IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 93-7430
Summary Calendar
_____________________
JOHN BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR., ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________
(August 26, 1994)
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mississippi State Penitentiary inmate John L. Boyd appeals
the district court's dismissal with prejudice of his pro se and
in forma pauperis § 1983 complaint. We affirm as to two
defendants based on the doctrine of absolute immunity, and as to
the remaining defendants based on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994)
[boyd.008] 1
I. BACKGROUND
On January 8, 1981, John L. Boyd (Boyd) and his cousin,
Johnny B. Boyd, were charged with the murder of Bobby Rogers. In
1981, Boyd was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The evidence showed that Boyd's cousin fired the
fatal shot and that Boyd struck the victim with an axe handle.
Before the trial of Boyd's cousin in 1984, new evidence was
discovered that supported Boyd's contention that he and his
cousin had acted in self-defense. This evidence was admitted at
the trial of Boyd's cousin, and he was convicted of the lesser
offense of manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years
imprisonment. Boyd petitioned for habeas corpus based on the
newly discovered evidence, and in 1989 the federal district court
granted Boyd's petition and ordered a new trial. We reversed the
district court's judgment, reasoning that newly discovered
evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of a state prisoner
cannot support federal habeas corpus relief. Boyd v. Puckett,
905 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 988 (1990).
On August 6, 1991, Boyd used a form designed for prisoner
complaints concerning conditions of confinement to file an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court alleging
inter alia that Judge Neal Biggers (a state judge at the time of
the events at issue here), Prosecutor John Young, Ronald Windsor
(Boyd's court-appointed counsel), Sheriff Edwin Coleman and
Investigator Larry Brinkley conspired to violate his
constitutional rights by causing him to be convicted and
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sentenced more severely than his cousin. In the blank left for
requested relief, Boyd asked for $10,000 in compensatory damages,
$10,000 in punitive damages, $10,000 in mental anguish damages,
and "any other relief this Court deems proper and adequate[] in
the foregoing matter." The case was referred to a magistrate
judge. On January 12, 1993, the magistrate judge held a Spears1
hearing to determine whether a non-frivolous basis for Boyd's §
1983 action existed. At the Spears hearing, Boyd stated that by
filing this suit he was seeking to attack the constitutionality
of his state court conviction.
In a written report filed on January 21, 1993, the
magistrate judge recommended that Boyd's claim be dismissed with
prejudice. The magistrate judge concluded that Judge Biggers and
Prosecutor Young were absolutely immune from suit under § 1983
for the conduct alleged by Boyd, that Boyd's defense attorney was
not a state actor for § 1983 purposes, and that Boyd's
allegations against Sheriff Coleman and Investigator Brinkley
were merely conclusory and failed to state a claim under § 1983.
The magistrate judge also advised Boyd to exhaust his state
remedies if he wished to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance
against his defense counsel. On June 18, 1993, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in
its entirety and entered final judgment dismissing Boyd's
complaint with prejudice.
1
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the district court did not expressly state that
Boyd's claims were "frivolous" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), we
treat the court's determination as a § 1915(d) dismissal because
the court dismissed his complaint with prejudice prior to
service. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985).
Dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint is appropriate if the
district court determines that it is frivolous, i.e., that "it
lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is legally
frivolous if it is premised on an "indisputably meritless legal
theory." Id. at 327. We review a district court's § 1915(d)
dismissal using an abuse of discretion standard. Denton v.
Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992).
III. DISCUSSION
A. HECK V. HUMPHREY
We first consider the impact of Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct.
2364 (1994), decided during the pendency of this appeal, on the
instant case.2 For reasons that will be explained in Part III.B,
infra, we limit our discussion of Heck to the dismissal of Boyd's
2
The Supreme Court applied its decision in Heck to the
litigants in that case. Thus, under James B. Beam Distilling Co.
v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991), we must apply Heck
retroactively to the litigants in the instant case. Luce v.
First Equip. Leasing Corp. (In re Luce), 960 F.2d 1277, 1281 &
n.5 (5th Cir. 1992).
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claims against Windsor, Sheriff Coleman, and Investigator
Brinkley.
