Appellants Joseph Clifford Elder and Sharon Lee Elder appeal from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees Security Bank of Harrison, et al. We affirm.
On August 7, 1980, the Elders purchased a home and financed it with a thirty-year mortgage. At the time of the loan closing, Barry Molder, who was a loan officer for Security Bank of Harrison, sold the Elders a mortgage-payment disability insurance policy. The Elders remembered that they never received a copy of the policy, but that Mr. Molder assured them that, in the event of a disability, the mortgage insurance would cover the loan payments for the duration of the thirty years. In fact, however, the policy only provided for a maximum of five years of monthly payments in the event of disability.
Mr. Elder became totally disabled in March 1988, at which time the disability policy had passed to Integon. Integon began making the monthly mortgage payments and sending a monthly worksheet to the Elders reflecting this payment. Then, in December 1991, appellee Liberty Life acquired the policy from Integon. In May 1992, Liberty Life provided the Elders with a copy of a document entitled policy schedule, which summarized the coverage of the Elders’ insurance policy. According to Mrs. Elder, this was the first time she had seen the policy schedule, and she contacted Liberty Life with questions about it. A representative of Liberty Life replied in October 1992 that the coverage was for a thirty-year term and a monthly benefit of $300. In April 1993 (five years after the disability), Liberty Life discontinued paying the monthly mortgage payments.
The Elders brought suit against the appellees on December 30, 1993, alleging breach of contract and negligence. Their complaint averred:
At the time the disability insurance policy was issued, Barry Molder, acting within the apparent scope of his duties as agent for Security Bank, First Commercial and Liberty Life, contractually obligated himself to provide mortgage insurance for the full term of the plaintiff’s mortgage. The selection by Barry Molder of a policy of insurance coverage which provided only sixty (60) months of coverage constitutes a breach of contract for which damages will lie. In the alternative, Security Bank acting by and through Barry Molder undertook a duty of reasonable care to the Elders to select an appropriate policy of credit disability insurance. Security Bank breached its duty by selecting a policy which was limited to sixty (60) months of benefits.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and depositions, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees. Specifically, the court found that the Elders’ complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court stated:
The Court finds that it is clear from the pleadings that the application for disability insurance was completed by the Plaintiff, Joseph Clifford Elder, on August 7, 1980, and was turned over to Barry Molder as agent for or employee of the Security Bank of Harrison. A three-year Statute of Limitations, after the cause of action accrues, is applicable to both causes pled by the Plaintiffs. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the limited term (five years) payments under the policy when they received the “check stubs” with each check issued under the terms of the disability policy. Each monthly stub provided ample information concerning the term or length of payments. The Court finds that the first “check stub” was received by the Plaintiffs in May of 1988 and the applicable Statute of Limitations as to both causes of action pled by the Plaintiffs expired three years from that date. The Plaintiffs’ original complaint herein was filed on December 30, 1993, which was after the time of expiration of the Statute of Limitations.
The Elders now appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. They contend that the court erred in finding that they knew or should have known of the limited payment schedule in May 1988; in failing to consider the appellees’ failure to disclose the terms of the policy; and in finding that the cause of action in contract accrued before April 1993, when the payments were terminated.
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment; once the moving party meets this burden, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ark. 802, 957 S.W.2d 700 (1997). On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and resolve all questions and ambiguities against the moving party. Id. Summary judgment is proper when the statute of limitations bars the action. Alexander v. Twin City Bank, 322 Ark. 478, 910 S.W.2d 196 (1995). We will affirm a summary judgment when the plaintiff admits a dispositive fact. Sublett v. Hipps, 330 Ark. 58, 952 S.W.2d 140 (1997).
In Mrs. Elder’s deposition, she acknowledged that, at some time when she was receiving monthly forms from Integon, she noticed an expiration date of 5/1/93. She thought that the date was wrong, and stated she thought the insurance company was “faking us out.” As a result of the discrepancy, she asked for a copy of the policy along with the policy schedule, and received the policy on January 5, 1989. However, she stated that the policy schedule reflecting the five-year limit was not received until May 1992. Mrs. Elder testified that, when the policy was issued, she was led to believe it covered the full thirty-year term of the mortgage and that she believed this to be the case until the payments were terminated in April 1993.
