Singh v. Attorney General of the United States

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 11-1988
_____________

NIGEL ST. IVAN SINGH,
Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
_____________

On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Edward R. Grant
(No. A035-479-111)
______

Argued March 6, 2011

Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN,
Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: April 16, 2012)

Thomas E. Moseley, Esq. [ARGUED]
1 Gateway Center, Suite 2600
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Counsel for Petitioner

Tony West, Esq.
David V. Bernal, Esq.
Jesse M. Bless, Esq. [ARGUED]
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
Counsel for Respondent
______

OPINION OF THE COURT
______

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.

Nigel Singh petitions for review of a final order of
removal based on his conviction, under 18 U.S.C § 152(3),
for knowingly making a false statement under penalty of
perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Singh’s
conviction was an offense involving fraud or deceit in which
the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, and hence an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). In his
petition, Singh argues that 18 U.S.C § 152(3) is a perjury
offense that must meet the requirements for perjury-based
aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(S). Singh
further argues that, even if assessed under 8 U.S.C §
1101(a)(43)(M)(i), he is not removable because his offense
did not cause an actual loss exceeding $10,000. While we

2
reject Singh’s first argument, we agree that under the unique
facts of this case his offense did not cause an actual loss.
Because we hold that § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) requires an actual,
not merely intended, loss, we will grant Singh’s petition and
vacate the order of removal.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Singh was born in Jamaica on August 23, 1959, and
has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States
since December 7, 1975. Since that time, Singh has married a
U.S. citizen and raised three U.S. children. In 1997, Singh
founded the Raeback Corporation, a construction contracting
firm that bid on public works projects as a Minority Business
Enterprise (MBE). During his tenure as Raeback’s president,
Singh was asked on several occasions by a business contact at
a non-MBE firm, U.S. Rebar, to help U.S. Rebar secure
government contracts. In exchange for kickbacks, Singh
falsely attested that Raeback was serving as a subcontractor
on government projects when, in fact, U.S. Rebar did the
subcontract work. Under the scheme, billing was done in
Raeback’s name and the general contractor paid Raeback,
which then forwarded the payments to U.S. Rebar, less a ten
percent kickback. One of the government entities that funded
these projects was the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (“Port Authority”).

In September 2005, during the course of the Port
Authority project, Raeback filed for bankruptcy due to losses
on another project. Since the bankruptcy proceedings
automatically froze Raeback’s bank accounts, Singh and his
contact agreed on an arrangement in which the contact would
deposit the general contractor’s checks and hold the funds for

3
Singh during Raeback’s bankruptcy. 1 Unbeknownst to Singh,
however, his contact was a confidential informant for the Port
Authority, which had begun investigating U.S. Rebar’s
arrangement with Raeback. Rather than holding the funds for
Singh, therefore, the contact transferred the funds—
approximately $54,000 in total—to the Port Authority.

When the Port Authority informed Singh of its
investigation in 2007, Singh participated in two proffer
sessions with law enforcement agents. During these sessions,
agents learned of Raeback’s bankruptcy proceeding. Agents
also learned that Raeback’s bankruptcy petition failed to
disclose its revenue stream from the Port Authority project.
Although the Port Authority did not take legal action against
Singh, Singh was charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
the Eastern District of New York for one count of “fail[ing] to
disclose all of Raeback’s accounts receivable on Raeback’s
bankruptcy petition,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3).
Under § 152(3), it is a crime to “knowingly and fraudulently
make[] a false declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement under penalty of perjury” in relation to a
bankruptcy proceeding. On June 24, 2009, Singh pled guilty.
As part of the plea agreement, Singh agreed to “restitution in

1
As noted in the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), Singh “cashed
$53,952.41 worth of checks through the confidential
informant in order to hide these funds from creditors of
Raeback.” App. at 209. While the PSR does not specifically
state that Singh had the general contractor send the checks
directly to U.S. Rebar, a copy of one of the checks confirms
that this was, in fact, the arrangement. See App. at 156
(providing photocopy of $6,000 check from general
contractor to U.S. Rebar).

4
the amount of $54,418.08,” to be paid by transferring the
money “held by the Port Authority” to the bankruptcy trustee.

