[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-15412 MAY 12, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
Agency Nos. A079-474-335, A079-474-336
ADRIANA CASTRO PABON,
HUGO CASTRO,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(May 12, 2009)
Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Adriana Castro Pabon, a citizen of Columbia, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reconsider its
previous decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) and protection under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). After review, we deny the petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Pabon’s asylum application alleged that she received several death threats
from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) after she, an
optometrist, refused to assist the FARC with someone who had lost an eye. The
BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that Pabon had not established her eligibility for
asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief. Specifically, BIA and the IJ found
that Pabon had not shown past persecution on a protected ground or a well-founded
fear of future persecution.
Pabon filed a motion for reconsideration with the BIA, arguing that the IJ
and the BIA had failed to discuss two Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
in Colombia (“Country Reports”). Pabon argued that these Country Reports were
part of the administrative record and showed that the FARC was conducting
countrywide persecution.
The BIA denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that Pabon’s
arguments did not establish reversible error in its prior decision. The BIA stated
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that it had considered the Country Reports cited by Pabon and continued to find
that Pabon did not meet her burden of proof. In a footnote, the BIA observed that
the 2006 Country Report’s statement concerning the widespread resignation of
government officials did not sufficiently establish that Pabon “has a country-wide
fear of persecution.” The BIA also distinguished this Court’s opinion in Arboleda
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 434 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2006), pointing out that Pabon, unlike
Arboleda, had not established past persecution and, thus, had the burden to show
that internal relocation within Colombia was not a reasonable option. The BIA
also noted that Pabon had not shown that the FARC threats she received were on
account of a protected ground. Pabon filed this petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
discretion. Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). Our
review is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of
administrative discretion and whether the manner in which it was exercised was
arbitrary or capricious. Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.
2005).
After the BIA has affirmed an IJ’s order of removal, the alien may seek
reconsideration on the ground that the BIA has made a legal or factual error. See
INA § 240(c)(6); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “A motion to
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reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or
law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also INA § 240(c)(6)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Pabon’s motion for
reconsideration. In its order, the BIA stated that it previously had considered the
Country Reports and then reaffirmed its conclusion that Pabon had not shown she
could not relocate within Colombia.1
Pabon complains that the BIA did not “further distinguish the critical
language in each passage in both Country Reports” that she raised in her motion
for reconsideration. We could find no support for Pabon’s contention that the BIA
was required to discuss the Country Reports with the specificity she desires. It is
well settled that the IJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record in assessing
an applicant’s asylum claim. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287
(11th Cir. 2005). However, we have never required the IJ to analyze in depth each
and every piece of evidence on the record. Nor have we required the BIA to grant
a motion for reconsideration and remand for further proceedings when the IJ fails
to do so. The only authority Pabon cites is In re E-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 860, 862
1
Contrary to Pabon’s claim, the BIA did not misstate the procedural posture in Arboleda.
In Arboleda, unlike in Pabon’s case, “the BIA presumed past persecution and therefore the
burden was on the government to show that internal relocation was reasonable.” 434 F.3d at
1224.
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(BIA 1997), which does not impose such an obligation on the IJ or the BIA.
In any event, as the BIA noted, the IJ and the BIA also had concluded that
Pabon showed no nexus between the persecution she feared and her political
opinion. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the Country Reports showed that the
FARC’s reach was countrywide, Pabon remained statutorily ineligible for asylum
and withholding of removal. See In re Heidari, 16 I. & N. Dec. 203, 203 (BIA
1977) (requiring a respondent moving for reconsideration to make a prima facie
showing of eligibility for the relief requested). We cannot say the BIA acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying her motion for reconsideration.2
PETITION DENIED.
2
On appeal, much of Pabon’s argument relates to the merits of the IJ’s and the BIA’s
underlying denial of her application for asylum and withholding. However, because Pabon did
not file a petition for review within thirty days of the BIA’s final removal order, we lack
jurisdiction to review these claims. See INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Dakane v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 371 F.3d 771, 773 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004).
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