IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 21, 2009
No. 07-30842 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
ROY BURTON
Petitioner-Appellant
v.
TERRY TERRELL, Warden, Allen Correctional Center
Respondent-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and HAYNES, Circuit
Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Roy Burton petitions for habeas relief, urging that he was never advised
of the maximum sentence he faced under Louisiana’s manslaughter statute,
rendering his plea in the state prosecution involuntary. The district court
rejected Burton’s claim. We granted a certificate of appealability to consider the
voluntariness issue and now AFFIRM.
No. 07-30842
I
Burton was charged with second degree murder and felony theft, and
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. At the time that Burton committed his offense
in April 2000, the statutory maximum sentence for manslaughter was forty
years in prison, and there was no minimum sentence.1 The written guilty plea,
which Burton signed, did not disclose the maximum sentence, although it noted
the correct statutory provision and provided that Burton was “aware of the
minimum and maximum sentences provided.” At rearraignment, the trial court
did not advise Burton of the potential forty-year sentence, instead instructing
him that “the nature of the charge . . . is a felony which could result in a
penitentiary sentence if [you are] guilty.” The trial court also asked Burton if
defense counsel had informed him of “the minimum and maximum sentences
provided by law for manslaughter,” and Burton answered affirmatively.2 The
first recorded mention that the maximum sentence was forty years occurred
when Burton’s counsel acknowledged it at sentencing.
1
L A . REV . STAT . ANN . 14:31(B) (West 2000).
2
At rearraignment, the judge engaged in the following colloquy with Burton:
THE COURT: You understand the nature of the charge against you is a felony
which could result in a penitentiary sentence if you’re guilty?
MR. BURTON: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you’ve been told by [defense counsel] the minimum and
maximum sentences provided by law for manslaughter?”
MR. BURTON: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand what you could get, the range?
MR. BURTON: Yes, sir.
2
No. 07-30842
A Louisiana state court sentenced Burton to thirty years at hard labor. On
direct appeal, Burton’s counsel argued that his client’s sentence was excessive.
Burton also filed a pro se supplemental brief, asserting that his sentence was
excessive, that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance resulting in an
involuntary guilty plea, and that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was
never advised of the applicable statutory range of sentences. On the
voluntariness question, Burton asserted that his attorney mistakenly advised
him that he would face a maximum of ten to fifteen years in prison if he pleaded
guilty, and that he was not otherwise informed of the forty-year maximum
sentence he actually faced. The state appellate court affirmed Burton’s
conviction, addressing only his excessive sentence claim. Burton filed an
application for rehearing, which was denied. The Louisiana Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
Burton filed a state postconviction application, raising the same issues
addressed in his supplemental appellate brief. The state trial court rejected all
three claims, concluding that they were not reviewable in postconviction
proceedings. Although the state appellate court concluded, on review, that the
trial court erred in that assessment, it found Burton’s claims meritless. As to
Burton’s claim that he pled involuntarily, the appellate court concluded that he
“failed to prove that he did not understand the nature of the offense to which he
pled, that he was not made aware of the minimum or maximum sentence, or that
3
No. 07-30842
he was promised a cap of fifteen years of imprisonment.” 3 The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied writs, finding Burton’s claims “repetitive.”4
Burton then filed an application for federal habeas in the Western District
of Louisiana. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending denial,
concluding in relevant part that Burton’s plea was voluntary because the
transcript reflected that he understood the minimum and maximum sentences
available. The district court adopted the magistrate’s report after an
independent review and denied Burton’s habeas petition. In this federal habeas
corpus appeal, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
legal conclusions de novo.5
II
Burton’s tethers his habeas petition to the Due Process requirement that
a defendant “be advised and understand the consequences of a guilty plea.”6
With respect to sentencing, this means “that the defendant must know the
maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.” 7 In Boykin v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court held that “[i]t was error . . . for [a] trial judge to accept [a
3
State of Louisiana v. Roy Burton, No. KH 05-1497 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/5/06)
(unpublished).
