(concurring). The only question for consideration here is whether or not the petition alleges grounds for interference with the contemplated action of the canvassing board. I am clearly of the opinion that it does not. It is unnecessary to go further into the consideration of article 33 of the amendments to the Constitution, than to determine whether or not a duty is imposed upon the secretary of state, in the first instance, to ascertain the sufficiency of petitions filed in his office and to act upon them in accordance with his determination. Clearly, the sufficiency of the recall petition must be determined in the first instance by the officer with whom it is filed, and, when so determined, a mandatory duty is imposed to call an election. State ex rel. Little v. Langlie, 5 N. D. 594, 32 L.R.A. 723, 67 N. W. 958. If the determination is adverse he should refuse to call it. In this instance, the determination was made and the resulting duty performed *19more than forty days before the election complained of was held. It is familiar law that voters, no less than parties plaintiff in other capacities, may be estopped to assert their legal rights, if any they have, and that such estoppel arises where they participate in an election thereby seeking to influence its result. It is not alleged that the election did not result in a fair expression of the will of the voters. The facts which preclude the plaintiffs here appear on the face of the petition. Extraordinary relief should therefore be withheld. In my view of the case it is unnecessary to- consider the qualifications of a signer to a recall petition. Nor are we required to determine whether the petition heroin sufficiently alleges a cause of action if it had been presented prior to the election. It was not so presented. According to my view it does not state facts warranting the relief sought, and I join in denying it.