[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 7, 2008
No. 08-10857 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A97-200-783
FRANK MARTINEZ MARIN,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(November 7, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
With counsel,1 Frank Martinez Marin, a native and citizen of Colombia,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) final order
affirming the IJ’s denial of his claims for asylum.2 Marin argues that his testimony
should have been deemed credible and that he established a well-founded fear of
future persecution by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) on
account of his political opinion on return to Colombia. After careful review, we deny
his petition.
When considering a petition to review a BIA final order, we review legal issues
de novo. Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001). The
BIA’s factual findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001). Under this test, we affirm the BIA’s
decision if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” Id. at 1284 (quotation omitted). “To reverse a factual
finding by the BIA, [we] must find not only that the evidence supports a contrary
conclusion, but that it compels one.” Farquharson v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 246 F.3d 1317,
1
During his appeal to the BIA, Marin filed a pro se notice of appeal and brief, which we
liberally construe. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
2
Because Marin concedes on appeal that he did not demonstrate past persecution before
the IJ, and does not develop in his appellate brief arguments related to the subjection to
withholding of removal or protection under United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, he has abandoned these issues.
Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
2
1320 (11th Cir. 2001). We review only the BIA decision except to the extent the BIA
expressly adopts the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) opinion or reasoning. Al Najjar, 257
F.3d at 1284. In this case, the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision and expanded
on the decision in its own opinion.
An alien, who is present in the United States, may apply for asylum. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General or Secretary of DHS have discretion to
grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . .
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself . . . of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . .
political opinion . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The alien carries the burden of proving
statutory “refugee” status. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284.
While the INA does not define persecution, we have held that “[p]ersecution
is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal
harassment or intimidation.” Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir.
2006) (quotations omitted). A well-founded fear of future persecution may be
established by showing a reasonable possibility of personal future persecution that
cannot be avoided by relocating within the subject country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1),
3
(2); Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231. If the BIA finds that the alien could avoid a future
threat by relocating to another part of his country, he cannot demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)-(2), 208.16(b)(1)-(2);
Mazariegos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).
The well-founded fear inquiry has both a subjective and objective component --
that is, the applicant must show that his fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. “The subjective component is generally
satisfied by the applicant’s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears
persecution.” Id. “[T]he objective prong can be fulfilled either by establishing past
persecution or that he . . . has a ‘good reason to fear future persecution.’” Id.
(quotations omitted). “Demonstrating such a connection requires the alien to present
specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he . . . will be singled out
for persecution on account of” a statutory factor. Id. at 1287 (quotations omitted).
“[E]vidence that either is consistent with acts of private violence or the petitioner’s
failure to cooperate with guerillas . . ., does not constitute evidence of persecution
based on a statutorily protected ground.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247,
1258 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, when family remains in the country of
origination without persecution, the petitioner’s fear of future persecution may be
undermined. See id. at 1259.
4
On the record here, substantial evidence supports the determination that Marin
was not eligible for asylum because he did not show that he reasonably feared future
persecution on account of his political opinion.3 Marin admitted that he was not a
member of a political party and his assistance to a politically involved uncle was
“nothing like in the campaign or voting or anything like that.” Further, Marin’s
testimony and statements indicated that the FARC desired to recruit him because of
his computer skills and did not resort to actions beyond phone calls and in-person,
non-violent requests. That the FARC targeted Marin because he failed to cooperate
does not constitute persecution on account of political opinion. See Ruiz, 440 F.3d
at 1258 (holding that a petitioner’s failure to cooperate with guerillas does not
constitute evidence of persecution).
Moreover, these phone calls and in-person requests do not compel the
conclusion the Marin will be singled out for future persecution on account of his
political opinion. See Silva, 448 F.3d at 1239 (holding that persecution is more than
incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation). Nor can we ignore the fact that
Marin’s mother continued residence in Cali, Colombia without persecution. See
Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1259. In short, substantial evidence supports the determination that
3
Because substantial evidence independently supports the conclusion that Marin did not
have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his political opinion, we need not address
whether the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence.
5
Marin was not entitled to asylum because he failed to establish a well-founded fear
of future persecution on account of political opinion. See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at
1283-84.
DENIED.
6