4
State ex rel. Burton v. State, 949 So. 2d 436 (La. 2007).
5
Dorsey v. Quarterman, 494 F.3d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 2007); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d
941, 946 (5th Cir. 2001).
6
United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1990).
7
Id. at 447 (quoting Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d 634, 635 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also
Burdick v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ammirato, 670
F.2d 552, 555 (Former 5th Cir. 1982); Cheely v. United States, 535 F.2d 934, 935 (5th Cir.
1976); Tucker v. United States, 409 F.2d 1291, 1295 (5th Cir. 1969).
4
No. 07-30842
defendant’s] guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent
and voluntary.”8 The Court cautioned:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.
When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record
adequate for any review that may be later sought, and forestalls the
spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky
memories.9
Yet a trial court’s failure to discharge this duty by informing the defendant
of the maximum possible sentence does not invariably lead to constitutional
error. This court has consistently held that the critical question is not whether
the court informed the defendant of the maximum sentence, but whether the
defendant knew, in fact, the maximum he faced.10 While we acknowledge that
8
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Louisiana argues that Boykin does not require that an
individual be advised of the statutory maximum sentence he faces for a guilty plea to be valid.
This argument is unavailing in light of this court’s long-established precedent and Boykin’s
directive that the defendant have a full understanding “of the plea and its consequences.”
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44. The state fails to note that, in support of this proposition, Boykin
cites a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case recommending that the trial court “satisfy itself that
the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts
sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of
sentences.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 237 A.2d
196, 197-198 (Pa. 1968)) (emphasis added). See also Marvel v. United States, 380 U.S. 262
(1965) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding for a hearing to determine whether the
defendant was misled by the trial court as to the maximum sentence).
9
Id. at 243–44.
10
Burdick, 504 F.3d at 547 (“The question, then, is whether Burdick was advised by
someone, prior to pleading guilty, of her punishment range.”); Cheely, 535 F.2d at 935 (“The
question . . . is not whether [the defendant] learned of such penalty from the judge, his lawyer,
his bondsman, or from some other source.”) (quoting Tucker, 409 F.2d at 1295); see also Davis
v. Wainright, 547 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406
5
No. 07-30842
this is a “somewhat stingy implementation of . . . Boykin,” this court’s precedent
is clear that the source of the defendant’s actual knowledge is of no moment to
the plea’s constitutionality.11
In Burdick v. Quarterman,12 this court considered whether the defendant
was advised by someone, prior to pleading guilty, of her punishment range. The
defendant’s trial counsel had submitted an affidavit to the state habeas court
attesting that he had explained the applicable sentencing law and the “different
ranges of punishment.” 13 The state trial court found this affidavit credible.14
There was also evidence that during voir dire prior to the defendant’s guilty plea,
defense counsel referred to the range of imprisonment, specifically referencing
the maximum possible term, and the defendant acknowledged that she
(5th Cir. 1971) and McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1973)) (“The record
shows that counsel for [defendant] conferred with him . . . and discussed the possible
sentences. . . . Even if we accept [defendant’s] allegation that the Court failed to advise him
specifically of all of the rights he waived in pleading guilty, that failure does not of itself
render the plea involuntary.”).
11
Burdick, 504 F.3d at 547. We are not alone among circuits in this view. See, e.g.,
Pardue v. Burton, 26 F.3d 1093, 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (“If the state can demonstrate that a
defendant had full knowledge of the relevant provisions of the Youthful Offender Act, then
Boykin is not violated because the accused was in fact fully aware of his rights.”); Owens v.
Wainright, 698 F.2d 1111, 1113 (11th Cir. 1983) (although trial court failed to inform
defendant of minimum sentence, guilty plea was entered knowingly because attorney had so
advised defendant). Cf. United States v. Jenkins, 2000 WL 13596666 (4th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished) (magistrate advised defendant of a shorter maximum sentence than that
actually imposed but this did not violate due process because defendant was informed of
proper maximum sentence prior to arraignment and he did not show that he relied on judge’s
incorrect statement).
