[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-11213 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 17, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00529-CV-4-SPM-WCS
ALEX M. CORDERO,
Plaintiff-Appellant
Cross-Appellee,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Defendant-Appellee
Cross-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 17, 2008)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alex Cordero appeals the summary judgment in favor of his former
employer, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and against his
complaint of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. The Department cross-appeals and
argues that Cordero is not disabled. We affirm the summary judgment and dismiss
the cross-appeal.
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides that no covered employer
“shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual” in any of the “terms, conditions, [or] privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination under the Act, a plaintiff must prove that he is a
qualified individual with a disability who suffered discrimination based on his
disability. Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 2004).
We review summary judgment of an action under the Act de novo, view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all inferences in his
favor. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263
(11th Cir. 2007).
Cordero failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on his
morbid obesity. Cordero contends that his supervisor, Danny Riley, harbored
2
discriminatory animus toward him as evidenced by harassing him about his weight
and recommending to Katherine Andrews that she terminate Cordero, but Cordero
failed to present evidence of a causal link between Riley’s alleged discrimination
and Andrew’s later decision to terminate Cordero. The record establishes that,
after Riley had been terminated, Andrews terminated Cordero based on her
personal knowledge of and dissatisfaction with Cordero’s performance. Because
Andrews made an independent decision to terminate Cordero, the alleged animus
of Riley cannot be imputed to Andrews. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261
F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001). Andrews also was not required to investigate
the possibility of discriminatory animus when Cordero never mentioned to
Andrews or any coworker that Riley discriminated against Cordero because of his
weight. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir.
1998).
Even if Cordero had established a prima facie case of discrimination, he
failed to prove that the legitimate reasons proffered for his termination were
pretextual. The Department presented evidence that Cordero was terminated for
failing to comply with a corrective action plan instituted after he missed several
deadlines and submitted deficient work. Cordero argues that the Department failed
to adhere to its policy of thirty-day performance improvement plans and singled
3
him out for additional writing responsibilities, but these arguments do not establish
that the reasons for Cordero’s termination were pretextual. See Chapman v. AI
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Provided that the
proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee
must meet that reason head on and rebut it.”). “We are not in the business of
adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole
concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged
employment decision.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d
1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). Cordero failed to present evidence that would create
a genuine issue of material fact about whether the reasons for his termination were
discriminatory or unworthy of credence. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d
1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
The summary judgment in favor of the Department is AFFIRMED, and its
cross-appeal is DISMISSED.
4