At the time the plea agreement was entered, the U.S.
Attorney believed Singh’s failure to disclose the Port
Authority funds had caused “substantial interference with the
administration of justice,” thus warranting a three-point
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2). Later,
however, the U.S. Attorney informed the sentencing court
that, “because the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are still
ongoing and the bankruptcy trustee will receive the funds
which the defendant attempted to secrete, the defendant’s
crime will not affect the ultimate outcome of the bankruptcy
proceedings.” App. at 298. The U.S. Attorney also informed
the court that the trustee “did not expend any substantial
additional resources as a result of the defendant’s fraud.”
App. at 299. Based on these discoveries, the U.S. Attorney’s
Office dropped its request for the three-point enhancement.
Singh, meanwhile, emphasized the restitution agreement as a
factor supporting his request for a non-incarceratory sentence.

On December 14, 2009, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced Singh
to ten months in prison. Although the court’s initial judgment
did not mention restitution, an amended judgment issued on
January 29, 2010 included a restitution order “pursuant to
[the] plea agreement.” The terms of the court’s restitution
order, identical in all relevant respects to the terms Singh
agreed to in the plea, ordered that “the $54,418.08 currently
held by the Port [A]uthority” be transferred to the trustee. On
March 22, 2010, the funds were transferred to the trustee, and
on January 19, 2011, the trustee distributed Raeback’s assets
to its creditors.

5
 Shortly after Singh began serving his sentence, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal
proceedings by issuing him a Notice to Appear (NTA). In the
NTA, the DHS charged that Singh’s § 152(3) conviction
involved a “loss or intended loss” to a victim or victims
exceeding $10,000 and thus made him removable as an
aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). App. at
343. Under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (hereinafter, “subparagraph
(M)(i)”), an aggravated felony is defined as an “offense that
involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000.” The Immigration Judge sustained
DHS’s charge and entered an order of removal, which the
BIA affirmed on April 12, 2011. In an unpublished opinion,
the BIA ruled that a conviction under § 152(3) “categorically
involves fraud,” as evident by our Court’s determination of
the crime’s essential elements in United States v. Mathies,
350 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965). The BIA also ruled that Singh’s
agreement to pay restitution and the sentencing court’s
restitution order provided clear and convincing evidence that
Singh’s offense caused a loss to the trustee exceeding
$10,000.

After the BIA issued its order, we granted Singh’s
request for a stay so that we could consider his petition for
review. In granting the stay, we cited the Second Circuit’s
decision in Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2009),
where an intended loss exceeding $10,000 was held
insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy the loss requirement
of subparagraph (M)(i).

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

6
 Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) divests federal
courts of jurisdiction to review orders of removal based on an
alien’s commission of an aggravated felony, this
“jurisdiction-stripping provision” only applies if we are
satisfied the petitioner is, in fact, an alien who has committed
an aggravated felony. Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207
(3d Cir. 2002). Whether or not Singh committed an
aggravated felony is a question of law which we review de
novo. Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2006).
While we generally defer to the BIA’s reasonable
interpretations of the INA, “[w]e do not defer to the BIA’s
determination of whether a crime constitutes an aggravated
felony.” Henry v. Bureau of Immig. & Customs Enforcement,
493 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2007). We also will not affirm a
BIA order if it cannot be sustained on the grounds upon
which the BIA relied, unless “it is highly probable” that the
omission or error did not affect the outcome. Li Hua Yuan v.
Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011).

Under the INA, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An aggravated felony under
subparagraph (M)(i) has two distinct elements: (1) it must be
a crime that “involves fraud or deceit,” (2) “in which the loss
to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” To determine
whether a crime involves fraud or deceit, we must employ a
“categorical approach” in which we focus on the crime’s
statutory elements “rather than . . . the specific facts
underlying the crime.” Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
1166, 1172 (2012). By contrast, we must use a
“circumstance-specific” approach to determine whether the
alien’s offense involved a loss to a victim(s) exceeding
$10,000, Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2009);

7
Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010),
wherein the loss must be “tethered” to the actual “offense of
conviction,” not “acquitted or dismissed counts or general
conduct,” Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302; Alaka v. Att’y Gen.,
456 F.3d 88, 106–08 (3d Cir. 2006).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fraud or Deceit Requirement

We begin our analysis here by considering whether
Singh was convicted of an offense that categorically involves
fraud or deceit. As the Supreme Court has recently made
clear, a crime involves fraud or deceit if it “necessarily
entail[s] fraudulent or deceitful conduct.” Kawashima, 132 S.
Ct. at 1172; accord Valansi, 278 F.3d at 210. For the reasons
that follow, we hold that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
152(3) necessarily entails deceit and therefore qualifies as a
deceit offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).

