This was a suit brought before a justice of the peace to recover upon a prom
We are of the opinion that the answer of defendants, in so far as it denies that plaintiff was the owner of the note, in the sense of denying that he was the possessor of the beneficial interest in it at the time of the trial, or when suit was brought, presents an immaterial issue. If it was assigned by a special indorsement to him, or by indorsement in blank made by the payee in whose possession it was at the time of such indorsement, and was delivered to him by the payee, he became the legal holder of the note, and as such could sue and recover on it in his own name. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1181a; Bliss, Code PI. § 232. Whether William Stamper was the owner of the note at the time of the alleged proceedings in garnishment is quite a different question.
In' our view of this ease, it will be necessary for us to consider but one of the errors assigned. Evidence was offered by the defendant to show that William Stamper, the payee in the note, became indebted in Carbon county, where he resided, and subsequently left the territory, leaving his debts unpaid; that attachment suits were'instituted by his creditors before John Q. Brooks, a justice of the peace of that county, and that defendants were summoned, as garnishees, to answer concerning their indebtedness to William Stamper upon the note in question; that they answered, and, upon the order of the justice, paid into his court the full amount due upon the note, and were thereby discharged from all liability thereon. To establish this state of facts they offered in evidence a certified transcript of the justice’s docket. The certificate to the transcript was as follows: “The territory of Wyoming, county of Carbon — ss.: I do hereby certify that the above is a full and true copy from my docket of the proceedings had by and before me at my office in Carbon, Carbon county, Wyoming territory, in the above-mentioned action. Dated this 2d day of Eehruary, A. D. 1889. [Signed] John Q. Brooks, Justice of the Peace for Said County and Territory.” The introduction of the copy in evidence was objected to upon the ground, among others, that it was not properly authenticated. The proof of records may be made by a copy, and the copy may be of three kinds, and only three: (1) Exemplification; (2) copies made by an authorized officer; (3) sworn copies. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 501. It is plain that this is not an exemplification, nor a sworn copy. Is it one of the second class named, a copy made by an authorized officer, or what is called an “office copy?” That it was not made by an officer specially authorized is clear. But it is well settled in the United States that an officer having the legal custody of public records is ex officio competent to certify copies of their contents, (1 Greenl. Ev. § 507,) and, if admissible at all, it is under this rule of law. Giving this rule its widest possible scope, there must be proof of some character that John Q. Brooks, at the time of making the certificate, was the custodian of the records desired to be proved. Of this there is no evidence whatever. He does not state it in his certificate. It is not testified to by any witness. John W. Johnson, while testifying on his own behalf, was asked the question, “You may state, if you know, who was justice of the peace at Carbon at that time, in 1887 and 1888,” and answered: “I think J. Q. Brooks.” This does not tend to show that he was occupying that position Eebruary 2, 1889, the date of the certificate. By the statute, an election for justices of the peace was required to be held in November, 1888, and the offi