This action was brought to recover damages which plaintiff claims he suffered through the fraud of defendant in selling him the relinquishment to one tract of land, when representing to him and leading him to believe he was purchasing a relinquishment to a more valuable piece. Plaintiff recovered judgment; a new trial was denied; and defendant has appealed from the judgment and order denying a new trial.
The printed record filed herein wholly fails to comply with the provisions of chapter 15, Laws 1911, as construed by this court in the case of State v. Doran, 28 S. D. —, 134 N. W. 53 ; but, in conformity with what was said in Atlas Lumber Co. et al. v. Quirk, 28 S. D. —, 135 N. W. 172, recently decided by this court, we have examined the original record filed herein.
[x] Appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support-the verdict and the correctness of one instruction given to the jury. He concedes that, if this instruction were proper, the evidence 'would sustain the verdict. Respondent contends that the instructions were in no manner excepted to; and an examination of the record sustains such contention. The only reference to such an. exception is in a proposed bill of exceptions, which was never settled, and had no proper place in the record. It appears that appellant started to settle a bill of exceptions under the old law, and before same was settled it was stipulated that a bill might be settled under chapter 15, Laws 1911, which was done. This bill shows no exceptions to the instructions, and the proposed bill (which was not settled) shows that appellant filed exceptions to the instructions July 10, 1911, while judgment was entered May 13, 1911. This court has repeatedly held that, as against the appellant, an instruction, not excepted to, becomes the law of the case.
[2,4] There was no motion to'direct a verdict; hence no exception to any ruling of the court upon the sufficiency of the evi
[5] Appellant asked for a new trial on the ground of 'newly discovered evidence. This motion was addressed to the-wise discretion of the court, and we are satisfied that there was no abuse of such discretion.
The judgment and order are affirmed.