To violate 18 U.S.C. § 152(3), one must “knowingly
and fraudulently make a false declaration . . . under penalty of
perjury” in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding. This Court
has previously interpreted the phrase “knowingly and
fraudulently” in § 152(3) as requiring an intent to defraud. In
re Topper, 229 F.2d 691, 692 (3d Cir. 1956) (interpreting §
152(3) as requiring “actual intent on the part of the bankrupt
to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors”); see also Mathies,
350 F.2d at 967. As Singh correctly notes, however, the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted (the Second Circuit)
interprets § 152(3) differently than we do. Under the Second
Circuit’s interpretation, “the words of the statute requiring
that the testimony be given ‘knowingly and fraudulently’

8
mean no more than an intentional untruth in a matter material
to the issue which is itself material.” 2 In re Robinson, 506
F.2d 1184, 1187 (2d Cir. 1974) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In the Second Circuit, therefore, “only the basic
requirements of perjury need to be proven.” 3 Id. at 1189.
Singh thus contends that the BIA erred in concluding that §
152(3) “categorically involves fraud.” Even if Singh is
correct, however, it would not change the result here because
the Second Circuit’s definition of § 152(3) necessarily
requires deceit. As noted in Kawashima, the word “deceit”
refers to “the act or process of deceiving (as by falsification,
concealment or cheating).” 132 S. Ct. at 1172. The Second
Circuit’s element of “knowingly” making a “false statement”
fits this definition. 4 Thus, irrespective of which statutory

2
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of § 152(3) is not
necessarily at odds with the plain meaning of the word
“fraudulently,” as the word “fraudulent” has at least two
distinctly different meanings. On one hand, a fraudulent
statement is one that is “made . . . with the purpose or design
to carry out a fraud.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (5th
ed. 1979). A statement is also fraudulent, however, if it is
made with the simple intent to deceive. See id. (“A
statement, or claim, or document, is ‘fraudulent’ if it was
falsely made, or caused to be made, with the intent to
deceive.”).
3
Consistent with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of §
152(3), the sentencing court did not require that the
government prove, nor did Singh admit to, an intent to
defraud.
4
The Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation in
Kawashima. There, the petitioner had been convicted of
filing a false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), which

9
elements we use, § 152(3) qualifies under subparagraph
(M)(i) as an offense that involves deceit.

B. Subparagraph (S) Considerations

Singh also argues that because the Second Circuit
considers § 152(3) to be “essentially equivalent to a perjury
statute,” Robinson, 506 F.2d at 1189, he cannot be removable
because his offense does not qualify under the INA’s
provision for perjury-based aggravated felonies, 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(S) (hereinafter, “subparagraph (S)”). 5 Singh
bases this position on Congress’s purported intent when
enacting subparagraph (S) and the “basic rule” that “the
specific statutory provision . . . should prevail over the more
general.” Appellant’s Br. at 23. This argument is at odds
with our precedent.

As we made clear in Valansi, “[w]hen the statutory
language [of the INA] has a clear meaning, we need not look
further.” 278 F.3d at 214. In Valansi, the petitioner argued
that her conviction for embezzlement was a theft offense and

established that the petitioner “knowingly and willfully
submitted a tax return that was false as to a material matter.”
Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172. The Supreme Court
concluded that the offense necessarily involved deceit,
irrespective of whether the statute actually used the word
“deceit.” Id.
5
Under subparagraph (S), perjury offenses only qualify as
aggravated felonies if they result in a “term of imprisonment
[of] at least one year.” Singh does not qualify as an
aggravated felon under subparagraph (S) because he only
received a ten-month sentence.

