It is pleaded, it is adjudged by the court, it is not specified as error, and it is relied upon in argument on both sides, that the deed made by Largey, purporting to be the deed of the Butte Hardware Company, was and is void. We will therefore start with the foundation that the deed was a nullity. When that pretended deed was made, the Butte Hardware Company owned a one-eighth interest in the Yellow Jack mining claim. The deed, being to Schwab, Cummings, Hauser, and Fitchen, without describing the shares which the grantees were supposed to take, therefore purported to give Schwab and Cummings two thirty-seconds of the Yellow Jack mining claim. The deed being a nullity, Schwab and Cummings took nothing thereby. If that be true, Schwab and Cummings conveyed nothing to Cobban in October, 1889. This is clear enough, unless there is some estoppel.
It is contended that the Butte Hardware Company is es-topped because it did not file in the United States Land Office an adverse claim (Rev. Stats. U. S., § 2326) to the application for patent. But it does not appear that at the time of application for patent the Butte Hardware Company had or claimed any interest in the Yellow Jack mining claim, or that its grantors had an interest upon which they failed to file an adverse claim. The pretended deed from the Butte Hardware Company to Schwab et al. was made December 27,1884. The Butte Hardware Company acquired its title to the one-eighth interest in May, 1884. If the notice of application for patent had been admitted, it would have appeared that the Butte Hardware Company did not own an interest in the claim when advertisement occurred. But, it not being allowed in evidence, it nowhere appeared, nor, indeed, was it pleaded, that the Butte Hardware Company, at the time of advertisement for patent, was an owner or claimant in the premises, or could thereby be estopped by virtue of not filing an adverse claim to the application for patent.
*357Again, is the Butte Hardware Company estopped from claiming its title in two thirty-seconds of the Yellow Jack mining claim by virtue of Cobban buying the two thirty-seconds interest from Schwab and Cummings, grantees in the pretended deed of Butte Hardware Company to Schwab, Cummings, Hauser, and Fitchen, of December 27, 1884? Added to the fact that that was a void deed, absolutely, we are of opinion that Cobban was not an innocent purchaser for value. It sufficiently appeared that, before Cobban bought from Schwab and. Cummings, he was informed that if Schwab and Cummings had an apparent title to the two thirty-seconds interest on record, they had none in fact. Fitchen testified to this effect, although he was disputed by Cobban. Schwab and Cummings each deposed that he told Cobban that he had no claim to this two thirty-seconds interest. Cobban, however, said he would take a deed. He obtained quitclaim deeds from Schwab and Cummings. He paid five dollars for each — a grossly inadequate consideration, under the evidence. Cummings deposed that Cobban promised to give him more if he got any thing out of the claim. Under all these facts, it is apparent that Cobban was not an innocent purchaser for value, and that he had the amplest facts to put him on inquiry. ■Therefore, we arrive at this situation: By the receiver’s receipt, December 30, 1884, whatever right passed from the United States (and we will call it a title for the purpose of this decision) passed to Schwab,. Cummings, Hauser, and Fitchen. But at that time the Butte Hardware Company owned one-eighth of the possessory title, as against Schwab, Cummings, Hauser, and Fitchen, and still owns it. These four persons concede this. Cobban disputes it. But his grantors are Schwab and Cummings. They concede it, and Cobban is in no position superior to them, because he is not an innocent purchaser for value. Therefore, every one — Schwab, Cummings, Hauser, and Fitchen, in fact, and Cobban, in effect — concedes that the first four persons named hold in their names the receiver’s receipt for the Butte Hardware Company’s one-eighth interest of the Yellow Jack Mining claim. Under those circumstances, why should they not convey it? It is not a question of proving a trust, by parol or otherwise. The simple situation is: *358Four persons have iu their names title to real estate which belongs to another. They admit that fact, and Cobban is not a person to controvert it. It is our opinion that they are trustees, and should be, as they were, decreed to convey to their cestui que trust. There seems to be no occasion for the creating or declaring of a trust, or offering evidence that it was created or declared, or relying upon the deed from the Butte Hardware Company to Schwab, Cummings, Hauser, and Fitchen. The existence of the trust is uncontroverted.
The action is to quiet title and remove a cloud. Appellant claims that plaintiff was not in the possession of the premises, the two thirty-seconds undivided interest in the mining claim at the commencement of the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 366.) His specification in this regard on motion for a new trial is as follows: “The evidence is insufficient to sustain the decision and the decree of the court, for the reason that the evidence establishes the fact that the defendant George A. Cobban was in possession of a portion, at least, of the premises in controversy at the time of the institution of said action, as was found by the court in its special finding No. 8.” Finding 8 is as follows: “Did said defendant Cobban, in pursuance of his purchase of said two thirty-seconds of said mining claim, enter upon a certain portion thereof, and construct and erect a house thereon? And was such house so upon said premises covered by it at the time that this action was commenced? Answer. He had built a foundation for a house, which foundation was partly upon a portion of said premises.” Appellant contends that this is a finding that respondent was not in possession of the premises, the subject of the action. The subject of the action was two thirty-seconds undivided interest in a mining claim. That defendant had put a foundation for a house partly upon the mining claim, we think, is not a finding that defendant was in possession of plaintiff’s claimed two thirty-seconds undivided interest in the premises, or, in effect, that plaintiff was not in such possession.
It is contended that plaintiff, as a commercial corporation, is not empowered to hold or claim au interest in a mining claim. It appeared that plaintiff was occupying a. portion of the surface of the claim w'ith a warehouse which it was using *359in its business. The defendant Cobban is not an appropriate person to raise that question. What Cobban claims as to title comes from plaintiff. If Cobban could be said to own any thing (which, as we have seen, cannot be said) he owned it from plaintiff as grantor behind Schwab and Cummings. (First Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 9 Mont. 331.) The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Pemberton, C. J., having been counsel in this case, does not participate in the decision.