[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-12361 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
December 15, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
Agency No. A98-730-999
PAOLA ANDREA LORENA MANTILLA-ORDONEZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(December 15, 2008)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Paola Andrea Lorena Mantilla-Ordonez, a native and citizen of Colombia,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision,
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order finding her removable and denying
her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.1
Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision, we review the
IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). We
review the IJ’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence test and will
affirm if the decision “is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Mejia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 498 F.3d
1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). We review the IJ’s legal
determinations de novo. Id.
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
asylum, see INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), and the U.S. Attorney
General or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has discretion to
grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of “refugee,” see INA §
208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
. . . , and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
1
Because Mantilla-Ordonez does not raise any challenge in her brief to the denial of
withholding of removal or CAT relief, she has abandoned those issues. See Sepulveda v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2005).
2
INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
To establish asylum eligibility, the alien must, with specific and credible
evidence, establish (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or
(2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutorily listed factor will cause future
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. Not all
“exceptional treatment” constitutes persecution, which is “an extreme concept,
requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation . .
. .” Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A finding of past persecution creates the
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution and shifts the burden to the
government to demonstrate that either conditions have changed in the alien’s home
country, or the alien could avoid such persecution by relocating in the home
country and that relocation is reasonable. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). To rebut such a
showing, an applicant must show that she faces a threat of future persecution
country-wide. Arboleda, 434 F.3d at 1223.
To establish a “well-founded fear” of future persecution, “an applicant must
demonstrate that his or her fear of persecution is subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. Evidence that a petitioner
has relatives living unharmed in the home country diminishes a well-founded fear
claim. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2006).
3
The evidence in this case consisted of a single 15-minute instance, wherein
petitioner was held in a car against her will by FARC members with guns and told
to stop her political activities. Petitioner did not report the incident to the police.
Thereafter petitioner’s parents received a letter indicating that petitioner should
leave the city for five years. However, petitioner’s similarly-situated relatives
continue to live unharmed in the city. We find no error in the IJ’s determination
that petitioner did not suffer past persecution nor had established a reasonable fear
of future persecution.
PETITION DENIED.
4