12
504 F.3d 545.
13
Id. at 548.
14
Id.
6
No. 07-30842
understood this maximum.15 We found that in light of this evidence, it was not
unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the defendant was advised of
her maximum sentence.16
Similarly, in Cheely v. United States, the defendant’s challenge to the
voluntariness of his plea failed in light of defense counsel’s sworn testimony that
he had informed the defendant of the plea’s consequences.17 This testimony was
partially corroborated by the defendant’s sister and the Assistant United States
Attorney who prosecuted the defendant.18
Louisiana contends that Burton is not entitled to relief based on his
admission at rearraignment and his signature on the plea agreement, calling
Burton’s current claims “blatantly untrue.” Indeed, “[s]olemn declarations in
open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation
of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary
dismissal.” 19 But Burton does not dispute that he made this declaration to the
trial court. Rather, he argues that his admission at rearraignment was the
result of a misunderstanding about the potential sentencing range suggested by
trial counsel. The question, then, is whether someone (or something) advised
him, prior to pleading guilty, of the accurate punishment range he faced.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
535 F.2d at 935.
18
Id.
19
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
7
No. 07-30842
III
Burton’s federal habeas petition is subject to the heightened standard of
review provided by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). When reviewing state proceedings, AEDPA proscribes federal habeas
relief unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or “resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding.” 20 Additionally, AEDPA requires us to “presume state court findings
of fact to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and
convincing evidence.” 21
The state court record reflects four salient points: the written plea
agreement and colloquy do not demonstrate on their face that Burton was aware
of the true forty-year maximum; Burton’s sworn statements during
rearraignment do not contradict his current contention that defense counsel
mistakenly informed him of a ten to fifteen year maximum; Burton curiously
submitted his Boykin claim separate and apart from his own counsel’s briefing;
and defense counsel stated at sentencing that his client faced a maximum
penalty of forty years. Because we presume the state court’s finding to be
correct–namely that Burton was indeed “made aware of the minimum or
maximum sentence” and “not promised a cap of fifteen years of
imprisonment”–he must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
20
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
21
Valdez, 274 F.3d at 947 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
8
No. 07-30842
state court erred. Burton has not done so, even though an affidavit from his own
trial counsel would ostensibly vindicate his claim. In light of the evidence before
the state court, and Burton’s failure to present clear and convincing evidence of
error, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the state court to infer that
Burton was in fact aware of the forty-year maximum when he pled guilty.
IV
If a habeas applicant cannot obtain relief on the basis of the factual record
before the state court, a federal court may nonetheless grant an evidentiary
hearing in limited circumstances.22 A court will only do so, however, if the
prisoner diligently and reasonably attempted, “in light of the information
available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” 23 For
state courts to have a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate the habeas
applicant’s constitutional claims, “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that
the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the
manner prescribed by state law.” 24 Even then, mere requests for an evidentiary
hearing will not demonstrate reasonable diligence.25
Burton was not diligent in developing the factual record–whether or not
he requested an evidentiary hearing from the state court–because he neither
claimed nor demonstrated that his trial counsel’s all-important affidavit “could
22
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 430 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
23
Williams, 529 U.S. at 435.
24
Id. at 437.
25
See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Williams, supra
note 22).
9
No. 07-30842
not be obtained absent an order for discovery or a hearing.” 26 He instead relied
solely on conclusory arguments just as he later did in seeking federal relief with
the petition now before this court.
Burton presented his claims to the state court and the state court rejected
them, with a finding of fact that we cannot disturb here. We affirm the
judgment of the district court denying relief.
AFFIRMED.
26
Id. We need not consider whether Burton effectively requested an evidentiary
hearing in state court. If he had, it was done so only implicitly. Burton’s briefs to the state
court, both on direct appeal and habeas, request “further proceedings” as to whether he was
informed of the elements of the crime, and request “specific performance of the [plea]
agreement” or “nullification or withdrawal of the plea” if Burton was found to be unaware of
the correct maximum sentence.
10