(dissenting). It is for the interest of the republic that there should be an end to litigation. Accordingly, when the issues in an action have been fairly submitted to a jury and a verdict rendered, it should not be set aside unless on a reasonable showing that the verdict is wrong. The plaintiff and appellant sued to recover from defendants on a promissory note made to it for $3,000 and interest. The note is made by *960Davidson and indorsed by the other defendants. The answer of Davidson is that at the request of Roberts, the president of the bank, he signed the note for an accommodation and without any consideration. To the same effect is the answer of the other defendants. The case was fairly submitted, and the jury found in favor of the defendants on all the issues, and the bank appeals. Now it is certain the bank paid nothing for the note, and it did not release or surrender any drafts or securities. It solicited and secured the note as an accommodation for the purpose of making a good showing to the bank examiner. Appellant makes 40 points or assignments of error, and it seems to conclude that 40 bad points make 1 good point. The only good point w'ould be a showing that the note was made to the bank for a valuable consideration.
In his memoranda opinion the trial judge says:
“The case was carefully tried by able counsel on both sides, and submitted to the jury upon written instructions, and the jury found a verdict in favor of the defendant. I deny the motion for a new trial on the ground that the case was carefully tried, a good record made, and, in my judgment, the instructions covered the questions of law involved in the.case, and I am not prepared to say that the verdict is not in conformity with the evidence.”
The instructions appear to be full and fair. The jury was told:
“The point which defendants raise is that the note in suit was never to become a part of the assets of the bank. That is the question of fact which the jury are called upon to determine, and the burden of proof is upon the defendants to establish the defense by the weight of evidence.” “The burden of proof is upon defendants to establish either failure of consideration or any other defense that is alleged, and such defense must be established to your satisfaction by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” “You are instructed that to constitute a consideration it is not necessary that a person executing or indorsing a note shall himself recover a consideration. It is sufficient that the person accepting the note extends either to the person making or indorsing the note, or to some one else, at his request, something of value, be it money, property, credit, or other favor which may be of benefit to such person.” “If you are con-' vinced from the evidence that the note was made without any consideration or value, and simply turned over to the plaintiff for temporary use to cover up overdrafts of the New Rockford Publishing Company, but not to pay the same, with the understanding and agreement that defendants were never to pay the note, or that it was to be used tern*961porarily by the plaintiff to get the approval of the examining officer, and not to be a part of the assets of the bank, then, and in that case, they have established their defense.”
Thus the points at issue were fairly submitted and decided, and now, on appeal from the order denying a new trial, the real and narrow issue should not be obscured by a multitude of words. It is for the appellants to point out and clearly show a legal and valuable consideration for the note. The fact that it was given to cover up the condition of the bank is neither a consideration nor an estoppel. The accommodation did the bank no injury. The bank is in no position to object to it. In appellant’s brief (p. 71) it is said:
“There was a valuable consideration for the note. It was given for the purpose of taking care of or covering up overdrafts which the bank held against the New Rockford Publishing Company, and for the purpose of reducing notes previously given.”
Truly it does appear that the note was given to cover up, but it does not appear that it was given for the renewal, or even the accommodation of prior notes. There is no showing that it was given or received in payment or discharge of any debts. The contention amounts to no more than this: That the defendants were directors of the publishing company, and hence were under some obligations to pay its debts and overdrafts. And that may be true, but the note was not given to pay any such debts or overdrafts, and defendants were under no legal obligation to pay the same. Of course if the note had been given to the publishing company and it had transferred the same to the bank in due course, and for value, then there would be no question on the consideration. Then the bank would be a holder for value the same as in case of Bank v. Meyer, 30 N. D. 392, 152 N. W. 657. But clearly the note in question was not given to the bank in that way. The bank received it directly as accommodation paper, and it was not at liberty to use or transfer the note. It was made to cover up defaults and overdrafts, and to prepare the way for the bank examiner. If the bank had transferred the note to an innocent purchaser for value, then, on payment of the same, the defendants could have recovered against the bank. We should not try to obscure the issues by a multitude of words or by talking around the real issue. The verdict is right. The note was given only as an accommodation and a cover-up.