[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 19, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 09-10139 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00013-CR-5-RH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TIMMIE RICHARDSON,
a.k.a. Big Man,
a.k.a. Big Boy,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 19, 2009)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Timmie Richardson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a
reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendments 706 and 715 to
the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Richardson argues that this Court’s
decision in United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam),
was wrongly decided and maintains that Amendment 706 lowered his guideline
range despite the fact that his original sentence was based upon the application of
a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
“We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on a subsequent change in the sentencing
guidelines, for abuse of discretion.” Williams, 549 F.3d at 1338 (quoting United
States v. Brown, 322 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003)). “However, where the
issue presented involves a legal interpretation, our review is de novo.” Id. at
1338-39 (citation omitted).
A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has been lowered subsequently by the Sentencing Commission. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). However, we have held that when a defendant is subject to a
statutory mandatory minimum that replaces his guideline range, that defendant is
ineligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 706. Williams, 549 F.3d at
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1342 (“Because Williams was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum that
replaced his original sentencing guideline range, he was not sentenced according
to the base offense level in § 2D1.1, even taking into account the § 5K1.1
downward departure. He thus would not fall within the scope of Amendment
706.”).
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we discern no error.
Richardson’s sentence was not based on the drug quantity tables set forth in §
2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, but was the result of the application of the
statutorily required minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which
prescribes a term of life imprisonment for a defendant with two prior felony drug
convictions. Because Richardson’s sentence was based upon the applicable
statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment rather than his original
guideline range, he was ineligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) based upon
Amendment 706. Further, his argument that Williams was wrongly decided and is
inapplicable is without merit, as Williams is binding precedent and has not been
overturned. See United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that prior panel decisions are binding on subsequent panels unless
overturned by an intervening decision of the Supreme Court or the Eleventh
Circuit sitting en banc). Therefore, Richardson was ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2)
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sentence reduction, and we affirm the district court’s denial of his § 3582(c)(2)
motion.
AFFIRMED.
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