(after stating the facts). Counsel for the defendant say this action is based on the lookout statute, making it the duty of all persons running trains in this State to keep a constant lookout for persons and property on the track, and contends that a motor car is not a train within the meaning of the statute. In the case of Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. Co. v. Blewitt, 65 Ark. 235, the court held that an engine is a train within the meaning of the statute. See also Railway Co. v. Taylor, 57 Ark. 136. The motor car in question was run by the defendant company for the purpose of carrying passengers over its line of railroad, and, we think, was a train within the meaning of the statute.
2. It is next contended that the court erred in refusing to give instruction numbered “A,” asked by the defendant. It is as follows:
“A. The court instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence that the horses, whose death and injury are sued for, were found dead or injured so near the roadbed of the defendant company as to indicate that they were thrown there by a passing train of the defendant company, then the presumption, is that the killing or wounding was done by the defendant’s train, and that it resulted from want of care, and the defendant would be liable unless this presumption is rebutted by evidence overcoming it; but this presumption does not attach if the evidence shows that the horses were not killed or wounded by contact with a train of defendant company. The jury is instructed that if they find that the horses whose death and injury is sued for herein were killed or injured on a bridge from falling therein and were not killed or injured by the coming in contact with a train of the defendant, then there is no presumption of negligence on part of the defendant, and the plaintiff can not recover unless he shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, negligence on part of defendant’s employees causing the death or wounding of the horses sued for.”
It was not charged or attempted to be proved that the horses were killed and injured by a train striking them. The action was not brought under section 6776, Kirby's Digest, and that section has no application to the facts of this case. The suit was brought under the act of May 26, 1911, which is as follows:
“It shall be the duty of all persons running trains in this State upon any railroad to keep a constant lookout for persons and property upon the track of any and all railroads; and if any person or property shall be killed or injured by the neglect of any employees of any railroad to keep such lookout, the company owning or operating any such railroad shall be liable and responsible to the person injured for all damages resulting from neglect to keep such lookout. Notwithstanding the contributory negligence of the person injured, where, if such lookout had been kept, the employee or employees in charge of such train of such company could have discovered the peril of the person injured in time to have prevented the injury, by the exercise of reasonable care after the discovery of such peril, and the burden of proof shall devolve upon such railroad to establish the fact that this duty to keep such lookout has been performed.” Acts 1911, p. 275.
Under this section, that part of the instruction which tells the jury in effect that there is no presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant where the horses were not killed or injured by coming in contact with a train is too broad, and is not the law. The statute make the railroad company liable for all damages resulting from neglect to keep a lookout for property upon its track, and imposes upon the railroad company the burden of proving that it has kept such lookout. The statutory policy of imposing the burden of proof in this respect upon the railroad company doubtless had its origin in the fact that the company’s employees would know whether they kept a lookout or not, and the owner of the property would not know whether they had performed their duty in this respect or not. In other words, the statute makes it the duty of railroad companies to keep a lookout for property upon its tracks, and make it liable for all injuries that occur by reason of its failure to perform this duty.
Under the lookout statute, when the plaintiff has proved facts and circumstances from which the jury might infer that his property had been injured on account of the operation of the train, and that the danger might have been discovered and the injury avoided if a lookout had been kept, then he has made out a prima facie case, and the burden is on the defendant to show that a lookout was kept as required by the statute.
For the reasons here given instructions numbered “B” and “2,” asked by the defendant, were properly refused by the court.
It is finally insisted by counsel for the defendant that the court should have directed a verdict for it under the facts. While we do not agree with counsel in this contention, it must be admitted that the question is a very close one. It is true that the motorman and also the other occupant of the car testified that the motorman kept a sharp lookout, and was looking straight ahead all the time, and that the horses were not seen until they were found on the bridge or trestle, but it can not be said that their testimony in this respect was reasonable and consistent and was uncontradicted by any other facts or circumstances adduced in evidence. It will be remembered that the motorman testified that he could see objects on the track 150 yards ahead, and was looking straight ahead all the time. The testimony of the plaintiff shows that the horses came upon the track 800 or 4Ó0 yards from the bridge, and the impressions of their tracks made on the roadbed showed that soon after getting on the track they commenced running and continued to run faster as they approached the bridge. Then, too, testimony was introduced by the plaintiff tending to show that the persons in the car were heard hallooing and loudly talking and laughing. This testimony was not introduced, as counsel for the defendant seem to think, for the purpose of showing that the loud talking and laughing was calculated to frighten the horses, -but was no doubt introduced for the purpose of showing that the motorman, being engaged in an animated conversation with the other occupant of the car, was not keeping the lookout required by the statute, and the testimony was competent for that purpose. It will be remembered that there were only two persons in the car, and the motorman would necessarily be a participant in the loud talking and laughing. Under all the facts and circumstances adduced in evidence, the jury were warranted in finding that the motorman was not keeping the lookout required by the statute, and that, had he been doing so, he would have seen the horses on the railroad track some distance before they reached the trestle and would have observed that they were frightened by the approach of the motor car, and that they commenced to run and continued to run faster as the car approached them. Hence the jury might have found that he was guilty of negligence in not stopping the car when he had reason to believe the horses would not leave the track before reaching the trestle, and under such circumstances should have anticipated, as a natural and probable consequence of not stopping the car, that the horses would run into the trestle and be killed or injured. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rhoden, 93 Ark. 29.
The judgment will be affirmed.