[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-15324 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 28, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-61243-CV-KAM
WILLIAM HENRY ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. SATZ, State Attorney,
GERARD WILLIAMS, Assistant State Attorney,
JIMMIE L. HENDRY, Chairman of
Parole Commission,
M. DAVID, Assistant Chairman
of Parole Commission,
F. B. DUMPHY, Assistant Chairman of Parole,
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 28, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Henry Robinson, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. We
affirm.
I.
Robinson has been incarcerated since 1973 and is serving a life sentence for
murder. In his first complaint, Robinson alleged that at one time he had been
approved for work release, possessed gain-time credits, and expected to be paroled
in 1998. However, after the state attorney informed the Parole Commission that
the woman Robinson killed had also been raped, Robinson’s parole was denied and
his work release privileges were suspended. Robinson argued that because he was
never convicted of rape, the Parole Commission relied on false information to deny
him parole and his privileges. He also asserted that he was erroneously listed on
Florida’s sex offender website, which stigmatized him.
Robinson brought all of these claims in 2005. The district court dismissed
his lawsuit sua sponte for failure to state a claim. Robinson appealed. See
Robinson v. Satz, 260 Fed. Appx. 209 (11th Cir. 2007). We affirmed the dismissal
of Robinson’s claim that he was improperly denied parole and that his work release
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and gain-time privileges were wrongfully taken away. Robinson, 260 Fed. Appx.
at 211–13 (holding that the loss of work-release and gain-time was not actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Robinson could “not state a due process claim
simply by making a ‘conclusory allegation’ regarding the use of false information
by a parole board.”). We also held that Robinson had stated a claim by alleging
that he had been publicly listed on the Florida sex offender website without
receiving procedural due process. Id. at 213 (“An inmate who has never been
convicted of a sex crime is entitled to due process before the state declares him to
be a sex offender,” quoting Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
1999)).1 Accordingly, after affirming the dismissal of Robinson’s parole, work
release, and gain-time claims, we vacated the dismissal of his sex-offender
designation claim and remanded that claim alone to the district court. Robinson,
260 Fed. Appx. at 213.
On remand, Robinson filed an amended complaint asserting that we had
misunderstood his original claim about being listed as a sex offender. Robinson
denied and disavowed any claim that he had ever been listed on Florida’s sex
offender website. Instead, he claimed that he had been stigmatized by having
“false sex offense information” aired about him in the private documents and
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We also noted that if Robinson was not actually listed on the public website, summary
judgment in favor of the state would be appropriate. Robinson, 260 Fed. Appx. at 213 n.2.
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internal websites of the Florida Department of Corrections and the Florida Parole
Commission.
In light of Robinson’s amended complaint, a magistrate judge issued a report
and recommendation finding that Robinson had admitted that he was not listed on
any public website as a sex offender. Therefore, Robinson disavowed his only
claim that had survived dismissal— the claim that he had been publicly stigmatized
for being a sex offender without due process. See Kirby, 195 F.3d at 1292.
Further, the magistrate judge found that Robinson’s real reason for bringing the
amended complaint was that he wanted his parole and work release privileges,
which he believed had been improperly taken away because of the rape allegations.
In sum, by dropping his claim for stigmatization and reiterating his claims for
parole and work release privileges, Robinson simply restated claims that had
already been dismissed. See Robinson, 260 Fed. Appx. at 213. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and dismissed
Robinson’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. This is Robinson’s
appeal.
II.
We “review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state
a claim, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), using the same standards that govern Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissals.” Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223,
1230 (11th Cir. 2003). We accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and
construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kirby, 195 F.3d
at 1289.
Robinson’s most recent complaint and brief simply restate claims that we
already rejected in Robinson, 260 Fed. Appx. at 213. “Under the law of the case
doctrine, both district courts and appellate courts are generally bound by a prior
appellate decision in the same case.” Alphamed, Inc. v. B. Braun Med., Inc., 367
F.3d 1280, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we will not address
Robinson’s assertion that allegations of rape improperly cost him a chance at
parole, work release, and gain-time.
The only ground on which this case was remanded was Robinson’s claim
that he had been stigmatized by being listed on Florida’s sex offender website. But
now Robinson admits that he is not listed on that or any other public website as a
sex offender. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his amended
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
AFFIRMED.
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