he should have asked a correct instruction embodying it. Not having done so, he will not be heard to complain of the failure of the court to so instruct the jury. This act is a police regulation, intended to protect the wishes of the citizenship of the prohibition districts of the State and suppress the receiving and solicitation of orders and advertisements for the sale of liquor therein, and was well within the power of the Legislature to enact. Zinn v. State, 88 Ark. 275.
The judgment is affirmed.