The uncontradicted evidence at the trial of this action showed that immediately before and at the time the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, and which the defendant was driving, skidded and ran off the highway, the defendant was driving, knowingly and wilfully, at a greater rate of speed than forty-five miles per hour. *577He was driving at a rate of sixty-five miles per bour. He was, therefore, violating the statute, which provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to drive an automobile on a highway in this State at a greater rate of speed than forty-five miles per hour. N. C. Code of 1931, sec. 2621(46). The violation of this statute was in itself negligence. The conditions with respect to the weather, the traffic on the highway, or the surface and width of the highway, were immaterial. The speed at which the defendant was driving his automobile was unlawful, and therefore constituted negligence. All the evidence showed further that this negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the skidding of the automobile and the consequent injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
In Godfrey v. Coach Company, 201 N. C., 264, 150 S. E., 412, it is said: “The violation of a statute intended and designed to prevent injury to persons or property, or the failure to observe a positive requirement of the law, is under a uniform line of decisions, negligence per se, Dickey v. R. R., 196 N. C., 726, 147 S. E., 15; Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C., 125, 81 S. E., 1066, and when a violation or failure of this kind is admitted or established, it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Stultz v. Thomas, 182 N. C., 470, 109 S. E., 361.” See Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749, 161 S. E., 389.
There was, therefore, no error in the refusal of the court at the trial of this action to allow the motion of the defendant for judgment dismissing the action as of nonsuit, unless, as contended by the defendant, the plaintiff is barred of recovery because she failed to remonstrate with the defendant as to the speed at which he was driving the automobile in which she was riding as his invited guest, and to request him to lessen the speed, which she knew was too fast. The defendant does not contend that plaintiff contributed to her injuries by her own negligence in riding with him in his automobile under the conditions as to the weather, the traffic on the highway, and its width and surface, as shown by the evidence. His sole contention is that plaintiff assumed the hazards of a journey in an automobile, including the wilful negligence of the driver in violating a statute which prescribes the maximum speed at which an automobile may be lawfully driven on a highway in this State.
It is conceded that there are circumstances under which even an invited guest riding in an automobile driven by his host, owes the duty to himself to remonstrate against the excessive speed at which his host is driving his automobile, and to request him to lessen his speed, and that a failure on the part of such guest to discharge this duty bars his recovery of damages caused by the negligence of his host. King v. Pope, *578202 N. C.; 554, 163 S. E., 447, Nettles v. Rea, 200 N. C., 44, 156 S. E., 159. This principle, however, is not applicable to the facts shown by all the evidence in the instant case.
It does not appear from the evidence that plaintiff had an opportunity to discharge the duty imposed upon her by the law to remonstrate with the defendant and to request him to lessen his speed. Plaintiff and defendant had been driving only about a mile, when the defendant increased his speed to sixty-five miles per hour. His negligence, while probably not gross or wanton, was wilful and intentional, and could not have been anticipated by the plaintiff, when she entered defendant’s automobile as his guest.
Under the circumstances as shown by all the evidence, plaintiff was not required to remonstrate with the defendant, or to request him to lessen his speed, although she knew that he was driving too fast. The automobile skidded suddenly, before the plaintiff had an opportunity to protest to the defendant as to his speed. It cannot be held that she voluntarily assumed the risk of defendant’s wilful, and intentional negligence. There w^as no error in the refusal of the court to dismiss the action as of nonsuit.
Nor was there error in the refusal of the court to submit the issues tendered by the defendant. There wms no evidence tending to support defendant’s contentions with respect to these issues, which were not material to the trial. C. S., 584. The judgment is affirmed.
No error.
Stacy, C. J., and BbogdeN, J., dissenting opinions.