Cooper v. Noble

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-7678.

James COOPER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

W.B. "Billy" NOBLE, Sheriff of Madison County, et al.,
Defendants,

Jessie Hopkins, Sheriff of Madison County, Robert J. Dowdle,
Marcus Sharpe, David H. Richardson, Karl M. Banks & J.L.
McCullough, Members of the Madison County Board of Supervisors,
Defendants-Appellants.

Oct. 5, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi.

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Madison County officials1 appeal the United States

Magistrate Judge's denial of their motion for relief from a consent

judgment governing jail conditions in Madison County, Mississippi,

and his finding of contempt for violations of that judgment.

Finding no reversible error in the magistrate judge's rulings, we

affirm.

I

This litigation commenced in 1978, when a group of Madison

County Jail inmates filed a class action against Madison County

officials challenging conditions at the jail. The parties

1
The county officials bringing this appeal are the Madison
County Sheriff and the members of the Madison County Board of
Supervisors.

1
negotiated an interim consent agreement, which was accepted by the

district court and entered as an interim judgment. The interim

judgment incorporated a wide variety of remedial measures, and its

directives covered matters ranging from racial discrimination to

the type of combs issued to inmates.2 A year later, the parties

agreed to allow the district court to refer their dispute to a

United States Magistrate Judge for all future proceedings and entry

of judgment. The parties then negotiated a second, substantively

similar, interim consent judgment. The magistrate judge entered

the final judgment, which also resembled previous agreements, soon

thereafter.

Although the magistrate judge has closely supervised the

jail's efforts to comply with the consent judgments, the inmates

petitioned the magistrate judge to hold the county officials in

contempt for violations of the first interim judgment and filed

similar motions three times after the final judgment.3 While each

2
The interim judgment was divided into the following 24
categories: nutrition, hygiene supplies, clothing, bedding,
writing materials and postage, medical attention, matrons, fire
safety, mail rules and regulations, custodial personnel, access
to attorneys and legal materials, reading materials, televisions
and radios, smoking, telephone calls, visitation, exercise and
recreation, use of force and corporal punishment, classification
of inmates, access to stores, daily cleanup, selection and
training of jail personnel, disciplinary procedures, and notice
of rules.
3
In their first four motions to have the county officials
charged with contempt, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that
inmates at the Madison County Jail had been beaten by guards,
denied adequate medical treatment, denied access to the exercise
yard, punished without notice or cause, denied toiletries and
hygiene materials, and denied clean linens and bath clothes.
They further alleged that the jail was understaffed and
overcrowded, that there was no matron or doctor on call at the

2
of the first three motions was dismissed after the county officials

agreed to new terms for compliance monitoring, the fourth was not

dismissed until the inmates reported that the county officials were

in substantial compliance with the final judgment.

A year later, and a decade after the magistrate judge issued

the final judgment, the county officials filed a motion for relief

prompted in large part by the county's construction of a new jail,

the Madison County Detention Center ("MCDC"). They filed the

motion under subparts (5) and (6) of Rule 60(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that changes in the operative

facts and applicable law warranted relief from the final judgment.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), (6). The county officials argued that

jail conditions and procedures had been radically altered by the

construction of the new facility, and were either in conformity

with or improvements upon the stipulations contained in the final

judgment. In their amended response to the Rule 60(b) motion, the

inmates once again asked the magistrate judge to hold the county

officials in contempt for violations of the final judgment.4

jail, and that inmates were allowed insufficient time to exercise
and use the telephone.
4
The inmates alleged that the MCDC violated the final
judgment by, inter alia, allowing overcrowding, providing
inadequate medical care (e.g., denying treatment, providing
inadequate treatment, and not having a nurse or doctor present
during sick calls), ignoring health guidelines for food service
(e.g., allowing food to be handled and served in unsafe ways, not
submitting menu proposals to a government dietitian, and not
serving juveniles whole milk), compromising inmates' health and
hygiene in other ways (e.g., not providing the required hygiene
supplies, not cleaning linens or facilities frequently enough,
and not providing sufficient opportunities for exercise),
neglecting minority groups (e.g., not providing special meals for

