[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
-------------------------------------------U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 07-14149 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 26, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
-------------------------------------------- THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 07-20009-CR-JEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALPHONSO CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 26, 2008)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Alphonso Clark appeals his 262-month sentence
imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1). No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
On appeal, Clark argues that his sentence is unreasonable in the light of his
poor mental and physical health, drug addiction, and prior drug crimes, which
involved only small drug amounts. We review Clark’s sentence for
reasonableness in the light of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
See United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244-46 (11th Cir. 2005). And
we evaluate the reasonableness of a sentence using a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
Briefly stated, under section 3553(a), a district court should consider,
among other things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to provide adequate
deterrence, respect for the law, and protection of the public, policy statements of
the Sentencing Commission, provision for the medical and educational needs of
the defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the
burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the]
record and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784,
788 (11th Cir. 2005).
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We conclude that Clark’s sentence was reasonable. The district court
correctly calculated Clark’s advisory Guidelines range at 262 to 327 months based
on his status as a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and sentenced him to the low
point of that range. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 788 (noting that “ordinarily we would
expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable”). In addition,
Clark’s 262-month sentence is well below the statutory maximum life sentence he
could have received. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); Winingear, 422 F.3d at
1246 (comparing, as one indication of reasonableness, the actual prison term
imposed against the statutory maximum).
And the district court explained that it considered the information in the
presentence investigation report and the parties’ arguments and concluded that
nothing justified a sentence below the Guidelines range. The district court
considered both Clark’s mental and physical health and his extensive criminal
history in drug crimes. The district court acknowledged that Clark had limited
mental capabilities but also noted that nothing indicated that he was incompetent
and his participation in the instant drug conspiracy was of his own free will,
flagrant, open, and notorious. The district court’s statement of reasons was
sufficient. See United States v. Rita, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007) (a lengthy
explanation is not necessarily required when a judge decides to follow the
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Guidelines in a particular case, especially where a sentencing judge has listened to
the arguments of the parties, considered the supporting evidence, and was aware of
the special conditions of the defendant).
Based on the factors outlined in section 3553(a) and our review of the
record, we conclude that Clark has not carried his burden of showing that his
sentence was unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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