Josephi v. Mady Clothing Co.

De Witt, J.

Upon the trial of the case the defendant objected to the evidence in reference to the alleged fraudulent disposition of the property, upon the ground that the affidavit setting it forth was defective. The affidavit set forth the fraudulent intent in the language of the statute. The defendant’s objection was that the affidavit states no facts within the statutory requirements. Thereupon the plaintiffs asked leave to amend their affidavit, which leave was granted by the court, and they then and there incorporated into the affidavit five paragraphs of the complaint, including paragraphs 3,4, and 5, mentioned in the statement above, which paragraphs were a full setting forth of the acts which plaintiffs claimed showed the fraudulent intent of the defendant to dispose of its property. It is not contended by appellant that the affidavit as amended was insufficient, but it is now urged in this court" that the original affidavit was jurisdictional, and that it was so defective that it was no affidavit, and the court never had jurisdiction of the case. Respondents contend that, even if the original affidavit were not sufficient, it was not error to allow the amendment. This case is not like those cases wherein there was no affidavit at all. There was an affidavit here, which set out the facts in the language of the statute. The complaint is that they were not sufficiently stated. Passing the question of whether the affidavit was originally sufficient, we feel satisfied that the tendency of the decisions of this court is that such an affidavit may be amended. (Pierse v. Miles, 5 Mont. 549; Langstaff v. Miles, 5 Mont. 554; Magee v. Fogerty, 6 Mont. 237.) In .the last case, Chief Justice "Wade, in the opinion, said: “ The procuring of an attachment, and the steps necessary therefor, is a proceeding within the spirit and meaning of the one hundred and fourteenth section [section 116] of the Code of Civil Procedure; and if such proceeding is defective, the same may be amended, in the furtherance of justice, like any other proceeding under that section.”

As to the estoppel suggested by appellant by reason of the. judgment in the case of Kleinschmidt & Brother v. Mady Clothing Company, I concur in the result reached in the other opinion filed in this case.

Another error claimed is as follows: A witness, Gaines, was upon the stand. He says that in 1890 he was the agent of the commercial reporting association of R. G. Dun & Co. He was asked this question: “Tell us what your conversation was with Mr. Kleinschmidt, in May, 1890, in reference to the Mady Clothing Company?” The defendant objected, on the ground that Kleinschmidt was not a party to the action, and the declarations made by him are not material to bind any one connected with the parties, or the parties themselves. The objection was overruled, and the witness testified that Kleinschmidt had told him, about May 3,1890, that the capital stock of defendant was $15,000; that he held $10,000, and Mady $5,000; and that the company had started with a clean balance sheet. The company was incorporated May 1, 1890. It appears that Kleinschmidt was a trustee of defendant, and a stockholder to the extent of two-thirds of the stock. A contention of the action was that defendant was disposing of its goods with the intent to defraud its creditors, and disposing of them to this same Albert Kleinschmidt and another. It was being contended that about the commencement of the action there was a large alleged indebtedness from the defendant to said Albert Kleinschmidt and another. The plaintiffs were claiming that this large indebtedness was a fraudulent one, and the defendant was disposing of its goods, or allowing its goods to be taken by said Kleinschmidts, on account of said alleged fraudulent indebtedness. Now, under this condition of affairs, a large fraudulent indebtedness being claimed to exist in October, we are of opinion that it was not error to allow the witness to testify that Albert Kleinschmidt had told him on May 3d that the Mady Clothing Company had started with a clean balance sheet on May 1st, when the plaintiffs were claiming and undertaking to prove that the company had a decidedly unclean balance sheet the October following.

There is one more matter presented by appellant. The verdict of the jury was as follows: “ We, the jury in the above-entitled case, do hereby find in favor of plaintiffs.” The appellant objects that this verdict does not comply with the statute (Code Civ. Proe., § 276), in that it does not state the amount awarded plaintiffs. But our statute provides, in section 271, of the Code of Civil Procedure, that “ if the verdict be informal or insufficient in not covering the whole issue or issues submitted, or in any particular, the verdict may be corrected by the jury, under the advice of the court, or the jury may be again sent out.” Under this provision the verdict could have been made more formal if it were necessary; but appellant, at the time of its rendition, made no application to that effect, nor did he make any objection to the verdict on motion for new trial. (Douglass v. Kraft, 9 Cal. 562.) But we are of opinion that, as a matter of fact, the verdict is not objectionable. There was no issue in the pleadings as to the amount due plaintiffs. The complaint sets up the claim for $1,283.50, and the answer does not deny the indebtedness, nor the amount thereof. The only denial was to the effect that the amount was not yet due; that is, that the allegations of fraud by which it was sought to show that the debt should be considered as due were not true. Therefore, as far as the amount was concerned, it was admitted by the pleadings. (Hutchinson v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 119.) Therefore, when the jury found their verdict simply to the effect that it was for plaintiffs, they found, in effect, for the plaintiffs on the issue in controversy; that is, the issue of fraud, which made the debt then due. We are of opinion that this is just such a form of general verdict as was suitable to the issues. Judgment was thereupon entered for the amount admitted to be due, namely, $1,283.50.

The points above discussed are those presented in the briefs and arguments. None of them, we are of opinion, should be sustained. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.