The facts of Heck are strikingly similar to those presented
in the instant case. The § 1983 plaintiff in that case, Roy
Heck, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Indiana state
court and sentenced to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment. Id.
at 2368. He filed his § 1983 lawsuit in federal court while his
appeal from his conviction was pending in the Indiana courts,
alleging that he had been the victim of a conspiracy by county
prosecutors and a police investigator to destroy exculpatory
evidence and to use an illegal voice identification procedure at
his trial. Id. The district court dismissed Heck's § 1983
action because the issues raised in that action directly
implicated the legality of Heck's confinement. Id. While Heck's
appeal to the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of Heck's § 1983 action, following the rule that
[i]f, regardless of the relief sought, the [§ 1983]
plaintiff is challenging the legality of his conviction, so
that if he won his case the state would be obliged to
release him even if he hadn't sought that relief, the suit
is classified as an application for habeas corpus and the
plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies, on pain of
dismissal if he fails to do so.3
3
This circuit has long followed the same rule that the
Seventh Circuit applied in Heck. Interpreting the Supreme
Court's opinions in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), we concluded that
"habeas corpus is the exclusive initial cause of action where the
basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality of the state
court conviction." Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir.
1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(per curiam); see also Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386 (5th
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Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114
S. Ct. 2364 (1994).
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Heck, it
rejected the analysis employed by the Seventh Circuit and by our
court in cases such as Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.
1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(per curiam), and Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976),
adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). The Court adhered to
its "teaching that § 1983 contains no exhaustion requirement
beyond what Congress has provided." Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2370.
The Court agreed, however, that Heck could not proceed with his §
1983 action. Using the common law tort of malicious prosecution
as an analogy to aid in interpretation of § 1983, the Court
concluded that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Cir. 1976), adhered to en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). We have
strictly applied the Fulford/Meadows doctrine, instructing the
district courts not to address the merits of § 1983 claims that
must first be exhausted through habeas challenges "even if it
plainly appear[s] that [the] § 1983 claims would be foreclosed as
a matter of law." Williams v. Dallas County Comm'rs, 689 F.2d
1212, 1215 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935
(1983).
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Id. at 2372. As the Court remarked a little later in the
opinion,
We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but
rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a
prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies
has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the
conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated,
or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. . . .
[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an
unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue
until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.
Id. at 2373-74.
Although the Heck Court rejected part of the reasoning
underlying the Fulford/Meadows doctrine, the analysis required by
Heck is similar in certain respects to the analysis we have long
used in this circuit when a state prisoner brings a § 1983 action
in federal district court. Under Heck, when a state prisoner
brings a § 1983 action seeking damages, the trial court must
first ascertain whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
the § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence. Id. at 2372. If it would, the prisoner
must show that his conviction has been "reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas
corpus," id. at 2373, in order to state a claim. Dismissal of
the § 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is appropriate, post-
Heck, because the plaintiff's action has been shown to be legally
frivolous.
The validity of Boyd's conviction and sentence has yet to be
undermined; we proceed to evaluate the claims raised in his §
1983 action to determine whether they challenge the
[boyd.008] 7
constitutionality of his conviction or sentence. We conclude
that they do. Some of his allegations amount to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. If proved, these claims would
call Boyd's conviction into question under cases such as
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Liberally
construed, his complaint also alleges that Sheriff Coleman and
Investigator Brinkley violated Boyd's rights by withholding
exculpatory evidence obtained during the investigation of Bobby
Rogers' murder. If proved, these claims would call Boyd's
conviction into question under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and its progeny. Indeed, Boyd stated, "My main thing
about this here, I really wasn't trying to sue nobody about this
here. I don't want nothing, money or nothing. I mostly want my
freedom."4 We conclude that all of his claims come within the
ambit of Heck and are therefore frivolous under § 1915(d).
The only remaining question is whether the district court
properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice as to Windsor,
Sheriff Coleman, and Investigator Brinkley. We note that the
district court in Heck dismissed Heck's complaint without
4
It could be argued that Boyd amended his § 1983 complaint
at the Spears hearing to request the relief of immediate or
speedier release from his incarceration. This is the very
practice held impermissible by the Court in Preiser; as the Court
held, "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or
duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is
a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy
is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. As a
result, placing such an interpretation on Boyd's statement at the
hearing would not change our conclusion: Boyd's § 1983 action
must be dismissed because his claim would then be cognizable only
in habeas corpus.
[boyd.008] 8
prejudice, Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2368; the Seventh Circuit affirmed
that judgment; and the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit's judgment. The question whether the logic of Heck, as
distinguished from its result, would permit dismissal with
prejudice of a state prisoner's § 1983 action challenging the
validity of his conviction or sentence has been settled, albeit
without discussion, by another panel of this court in Stephenson
v. Reno, --- F.3d ---, slip op. at 5574 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 1994)
(No. 94-30080) (Conference Calendar). The Stephenson panel
applied Heck to a federal prisoner who had brought a Bivens5
action asserting a myriad of alleged constitutional violations in
connection with his conviction. Id., slip op. at 5574-75. The
district court had adhered to pre-Heck practice, holding the suit
in abeyance pending exhaustion of Stephenson's post-conviction
remedies. Id., slip op. at 5575. The panel held that Heck
applies to Bivens actions just as it does to § 1983 actions,
vacated the order holding the suit in abeyance, and remanded the
case for dismissal with prejudice. Id., slip op. at 5575-76.
