[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-10417 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 23, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-01271-CV-TWT-1
JAMES RAMSEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN VICTOR L. WALKER,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 23, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Ramsey, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the final judgment
entered against him on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. The district
court initially denied his § 2254 petition in October 2001 based on its finding that
the petition was time-barred because he did not timely file it within the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) one-year statute of
limitations. Ramsey did not appeal that ruling. In October 2007 he filed the
instant Rule 60(b) motion for relief based on an alleged clarification of law
regarding AEDPA’s statute of limitations, as explained in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545
U.S. 524, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005), and Day v. Chatman, 130 Fed.
Appx. 349 (11th Cir. May 3, 2005) (unpublished).
The district court denied Ramsey’s Rule 60(b) motion based on its finding
that the motion was not filed within one year or a reasonable time of the underlying
denial of his habeas petition. The court granted Ramsey a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) on the issue of “whether his motion for relief from
judgment was filed within a reasonable time.”
On appeal, Ramsey argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment because he filed the
motion within a reasonable time. He also argues that the court’s denial of his
habeas petition was based on the erroneous finding that the petition was untimely
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under AEDPA’s statute of limitations.1
The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Crapp v. City of Miami Beach Police Dep't, 242 F.3d 1017, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001).
The district court has broad discretion in ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion. See Cano
v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006). “An appeal of a ruling on a Rule
60(b) motion . . . is narrow in scope, addressing only the propriety of the denial or
grant of relief,” and not issues regarding the underlying judgment. American
Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338
(11th Cir. 1999). “Because of this limitation, the law is clear that Rule 60(b) may
not be used to challenge mistakes of law which could have been raised on direct
appeal.” Id.
We may affirm the district court’s decision on any grounds supported by the
record. Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.2 (11th Cir. 2004).
The catchall provision of Rule 60(b) authorizes relief from judgment based
on “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Motions under
Rule 60(b)(6) must be filed within a “reasonable time . . . after the entry of the
judgment or order.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1). A determination of what constitutes a
1
We note that Ramsey relies solely upon the catchall provision from Rule 60(b)(6) on
appeal. Accordingly, any claims under other subsections of the rule are abandoned. See Timson
v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, (2008) (discussing abandonment).
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reasonable time depends on the facts in an individual case, and in making the
determination, courts should consider whether the movant had a good reason for
the delay in filing and whether the non-movant would be prejudiced by the delay.
Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976).
A motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) must “demonstrate that the
circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief. Even then, whether
to grant the requested relief is . . . a matter for the district court’s sound discretion.”
Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). In order for us to reverse a district court’s denial
of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion on appeal, the appellant must demonstrate that the
district court was required to grant relief. Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342.
A change of law alone does not provide grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 1987). In Ritter, we reversed the
denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, which depended on a change of law, only
because the district court judgment had not been executed, there was minimal
delay between the motion for relief and the finality of the judgment, and
considerations of comity argued for the relief. Id. at 1401-03 (reversing the district
court’s denial of the state’s motion for relief from judgment when the court’s
underlying judgment granted habeas relief and ordered resentencing in state court).
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In Gonzalez the Supreme Court addressed an appellant’s argument that he
was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), based on a change of law, from a
judgment that his § 2254 habeas petition was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536, 125 S.Ct. at 2650. Even assuming that the
law actually changed, the Court noted that a change of law “is hardly
extraordinary” and “not every interpretation of the federal statutes setting forth the
requirements for habeas provides cause for reopening cases long since final.” Id.
The Court also noted the appellant’s “lack of diligence in pursuing review of the
statute-of-limitations issue” because he did not raise the issue in attempting to
appeal the decision, and ultimately held that the appellant did not demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 537-38, 125 S.Ct. at 2651.
AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a § 2254 habeas
petition, which begins to run following one of four events, including “the date on
which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(A).
Accordingly, the judgment becomes “final” after the expiration of the 90 days in
which the petitioner could file a petition of certiorari. Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d
770, 774 (11th Cir. 2002). This 90-day period starts running from the date of the
“entry of judgment, and not the issuance of the mandate.” Chavers v. Secretary,
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Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006).
The one-year statute of limitations is tolled by statute while “a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
We conclude, based on the record, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Ramsey’s Rule 60(b) motion because it was not filed within a
reasonable time of the court’s denial of his § 2254 petition.2 Notably, he filed the
motion more than six years after the denial of his § 2254 petition and two years
after the cases on which he relied were decided. Nonetheless, even assuming,
arguendo, that Ramsey’s Rule 60(b) motion was timely, we conclude that the
clarification or change of law that he alleged resulted from Day did not
demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Ramsey’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief.
AFFIRMED.
2
We note that the district court properly treated Ramsey’s motion for relief as a true Rule
60(b) motion, rather than a successive habeas petition, because he sought relief from the court’s
dismissal of his § 2254 based only on an alleged error in the court’s application of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535-36, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 2650, 162
L.Ed.2d 480 (2005).
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