IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit
FILED
_____________________
April 7, 2009
No. 08-20564
Summary Calendar Charles R. Fulbruge III
_____________________ Clerk
MARTHA SCOTT, Individually, And as a Representative
of the Estate of David Scott; ESTATE OF DAVID SCOTT;
ROBIN DENISE BRYANT, Robin Denise Bryant as Next
Friend of ICS, a Minor and ALS, a Minor
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
RAUL VENEGAS, Deputy, in His Individual
Capacity
Defendants-Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
(4:06-CV-1436)
Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Raul Venegas, a Harris County, Texas deputy
sheriff, appeals the interlocutory ruling of the district court denying qualified
immunity to Venegas in his individual capacity in connection with claims
asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and grounded in alleged violations of
*
Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH
C IR . R. 47.5.4.
the Fourteenth Amendment substantive Due Process rights of decedent David
Scott, a pre-trial detainee who had been in the custody of Venegas. Plaintiffs
have alleged that Venagas’s delivery of Scott to an inmate processing center
rather than to a hospital or other medical facility, constituted deliberate
indifference to Scott’s serious medical needs.
Adopting the recommendations of the magistrate judge in her
Memorandum, Recommendation and Order, the district court denied
qualified immunity to Venegas based on the existence of a dispute of material
fact, described by the magistrate judge as “two significantly different versions
of key persons of the event” as to the facts leading up to Scott’s death, one
version being that of Venegas and the other being that of EMS paramedic
Kevin Traynor. Concluding that the “qualified immunity analysis [for
Venegas] hangs in the balance of these critical fact disputes,” the
recommendations of the magistrate judge adopted by the district court
convinces us that, indeed, one of the two widely divergent versions of the
critical facts preceding Scott’s death will ultimately determine entitlement of
Venegas to qualified immunity. This quintessential dispute of material fact
deprives us of appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s interlocutory
denial of qualified immunity at this summary judgment stage of the
2
proceedings.1
Venagas’s appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
1
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
3