In March, 1918, an accusation ivas filed in this court accusing' defendant of certain unprofessional conduct as a member of the ‘bar of this state. This accusation was referred to the Attorney General, with directions to investigate the matter set out in said accusation and to report the result of his investigation to this court. The report filed by the Attorney Genaral was such that the court felt warranted in issuing an' order directing that official to prepare and serve on defendant a formal com>plaint. The matter was delayed because of the ill health of the defendant, and the complaint was not served until the 6th of September, 1918.
The complaint charges that at divers times, for several years previous to the filing of the complaint, the defendant had published and. circulated a booklet -entitled “The Daw of Marriage, Annulment, Domicile, Divorce,” purporting to contain a synopsis of the laws of the various states pertaining to Marriage, Annul
It is the theory of the complainant that the said booklet referred to in the complaint was published, sold, and distributed by defendant for the purpose of advertising, first, the state of South Dakota as the place where divorces could be most easily obtained, as compared with other states; and, second, defendant as the man who was the -best qualified of any one in the state to procure such divorce.
[1] That such was the purpose of said publication is too plain to leave any room for argument. Reference to a few' of the matters contained in said booklet will suffice to support this conclusion. At pages 39 to 50, inclusive, thereof, is set out what purports to be the statutory causes that will authorize an “absolute divorce” in the various states. On page 47 the causes for divorce in South, Dakota are stated as follows:
“(1) Consanguinity ("nearer than second cousins) ; (2) Fraudulent contract: (3') Force in bringing about the marriage; (4) Duress in compelling marriage; (5) Unsound mind of either party; (6) Another husband or wife living, undivorced; (7) Nonage; (8) Impotency; (9) Adultery; (10) Extreme cruelty, physical or mental; (11) Willful desertion for one year; (12) Driving the other from home by cruelty, threats, strategem, or fraud:; (13) Refusal of matrimonial intercourse for one year; (14) Failure of the husband to support wife for one year; (15) Habitual intemperance for one year; (16) 'Conviction for felony.”
[2] Section 137, 'Code 1919, enumerates .the only grounds— six in number — on which a divorce m'ay be granted in, this state; therefore defendant’s statement that there are sixteen causes for divorce must necessarily be incorrect and misleading. This is
On page 69 of the booklet is a table purporting to give the length of time one must have resided in the various states before he can commence an action for divorce. The time necessary for acquiring a domicile in this state is fixed at seven months, and on page 82 is the folowing paragraph relative to domicile:
“Action may be commenced after a domicile of the plaintiff within the state for six months. 'Cause may be tried before the court, on the equity side, thirty days after service on defendant. Annulment suits are governed ¡by the provisions respecting citizenship, which, like domicile, is acquired in six months. If the cause accrued while the plaintiff was domiciled without the state, one year’s domicile is required.”
[3] No part of this statement of the law is positively false, though it is so badly garbled as to be misleading and deceiving. Sections 156 and 158 require a residence of one year, provided that, if the cause of action arises in this state, then a residence of six months is sufficient. A comparison of the table found on page 69 of the booklet with the statute of the various states will show that, in nearly all the states except ¡South Dakota, the length of residence is given at from two to ten months longer than that prescribed by the statutes. The effect of this is, of course, and it could have been intended to have no other effect, to -convince a nonresident that he could get a divorce quicker by coming to South Dakota than he could any place else.
[4] The newspaper articles mentioned in the complaint con
This -bring-s us to the more difficult question involved in the case to wit: What should be the judgment of the court The referee who tried the case recommends that defendant be censured by the court for his unprofessional and dishonorable conduct and that he be ordered to refrain and desist from such conduct in the future. The Attorney General excepts to the referee’s recommendation, but does not recommend disbarment.
[5] It appears from the evidence that defendant was admitted to the bar in 1889, and that he has been engaged in the
“The ethics of the profession forbid that an attorney should advertise his talents or his skill as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. An attorney may properly accept a retainer for the prosecution or defense of an action for divorce when convinced that his client has a good cause. But for any one to invite or. encourage such litigation is most reprehensible.” People v. McCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 32 Pac. 280, 19 L. R. A. 231, 36 Am. St. Rep. 270.
The practice of advertising or encouraging divorce litigation could hardly be condemned in stronger language, nor in our opinion could the condemnation be too strong. Re Schnitzer, 33 Nev. 581, 112 Pac. 848, 33 T. R. A. (N. S.) 941.
[6] To disbar defendant would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood after he has reached a time of life when it would be difficult for him to take up any other business. It is not at all likely that, if defendant is permitted to continue to practice law, he will ever again be guilty of any of the offenses charged in the complaint. But, on the- other hand, his offense against the ethics of the profession has been to flagrant .to be dismissed with a mere reprimand. To do so would be to reduce the case to a mere farce.
Tire judgment of the court will be that defendant will stand suspended from the right to practice for a period of six months from the entry of judgment herein.