[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 4, 2008
No. 08-10158 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00380-CR-01-RWS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HECTOR PINEDA MENDOZA,
a.k.a. Hector Mendoza,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 4, 2008)
Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After pleading guilty, Hector Pineda Mendoza appeals his 300-month
sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and 846. After review, we affirm.
The district court imposed a 300-month sentence, within the advisory
guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Mendoza
argues that the district court failed to explain the reasons for his sentence, as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). When a district court imposes a sentence
within the advisory guidelines range and in excess of 24 months, it must explain
“the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). To satisfy § 3553(c)(1)’s requirement, “[t]he sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered
the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2468 (2007). Although the district court must indicate that it considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, it does not have to “articulate its consideration of each
individual § 3553(a) factor, particularly where . . . it is obvious the court
considered many of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d
1176, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 2006).1
Here, the district court stated on the record that it had considered the §
1
We review de novo whether a district court complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), even
if the defendant did not preserve the issue. Bonilla, 463 F.3d at 1181.
2
3553(a) factors and identified several of particular concern that weighed most
heavily in its determination, including the nature and circumstances of the offense,
Mendoza’s history of drug trafficking, the seriousness of the offense and the need
for avoiding sentencing disparities. The district court’s statement of reasons was
adequate.
Mendoza also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.2 We
evaluate the ultimate sentence’s substantive reasonableness, considering the §
3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the
burden of showing that a sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Johnson, 485
F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007).3
We conclude Mendoza failed to carry his burden to show that the district
court abused its discretion in imposing a 300-month sentence, within the advisory
guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. Mendoza was a leader in a
large drug trafficking organization and was responsible for distributing hundreds of
kilograms of cocaine throughout the eastern United States. Under the
2
Apart from his § 3553(c)(1) argument, Mendoza does not argue that the district court
made any procedural errors in imposing his sentence or challenge any of the guidelines
calculations.
3
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall,
552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
3
circumstances, we cannot say Mendoza’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
4