[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 7, 2008
Nos. 07-15646 & 07-15703 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 06-00042-CR-WDO-001-5
90-00071-CR-WDO-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEXTER LEE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 7, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dexter Lee Williams appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D) and 21 U.S.C. §
846, and misprision of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4. He also appeals the reasonableness
of his 60-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3583. We affirm.
I.
Williams argues that the district court erred by failing to advise him of his
rights (1) to confront adverse witnesses, (2) to be protected from compelled self-
incrimination, (3) to testify and present evidence, and (4) to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses. See F ED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1). Williams further argues that
he was prejudiced by the district court’s error because the government’s case relied
on wiretap evidence and possible testimony from co-defendants, experts, and other
witnesses.
Because Williams did not “object to a Rule 11 violation, we review only for
plain error. To establish plain error, a defendant must show there is (1) error, (2)
that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Moriarty, 429
F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The “defendant . . . must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.”
United States v. Dominguez-Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340, 159
L. Ed. 2d 157 (2004).
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“A court accepting a guilty plea must comply with Rule 11 and specifically
address three ‘core principles,’ ensuring that a defendant (1) enters his guilt plea
free from coercion, (2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands
the consequences of his plea.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019. The defendant’s plea
colloquy will generally be upheld if it adequately addresses Rule 11’s core
principles, even if the court failed to address a specific Rule 11 issue. See United
States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, Williams’ written plea agreement included a paragraph outlining that
he had the rights (1) to confront and cross-examine the government’s proof, (2) to
testify on his own behalf, but that he could not be compelled to do so, and (3) to
present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf. Williams’ right to compel
witness attendance was not discussed at the Rule 11 hearing. Because the district
court nevertheless adequately addressed Rule 11’s three core principles and
Williams has not shown that, but for the court’s error, he would not have pleaded
guilty, Williams’ guilty pleas are not invalid. We accordingly affirm his
convictions.
II.
Williams next argues that the district court unreasonably imposed the
statutory maximum sentence upon revoking his supervised release. “We review a
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district court’s decision to exceed the Chapter 7 recommended guidelines range for
an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam). We review for reasonableness the sentence imposed upon the
revocation of supervised release. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-
07 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
A defendant whose supervised release term is revoked may not be required
to serve “more than [60 months] in prison if the offense that resulted in the term of
supervised release is a Class A felony . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines recommends a range of 27 to 33 months for a Grade A
violation with a category II criminal history if the defendant was on supervised
release as a result of a sentence for a Class A felony. U.S. S ENTENCING
G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 7B1.4(a) (2007). “Where the original sentence was the
result of a downward departure . . . , an upward departure may be warranted.” §
7B1.4 cmt. n.4.
Here, neither party disputes that the revocation of supervised release was
mandatory, that Williams’ original offense was a Class A felony, or that the
applicable statutory maximum sentence was 60-months’ imprisonment. The
district court also explicitly considered the Chapter 7 guideline range. The court
determined, however, that the range was inadequate.
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The court instead imposed the statutory maximum sentence, which was
reasonable under the circumstances. Williams previously received a substantial
downward departure. His original sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment was
reduced to 148 months’ imprisonment. Because he subsequently committed
numerous violations while on supervised release, his upward departure for
violating supervised release was warranted. See U.S. S ENTENCING G UIDELINES
M ANUAL § 7B1.4 cmt. n.4. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing a 60-month sentence upon revoking Williams’ supervised release.
CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we discern no
reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
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