In their argument for reversal, the appellants concede that the applicable limitations period is three years pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (1987). However, they argue that their claims against the appellees were not barred by this limitations period.
The appellants first contend that the circuit court erred in ruling that they knew or should have known of the actual terms of the written policy more than three years prior to December 30, 1993. Appellants note that the Integon form that was introduced into evidence was dated 12/4/91. They further note that that exhibit had the notation “Expirty Date 5/1/93.” Thus, appellants allege, it was not clear as to when these monthly forms began to reflect this notation, and at any rate the notation was ambiguous.
The undisputed facts clearly established that Mrs. Elder had actual notice of the five-year policy limit well before three years preceding December 30, 1993. She admitted that she saw the expiration date, thought it was incorrect, and that this caused her to ask for the policy, which she received on January 5, 1989. More importantly, the policy received on that date contained the following language:
In no event shall the periodic indemnity payable hereunder in the event of disability exceed the lesser of (a) 60 months of such payments....
Thus, by Mrs. Elder’s own admission, she was on notice of the alleged breach of contract on January 5, 1989, at the latest, and the limitations period expired before the complaint was filed.
The appellants next point out that, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 23-87-110 (Repl. 1992), the appellees were responsible for providing a copy of the policy, and they failed to do so until January 1989. The appellants also note that a representative of Liberty Life assured them in October 1992 that the policy covered the full thirty-year term. Appellants argue that appellee’s failure to disclose the policy provisions, and its concealment of the same, tolled the statute of limitations.
In Williams v. Purdy, 223 Ark. 275, 265 S.W.2d 534 (1954), the supreme court held:
Mere ignorance of one’s rights does not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations, but where the ignorance is produced by affirmative and fraudulent acts of concealment, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. Landman v. Fincher, 196 Ark. 609, 119 S.W.2d 521; Kurry v. Frost, 204 Ark. 386, 162 S.W.2d 48; State of Tennessee v. Barton, 210 Ark. 816, 198 S.W.2d 512. Some affirmative act of concealment must be done; mere failure to reveal is not enough, unless there is a duty to speak.
In the instant case, there may be a fact question as to whether the appellees failed in their duty to disclose the provisions of the policy when it was issued. However, this is a moot point because it is undisputed that the policy was sent to the appellants in January 1989, and it contained the provision at issue. Furthermore, whether or not there was a misrepresentation in Liberty Life’s letter to appellants in October 1992 is of no consequence because the limitations period expired in January 1992, at the latest. Thus, any concealment or misrepresentation did not sufficiently toll the limitations period in this case. Even accepting the Elders’ contentions as being true, their complaint was still not timely filed.
The appellants’ remaining argument is that their cause of action in contract did not accrue until April 1993, when payments were terminated. However, this is incorrect. For breach of contract, the true test in determining when a cause of action arises or accrues is to establish the time when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to successful conclusion. Oaklawn Bank v. Alford, 40 Ark. App. 200, 845 S.W.2d 22 (1993). The cause of action accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence, and occurs when one party has, by words or conduct, indicated to the other that the agreement is being repudiated or breached. Id.
The oral contract, which appellants contend was breached, was the alleged promise of appellees to provide appellants with a mortgage-payment disability insurance policy that would pay monthly benefits for up to thirty years. Assuming this promise was made to appellants, as we must on our review of this summary judgment, the promise was breached when appellees caused an insurance policy to be issued to appellants that provided for monthly benefits with a maximum of only sixty months. Consequently, their cause of action accrued when the policy was issued in 1980, and appellants could have commenced their action at that time. It is only because appellants were not put on actual notice of the breach until they received a copy of their policy in January 1989 that the three-year limitations period was tolled until that late date. But for purposes of the statute of limitations, the appellants were not entitled to wait until May 1, 1993 (when payments were actually terminated), to bring suit against the appellees. Their action had accrued and become time-barred long before then.
Viewing the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, we find that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the trial court committed no error in finding that the appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Pittman, Jennings, and Roaf, JJ., and Hays, S.J., agree. Griffen, J., dissents.