Blue Cross v. Jump

Paul W. Brown, J.,

dissenting. Where a burden of proof is imposed upon a party such as that imposed upon Blue Cross and other hospital service associations under this statute, a definitive, prospective and understandable statement of what is to be proven must be fairly discoverable from the terms of the legislation or from rules provided pursuant to a lawful delegation of that power to the administrative agency. To that end the delegation must be rationally circumscribed and rules designed to implement the delegation must directly relate to legitimate regulatory goals of the agency.

I perceive that the incorporation of “good faith effort” cost containment goals into the rate-making function of the Department of Insurance represents a standard so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. I conclude that the delegation violates fundamental notions of due process and that the statutory scheme is to such extent unconstitutional.

Herbert, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.