3
 The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the

motion for relief. He held that the county officials had failed to

show that relief from any part of the final judgment was warranted,

with the exception of those provisions concerning contact

visitation for pretrial detainees. The magistrate judge found that

the county officials had "ceased making any attempt to abide by the

conditions set out in the Final Judgment when they moved into the

new Madison County Detention Center" and were in violation of

several provisions of the final judgment.5 He denied the motion

for relief and held the officials in contempt of court for

violating the final judgment. The Madison County officials appeal

the magistrate judge's decision, arguing that he should have

granted their Rule 60(b) motion for relief and not held them in

contempt of court.

those whose religious beliefs prohibited their eating the regular
meal, not keeping a matron on call for female inmates, and not
separating juveniles and adults), limiting legal protections and
inmates' access to legal services (e.g., not following proper
procedure in disciplinary matters, not informing inmates of their
rights regarding access to legal materials, not allowing inmates
to meet with legal services personnel, and impeding inmates'
efforts to telephone their attorneys) and restricting privileges
(e.g., not allowing inmates to provide their own tennis shoes,
limiting reading material, not supplying inmates with televisions
and radios, hampering access to telephones, and limiting
visitation).
5
The magistrate found that the county officials had violated
the provisions of the final judgment requiring them to provide
special meals for prisoners who do not eat pork for religious
reasons, serve juveniles whole milk once a day, make a matron
available to the female inmates, inform inmates of a fire safety
plan and conduct fire drills, give inmates access to
jail-supplied televisions and radios, allow inmates adequate time
for exercise and visitation, and provide two guards for every
fifty inmates. The magistrate also noted that "there were
numerous other violations of the Final Judgment...."

4
 II

We review the magistrate judge's ruling on the Rule 60(b)

motion, and his finding of contempt, for abuse of discretion.6 In

doing so, we are mindful that our deference to the magistrate

judge's exercise of his discretion is heightened in cases such as

the one before us, which involve consent decrees directed at

institutional reform. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

502 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 748, 765, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting heightened deference owed to

district court findings in case involving implementation of a jail

reform consent decree). We owe substantial deference to the

magistrate judge's many years of experience with this matter. See

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2572, 57 L.Ed.2d

522 (1978) (holding that Court owed substantial deference to trial

judge in case involving prison reform).

A

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon

which the county officials based their request for relief from the

final judgment, provides in relevant part that:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ...
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

6
Both of the magistrate's rulings had the effect of
continuing the final judgment, and are therefore reviewable under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

5
The magistrate judge's denial of the county officials' motion for

relief from the final judgment is reviewable only for an abuse of

discretion. See Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc., 828 F.2d 325 (5th

Cir.1987) ("We review a denial of Rule 60(b) relief under an abuse

of discretion standard.") (citation and footnote omitted).

In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Supreme Court

set forth the standard to be applied in ruling on a Rule 60(b)

motion in institutional reform litigation cases such as this one.

502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 760. The Court interpreted Rule

60(b), which provides for relief from a court order when "it is no

longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application," as requiring the party seeking relief to "bear[ ] the

burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstance

warrants revision of the decree." Id. A party may meet this

burden in one of two ways: "by showing either a significant change

in factual conditions or in law." Id.

1

The county officials contend that "dramatic" and "unforeseen"

changes have occurred in the Madison County prison system since the

final judgment was entered. They assert that: (1) the MCDC houses

many more prisoners than the old jail, (2) the MCDC receives

prisoners from many different governmental agencies, (3) the

inmates at the MCDC have more diverse criminal records, (4) most of

the inmates at the MCDC are pretrial detainees, (5) only juveniles

adjudicated as adults reside at the MCDC, (6) the MCDC no longer

houses mental patients, and (7) the MCDC is subject to inspections

6
by the governmental agencies from which it receives inmates.

When significant changes in factual conditions make a consent

judgment unworkable, make compliance substantially more onerous, or

make enforcement detrimental to the public interest, a court has

the discretion to modify the judgment. Rufo, 502 U.S. at ----, 112

S.Ct. at 760. However, the Supreme Court never suggested that

changed factual circumstances in and of themselves were sufficient

grounds for relief from a judgment. In fact, the Court insisted

that the petitioning party must "ma[k]e a reasonable effort to

comply with the decree." Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 761. Thus,

even if we take as true all the alleged changes in factual

conditions, the county officials are far from meeting their burden

under Rufo. The county officials must also: (1) show that those

changes affect compliance with, or the workability or enforcement

of, the final judgment, and (2) show that those changes occurred

despite the county officials' reasonable efforts to comply with the

judgment. The county officials have not met either requirement.

