[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Aug. 20, 2008
No. 08-11113 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-01765-CV-ORL-GJK
ANGELA WILKINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(August 20, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is Angela Wilkinson’s appeal from the district court’s judgment
affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of her application for
supplemental security income under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Wilkinson raises two
issues.
First, Wilkinson contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical
opinions presented. She argues that the ALJ discounted the opinions of examining
physicians, including two specialists, in favor of the opinion of a non-examining,
non-specialist state agency physician.
The ALJ did not err in assigning minimal weight to the medical opinion of
the examining physicians supporting Wilkinson’s claim of disability because he
found, after reviewing the entire record, that their opinions were not supported by
the evidence. See Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a
contrary conclusion.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(b) (“[The ALJ] will always consider the medical opinions in [the] case
record together with the rest of the relevant evidence . . . receive[d].”).
The ALJ did not give undue weight to the opinion of the non-examining
state agency physician because he did not rely solely on that opinion. See
Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that “taken
alone” the opinions of non-examining physicians “do not constitute substantial
evidence on which to base an administrative decision”). The ALJ considered the
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opinions of other treating, examining, and non-examining physicians;
rehabilitation discharge notes indicating improvement; and Wilkinson’s own
disability reports and testimony. The record supports the ALJ’s finding that
Wilkinson had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. The ALJ
was not required to list in detail every bit of evidence he relied on to reach that
decision. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that
“there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of
evidence in his decision”).
Second, Wilkinson contends that the ALJ improperly applied the pain
standard in evaluating her testimony about her subjective complaints of pain. The
ALJ found that, although Wilkinson had medically determinable and severe
conditions that caused her some functional limitations, her statements about the
intensity, duration, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s findings. The ALJ observed
that Wilkinson’s testimony about the extent of her limitations was inconsistent
with medical evidence and disability reports regarding her daily activities. Thus,
the ALJ articulated explicit and adequate reasons for his findings. See Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[C]redibility determinations are
the province of the ALJ.”); see also Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th
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Cir. 2002) (holding that findings such as effectiveness of treatment, ability to
perform daily activities, and limited use of pain medication can support an ALJ’s
decision to discredit subjective testimony).
AFFIRMED.
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