There was a controversy between the parties as to whether the defendant, when he purchased the hotel property, agreed with Craney to pay the notes given by Craney to Fisher, and assigned by the latter to the plaintiff, and also as to whether the insurance money belonged to the plaintiff or to the defendant. These controversies were settled by the defendant and Fir. Erb, the latter assuming to act for the plaintiff. By the terms of the settlement the plaintiff was to receive $653.77 of the insurance money, and a conveyance of the *106premises mortgaged by Oraney to Eisber to secure the payment of the notes, and to release the defendant from all claim on the mortgage. This was declared to be a full settlement of all matters between the parties. The plaintiff afterwards received the insurance money thus stipulated to him. He did so with full knowledge that Erb had assumed to act as his agent in negotiating the settlement with the defendant, and with full knowledge of the terms of the settlement. The evi-idence of this is undisputed and conclusive. True, at the same time the plaintiff refused to accept the deed of the mortgaged premises, and denied that Erb had authority to make the settlement. But he received and retained the fruits of the settlement — the insurance money.
No rule of law is more firmly established than the rule that if one, with full knowledge of the facts, accepts the avails of an unauthorized treaty made in his behalf by another, he thereby ratifies s.uch treaty, and is bound by its terms and stipulations as fully as he would be had he negotiated it himself. Also, a ratification of part of an unauthorized transaction of an agent is a confirmation of the whole. If authorities are .desired to propositions so plain as these, they abound in the decisions of this court, many of which are cited in the briefs of counsel. Under the above rules it is entirely immaterial whether Erb was or was not authorized to make the settlement with the defendant. If not authorized, the plaintiff, by receiving the money with full knowledge of the terms of settlement, ratified and confirmed what he did, and cannot now be heard to allege his agent’s want of authority.
It will not do to say that the plaintiff was entitled to the money he received, and might receive and retain it as his own without regard to the settlement. That was the very point of the controversy between the parties. Manifestly each claimed the money in good faith, and we cannot determine from the record before us which was entitled to it; and it is immaterial whether one or the other was so entitled, there being a real *107controversy between them on that question. It was therefore a very proper case for negotiation and compromise between them; and under the circumstances they must both bo held bound by the settlement. The evidence of ratification is conclusive, and there was nothing for the jury to determine in that behalf. Hence, the court properly directed the jury to find for the defendant.
The foregoing views dispose of the case, and render it unnecessary to determine the question, which was very ably argued by counsel, whether a parol agreement by the defendant to pay-the mortgage debt (if he so agreed) is within the statute of frauds, and therefore invalid. "We leave that question undetermined.
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.