(after stating the facts). Appellant contends that he had no notice of the acceptance of his indorsement by the appellee company and the shipment of goods upon it, and on that account did not become liable thereon, and that appellee was negligent in proceeding to collect the debt from the insolvent company.
If appellee’s letter be construed as but an offer of indorsement or a conditional guaranty, it would have been necessary to notify him of its acceptance, or the conditions must have been performed by appellee company in order to fix his liability thereon, but such is not the case. Upon being advised of the refusal to ship the bill of goods ordered, because of the bad financial condition of the company ordering them, he wrote, expressing the utmost confidence in their ability to pay, giving his reasons therefor and concluded by saying, “If my indorsement is worth anything, you can ship on that. * * * I am vice-president of the McCarroll Brothers Company.” The appellee, upon the receipt of the letter, shipped the goods, upon said indorsement, charging them upon its books to the said company and John F. McCarroll, and relying absolutely upon the faith and credit of such indorsement, as the undisputed testimony shows.
This was not a continuing guaranty nor a conditional one, but a special guaranty or indorsement, directing the ship, ment of the good on the credit of the guarantor, if it was regarded good for the payment, and, being acted upon and the goods shipped in accordance therewith, appellant became absolutely bound with the principal on the contract of sale under which the liability of the failed company accrued. 20 Cyc. 1398-9; Stewart v. Sharp County Bank, 71 Ark. 588; Friend v. Smith Gin Company, 59 Ark. 91.
It is insisted that appellant should have been notified of the acceptance of his contract of guaranty or indorsement at the time of the shipment of the goods, and the failure of the company to pay for them, in order to bind him thereon.
If his letter had been but an offer to guaranty the payment of the account, this would be true, but it was a direction to ship the goods upon his indorsement, if his credit was regarded good for the amount and needed only to be acted upon by the appellee and the goods shipped in accordance therewith to bind him.
Appellee made no proposition to its salesman that it would ship the goods upon his guaranty of the account, but he sent the direction and indorsement which was acted upon by them, and thereupon became binding upon him. He does not claim that he did not have notice that the goods were shipped, but only that he was not advised at the time that the company would look to him for the payment in accordance with his proposition. He did know that appellee had refused to ship the bill of goods because of the financial condition of the firm ordering them, and also that he had directed their shipment after being notified -of such refusal upon his own indorsement, if it was regarded good, and that thereafter the goods were shipped. Nothing further was necessary to bind him to the payment therefor.
As these facts appeared from the undisputed testimony, the court did not err in directing the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.