[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 26, 2008
No. 08-13003 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A98-589-900
RUBEN ALONSO LEMUS-SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(November 26, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ruben Alonso Lemus-Sanchez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision dismissing his
appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen so that
he could apply for an adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7), 1255, more
than one year after he failed to depart the United States pursuant to his voluntary
departure agreement.1 “We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion.” Ali v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2006).
If the Attorney General permits an alien to depart the United States
voluntarily, the alien must do so during the prescribed period. See INA § 240B(a),
(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a), (d). If the alien fails to depart the United States within
the specified time period, he becomes ineligible to, inter alia, apply for an
adjustment of status or change of status for a period of ten years. See id.; INA §
245(i)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(A); see also Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. __,
128 S.Ct. 2307, 2310, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008) (noting that failure to depart within
the prescribed voluntary departure period renders the alien ineligible for
adjustment of status for a period of ten years).
In this case, Lemus-Sanchez admitted that he remained in the United States
after his voluntary departure period expired. Thus, he must wait a period of ten
years before seeking an adjustment of status. See INA § 240B(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
1
We agree with the government that Lemus-Sanchez’s brief does not comply with Fed.
R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). However, we exercise our discretion to consider the brief. See Mendoza
v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1286 n.4. (11th Cir. 2003).
2
§ 1229c(d)(1)(B). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Lemus-Sanchez’s appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen for purposes of
seeking an adjustment of status, and we deny Lemus-Sanchez’s petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
3