Given Stephenson's interpretation of Heck, we must affirm the §
1915(d) dismissal with prejudice of Boyd's § 1983 complaint as to
Windsor, Coleman, and Brinkley.
B. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that we could also
affirm the dismissal of Boyd's claims against Judge Biggers and
Prosecutor Young under Heck. We believe, however, that it
5
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
[boyd.008] 9
remains appropriate for district courts to consider the possible
applicability of the doctrine of absolute immunity, as did the
magistrate judge in the instant case, as a threshold matter in
making a § 1915(d) determination. As the Supreme Court has
stated, "the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's
entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil
damages action." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985).
Thus, the Court has described immunity as a threshold question,
to be resolved as early in the proceedings as possible. See
Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991) ("One of the
purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a
defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands
customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out
lawsuit."). Because absolute immunity is properly viewed as
"immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,"
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, it is appropriate for the district
courts to resolve the question of absolute immunity before
reaching the Heck analysis when feasible. If a defendant is
dismissed on absolute immunity grounds, it becomes clear that the
§ 1983 plaintiff will never have a claim against that defendant
based on the particular facts alleged, even if the plaintiff is a
state prisoner who eventually satisfies the precondition to a
valid § 1983 claim under Heck. We believe this approach best
serves the purposes underlying the absolute immunity doctrine.
Turning to the instant case, we find that Boyd's allegations
regarding Judge Biggers and Prosecutor Young are somewhat
[boyd.008] 10
confusing, but when his complaint is taken in conjunction with
his statements at his Spears hearing, it appears that Boyd was
simply contending that he was not guilty of murder and that
Biggers and Young should have prevented his wrongful conviction.6
Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from
claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise
of their judicial functions. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317
(5th Cir. 1993). The alleged magnitude of the judge's errors or
the mendacity of his acts is irrelevant. Young v. Biggers, 938
F.2d 565, 569 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991). Judicial immunity can be
overcome only by showing that the actions complained of were
nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken
in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco,
112 S. Ct. 286, 288 (1991); see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
220-21 (1988) (holding that a state judge's dismissal of a
subordinate court employee is not a judicial act entitled to
absolute immunity). A judge's acts are judicial in nature if
they are "'normally performed by a judge'" and the parties
affected "'dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'"
Mireles, 112 S. Ct. at 288 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
6
Boyd alleged that Judge Biggers was "without authorization
to accept the Jury Findings . . . that would shock the human
sensibilities [and] without ascertai[n]ing all of the elements of
such a case and the validity thereof." He alleged that
Prosecutor Young "undoubtedly wante[d] to clear all Court
Dockets, Old Warrants, Files and cases by convicting plaintiff
without ascertai[n]ing the significan[ce] of plaintiff['s]
evidence put before the court in plaintiff['s] behalf, or whether
accurate information would have made any diff[e]rence in the
court's decision."
[boyd.008] 11
349, 362 (1978)). Boyd does not complain of any actions taken by
Judge Biggers that were nonjudicial in nature, and his claims
against Judge Biggers were therefore properly dismissed with
prejudice as frivolous.
Criminal prosecutors also enjoy absolute immunity from
claims for damages asserted under § 1983 for actions taken in the
presentation of the state's case. Graves, 1 F.3d at 318. As the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed:
[A]cts undertaken by the prosecutor in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which
occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the
State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.
Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the
evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation
for its presentation at trial . . . .
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615 (1993).
Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor's actions in
initiating the prosecution and in carrying the case through the
judicial process. Graves, 1 F.3d at 318. This broad immunity
applies even if the prosecutor is accused of knowingly using
perjured testimony. Id. at 318 n.9; see also Brummett v. Camble,
946 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that state
prosecutors were absolutely immune from a § 1983 action
predicated on malicious prosecution), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2323 (1992); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.
1986) (en banc) ("[A] conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to
predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly
improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to
judges and prosecutors."). Boyd alleges no facts against
[boyd.008] 12
Prosecutor Young that would destroy Young's absolute immunity,
and his claims against Young were therefore properly dismissed
with prejudice as frivolous.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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