We have set forth the facts as stated in the affidavits somewhat fully for the reason that they have a direct bearing upon the validity of the order complained of. It' was conceded upon the argument that this is the decisive question in the case. Was there, or was there not, an order of the Board of Railroad Commissioners authorizing the increases complained of? In our view of the case the *321validity of the purported order does not depend upon the existence of any facts that might be more or loss controverted in the affidavits referred to in the foregoing statement. It seems, on the contrary, that the invalidity of the order is established by the facts concerning which there is a general agreement in all the affidavits.
It is elementary that the Board of Railroad Commissioners possesses only the authority conferred upon it by the constitution and the statutes of the state. Railroad Comrs. v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 17 Or. 65, 2 L.R.A. 195, 19 Pac. 702. Its action, therefore, concerning any subject-matter within its jurisdiction, to be valid, must be in substantial conformity with the statutes governing its procedure and must be consonant with due process of law. Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Beale & W. Railroad Rate Regulation, § 1142. Testing the action of the board in this instance by these simple, yet fundamental, requirements, we are forced to the conclusion that the order in question is void. A brief statement of the reasons leading to this conclusion should demonstrate'its correctness.
The Board of Railroad Commissioners is a governmental body whose members are elected at large by the people. The governmental authority vested in the board combines administrative, legislative, and judicial functions. Within its range, therefore, the board exercises authority of the same kind as that vested separately in the three main departments of the government. It differs only in extent and finality. The statutes governing its procedure bear unmistakable evidence of intention on the part of the legislature to make its action effective upon the subjects committed to it and to clothe its regular action with presumptions of validity. To this end the board is charged with the duty of giving ample opportunity to interested parties to be heard before action is taken. It is required to preserve and transcribe the evidence upon which it acts. Sess. Laws 1919, § 42, chap. 192. See also §§ 4731 and 4741, Comp. Laws 1913. Its findings are likewise required to be filed (Sess. Laws 1919, §§ 42 and 43, chap. 192), and (Comp. Laws 1913, § 4741), and certified copies are made competent evidence in any proceeding, either before the commissioners or in any court, etc.
Appeals from its decisions are provided for. Sess. Laws 1919, §§ 34 *322and 35, chap. 192. It is inconceivable that upon an appeal from an order of tbe Board of Railroad Commissioners a court, in arriving at tbe substance of tbe matters agreed upon as findings or to be incoi’porated in an order or decision, should be compelled to extract them from the memory of officers and employees who might produce affidavits or give testimony to informal discussions during meetings of the board. The importance which the law attaches to the hearings, the findings, and the orders of this hoard, points unmistakably to the negation of any such procedure as this. If resort can he had to this method of arriving at the very substance of the matters agreed upon by the board, reasonable caution would suggest that such action should be deprived of any sort of presumption in its favor. Yet the statutes treating of the effect of decisions of the board are replete with provisions giving them presumptive validity, extending even, in some instances, to conclusive presumptions. Before any presumption could be indulged as to the correctness of the findings and conclusions, it ought at least to be requisite that there be the clearest possible evidence obtainable as to what the findings and conclusions are. Certainly no sort of presumption should arise in favor of a finding that can only be extracted from recollections of informal discussions. And even less should such findings be made a basis for an appeal. These statutes, as well as others which might be cited, render it clear that it was not within the contemplation of the legislature that the hoard of Railroad Commissioners could act upon any matter pending before it as so many individuals, and that the evidence of its action could be made to rest in the recollection of its members and employees.
A brief statement of the facts in the instant case, concerning which there is practically no dispute, will serve to point out wherein the purported action of the commission falls short of satisfying the above requirements. There is no minute record that any definite proposition involved in the application of the carriers was submitted to a vote of the commissioners and the vote taken thereon. There are no findings signed by a majority of the members. There is no order or decision signed by a majority of the members. The purported order was admittedly promulgated at the direction of one member of the hoard (whose good faith we have no occasion to impugn), acting, as he believed, under the most favorable view of the facts, in accordance with *323the desire and consent of the other two members, such consent being apparently a matter of inference drawn from an informal discussion. Such does not, in our opinion, constitute action by the Board of Railroad Commissioners.
Upon the argument it was suggested that the record of the action of the board was established by evidence of a very satisfactory character; namely, the affidavits of those most familiar with the facts,—the officers themselves. But in our view qf the matter it is not a question of verifying an official record. It is a question as to whether or not an official record has been made. We are of the opinion that the undisputed facts show that no official action has been taken on the matter pending before the Railroad Commission.
It follows, therefore, that the injunction should issue as prayed for, and that the excess rates and fares collected and held subject to the further order of this court should be distributed to the vaxious patrons of the roads as they have contributed to the same. It is so ordered.
Christianson, Ch. J., and Robinson, J., concur.