See id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 760-61. They do not adequately

explain how increased inspections and changes in the number and

diversity of inmates affect the workability of the final judgment,

compliance with the judgment, or enforcement of the judgment.

Neither do they show that those changes, many or all of which were

changes made by the county officials,7 occurred despite their

7
The county officials offered into evidence a government
memorandum stating: "We are now enjoying the use of this new 4.7
million dollar facility [the MCDC], made possible through the
hard work of the Sheriff and Board of Supervisors...." (Record
on Appeal, Defs.' Ex. 7). Also, testimony revealed that the MCDC

7
reasonable efforts to comply with the judgment.

To find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in

denying the Rule 60(b) motion, "[i]t is not enough that the

granting of relief might have been permissible, or even

warranted—denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an

abuse of discretion." Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396,

402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (emphasis in original). The

magistrate judge, after a full evidentiary hearing, found that the

county officials "made no showing that changed factual conditions

make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous; that

the Final Judgment is unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles;

that enforcement of the decree without modification would be

detrimental to the public interest...." We hold that based on the

evidence before him, the magistrate judge did not abuse his

discretion in finding that the county officials failed to

demonstrate that changes in factual conditions compelled him to

grant the Rule 60(b) motion for relief.

2

The county officials also contend that changes in the law

governing prison conditions litigation compelled the magistrate

judge to grant their Rule 60(b) motion for relief. Specifically,

the county officials argue that the Supreme Court's decision in

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271

(1991), changed the law applicable to prison reform cases by

"add[ing] a subjective component to a plaintiff's burden of proof

voluntarily accepts federal inmates.

8
in a prison conditions case." (Record on Appeal, Appellants' Br.

at 27). The Supreme Court has held that "modification of a consent

decree may [also] be warranted when the statutory or decisional law

has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent."

Rufo, 502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762. However, while federal

courts "may not order States or local governments, over their

objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing

a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated," the Court

recognized that parties to a consent judgment "could settle the

dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations

that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution

itself requires ... but also more than what a court would have

ordered absent the settlement." Id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at

762-63.

The Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson is not a change in law

that would satisfy the Rufo requirements because it is not

applicable to the enforcement of a consent decree. As the Supreme

Court stated in Rufo, a court may enforce agreements in consent

judgments that are not constitutionally mandated. Rufo, 502 U.S.

at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63.8 The very nature of a consent

8
This is not to say that a court may not, in its discretion,
choose to modify a consent agreement to reflect the relaxation of
constitutional mandates. The magistrate recognized this when he
modified a section of the consent judgment requiring contact
visitation for pretrial detainees, in deference to a Supreme
Court ruling that denying pretrial detainees such visitation for
security reasons is not unconstitutional. See Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984).
The Rufo Court held only that modification is not compelled in
such cases. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762-
63.

9
agreement is such that parties will agree to act in ways they do

not believe the Constitution requires in order to "save themselves

the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation." Id., 502

U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762 (quoting United States v. Armour &

Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256

(1971)).9 We find that the magistrate judge did not abuse his

discretion in finding that changes in the law applicable to prison

conditions did not compel him to grant the county officials' Rule

60(b) motion for relief.

B

Finally, the county officials contend that the magistrate

judge erred in holding them in contempt of court for failure to

comply with the final judgment. The county officials do not argue

that they are in total compliance, but that they are in substantial

compliance, and that the only provisions of the final judgment they

have violated are those that the magistrate judge should have

modified under Rufo. We review the magistrate judge's finding of

contempt for abuse of discretion. Martin v. Trinity Industries,

959 F.2d 45, 46 (5th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Sorrells,

877 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir.1989)). We review the magistrate

judge's assessment of the evidence supporting that finding for

clear error. Martin, 959 F.2d at 45-46 (citing Petroleos Mexicanos

v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir.1987)).

The county officials argue only substantial compliance, admitting

9
This analysis is equally applicable to the other changes in
constitutional law mentioned in the county officials' brief.

10
to noncompliance in some areas. For example, the county officials

acknowledge that they do not provide radios and televisions for the

inmates as required by the final judgment, and do not allow as much

visitation and outdoor exercise as required by the final judgment.

We have already considered and rejected the county officials'

argument that Rufo compels modification of those provisions. Thus,

we conclude that the magistrate judge's finding of contempt was

neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of his discretion.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM both the magistrate

judge's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the final

judgment and his finding of contempt.

11