[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-13061 November 3, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00001-CV-4
ANGELA DENISE THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
A. MARK LEE,
COMMISSIONERS OF EFFINGHAM COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 3, 2008)
Before HULL, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Angela Denise Thomas appeals the district court’s order dismissing
as time-barred her federal due process claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Termination of Thomas
Thomas was employed as an administrative assistant to defendant A. Mark
Lee, the Solicitor General of Effingham County. On June 21, 2005, Lee
personally informed Thomas that she was terminated for making disparaging
remarks about county officials and improperly using the county’s computers.
Thomas immediately requested a hearing. Lee denied Thomas’s request on
grounds that she was not a merit system employee subject to the county’s
personnel rules. On the same day, Lee sent Thomas a letter confirming her
termination.
Thomas submitted a formal written request, dated June 21, 2005, to Lee and
Effingham County’s human resources director to appeal her discharge. On June
22, 2005, Lee sent Thomas another letter reiterating and elaborating upon the
grounds for her dismissal. On June 29, 2005, Thomas sent a second appeal
request, stating that if she did not receive a response within five days, she would
deem the appeal denied. Thomas received no response to her second request.
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B. Thomas’s Unemployment Compensation Claim
Thomas sought unemployment compensation benefits from the Georgia
Department of Labor (“GDOL”). On July 13, 2005, an administrative officer
denied Thomas benefits. Thomas appealed and, on January 26, 2007, GDOL’s
Board of Review affirmed the denial of benefits.
Thomas appealed GDOL’s decision to the Superior Court of Effingham
County. On June 5, 2007, the Superior Court granted partial summary judgment,
concluding that: (1) Thomas was subject to Effingham County civil service
policies, and her termination was contrary to those policies because Lee did not
have the authority to discharge Thomas without approval from the human
resources department and the county administrator; and (2) Thomas was entitled to
a discharge hearing to determine whether she could be discharged for cause. That
action remains pending to determine the amount of unemployment compensation
Thomas is due.
C. Thomas’s § 1983 Action
On November 30, 2007, Thomas filed this separate action in the Superior
Court of Effingham County against Lee and Effingham County Board of
Commissioners. Thomas’s complaint asserted, pursuant to § 1983, a claim that
her due process rights were violated when she was terminated without a hearing.
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The complaint also sought a writ of mandamus pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 to
compel Effingham County to hold a hearing on her termination and asserted
against Lee a claim of tortious interference with her employment contract. The
defendants removed the action to federal court.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Thomas’s
§ 1983 due process claims, concluding that they were brought outside the
applicable two-year statute of limitations. The district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Thomas’s state law claims and remanded them to
the Effingham County Superior Court. Thomas filed this appeal.1
II. DISCUSSION
Thomas argues that Georgia’s four-year statute of limitations for injuries to
personalty governs her § 1983 claim. However, it is well-settled that § 1983
actions filed in Georgia are governed by Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations
for personal injury claims. See Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626
(11th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, when the § 1983 claim relates to an unlawful
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We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim as barred by the statute of
limitations. Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007). Thomas does not
challenge the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remand of the state
law claims to the Effingham County Superior Court. Although Thomas’s brief states in passing
that she appeals the district court’s order assessing costs of $350, she offers no substantive
argument as to why this ruling was erroneous and thus has abandoned this claim. See Doe v.
Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.10 (11th Cir. 2005).
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termination, the limitations period begins to run when the termination decision is
made and communicated to the employee. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8,
102 S. Ct. 28, 29 (1981).
Lee told Thomas she was terminated on June 21, 2005. Thus, Thomas had
until June 21, 2007 to file her § 1983 due process claim. Thomas did not file this
action until November 30, 2007, five months too late.
Thomas argues that her claim did not accrue until June 5, 2007, when the
Superior Court ruled that she was a county employee entitled to civil service
protection and she became “aware of her property right status.” She also argues
that the limitations period was “tolled” while she pursued her unemployment
compensation claim.
Thomas’s accrual argument is foreclosed by Chardon. See Chardon, 454
U.S. at 8; 102 S. Ct. at 29 (explaining that the proper focus is on the alleged
unlawful employment act, “not the point at which the consequences of the act
become painful”). The alleged due process violation occurred on June 21, 2005
when Thomas was fired without a hearing. Thomas knew she was fired without a
hearing because Lee told her so at the time and also sent her a letter confirming
this fact. Thus, Thomas’s claim accrued on June 21, 2005.
Thomas’s tolling argument also fails. For § 1983 claims, we borrow not
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only the state’s statute of limitations, but also its body of tolling rules unless it is
inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the claim. See Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-86, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1795-
96 (1980); see also Hawthorne v. Wells, 761 F.2d 1514, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985).
As a general proposition of Georgia law, other pending lawsuits, even if they may
affect the parties rights, do not toll a statute of limitations. See McCabe v. Garrett,
211 Ga. App. 848, 848, 440 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1994) (“[T]he rule that the statute of
limitations begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrues is
not affected by the fact that the result of a pending lawsuit may largely affect a
party’s rights.” ) (quoting Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 741, 744,
197 S.E.2d 848, 850-51 (1973)). Thomas also does not point to any Georgia
tolling rule that pursuit of an unemployment insurance claim somehow tolls the
statute of limitations on her due process claim.
Given that Thomas did not file her § 1983 due process claim within the two-
year limitations period and did not show circumstances warranting the tolling of
the limitations period, the district court properly dismissed Thomas’s § 1983 due
process claim.
AFFIRMED.
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