10
could only be an aggravated felony if it satisfied the INA’s
specific criteria for theft offenses under subparagraph (G). Id.
at 213. We rejected this “all-or-nothing” argument because
the “plain meaning of [subparagraph (M)(i)] suggests that
embezzlement with intent to defraud would qualify as an
offense that ‘involves fraud or deceit.’” Id. at 214. A similar
situation applies here, as the plain meaning of subparagraph
(M)(i) encompasses offenses, such as § 152(3), that involve
knowingly making false statements. Under Valansi we need
not look further.

C. The Loss Requirement

We turn now to the issue of whether Singh’s offense
was one in which the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000.
Our determination depends in part on whether the
government must prove actual loss, or merely an intended or
potential loss. We begin, therefore, by considering the
meaning of subparagraph (M)(i)’s requirement that there be a
“loss to the victim or victims.” As we noted in granting
Singh’s request to stay removal, the Second Circuit holds that
subparagraph (M)(i) requires the loss to be an actual one. See
Pierre, 588 F.3d at 773 (citing Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d
105, 119 (2d Cir. 2001)). For the reasons that follow, we
agree with the Second Circuit.

Since the INA does not define the term loss, we must
interpret the word according to its ordinary meaning at the
time Congress enacted subparagraph (M)(i). See Robinson v.
Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 2009) (“‘A
fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning at the time

11
Congress enacted the statute.’” (quoting Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))). Thus, because subparagraph
(M)(i) was enacted by Congress in 1994, 6 we will consider
the ordinary meaning of loss as of that time.

The 1993 edition of Webster’s New International
Dictionary provides numerous definitions of loss, along with
illustrative examples. Each of these definitions, and their
corresponding examples, refer to loss that actually occurs.
See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1338 (1993). Loss is defined, for example, as: (a) “the act or
fact of losing”; (b) “a person or thing or an amount that is
lost”; (c) “the act or fact of failing to gain, win, obtain, or
utilize”; (d) a “decrease in amount, magnitude, or degree”; (e)
“the state or fact of being destroyed or placed beyond
recovery”; and (f) “the amount of an insured’s financial
detriment due to the occurrence of a stipulated contingent
event.” Corresponding examples to illustrate these
definitions include: (a) “loss of a leg”; (b) “killed, wounded,
or captured soldiers”; (c) “loss of opportunity”; (d) “altitude
loss”; (e) “loss of life in war”; and (f) financial detriment
caused by “death, injury, destruction, or damage.”
Importantly, not one of these definitions or examples refers to
potential loss; even where loss refers to a failure to gain, the
loss is characterized as having already occurred (e.g., loss of a
battle).

Consistent with Webster’s definition, this Court stated
in 1991 that the “ordinary meaning” of loss is “actual loss,”
not “probable” or “intended loss.” United States v. Kopp, 951

6
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-406, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994).

12
F.2d 521, 529 (3d Cir. 1991) (superseded by statute on other
grounds). We conclude, therefore, that when Congress
enacted subparagraph (M)(i), the plain meaning of loss
referred to actual, not merely intended, loss. Accordingly,
because neither subparagraph (M)(i) nor paragraph (43)
expand loss’s ordinary meaning, we hold that subparagraph
(M)(i) requires actual loss. Accord Kharana v. Gonzales, 487
F.3d 1280, 1282 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]nterpreting §
101(a)(43)(M)(i) such that a conviction involving an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain more than $10,000 counts as a
conviction ‘in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000’ flies in the face of the plain meaning of the
statute.”).

Although some have argued that subparagraph (M)(i)
should include intended loss, the reasons for overriding the
statute’s plain meaning are unconvincing. The concurrence in
Kharana advanced the argument, for example, that because
loss under subparagraph (U) has been interpreted to include
intended loss, see Matter of S-I-K, 24 I. & N. Dec. 324 (BIA
2007) and Matter of Onyido, 22 I. & N. Dec. 552 (BIA 1999),
loss under subparagraph (M)(i) should be read to include
intended loss as well. 7 Kharana, 487 F.3d at 1286 (Wallace,
J., concurring). The Kharana concurrence reasons that
because subparagraph (U) does not provide “additional gloss”
on the word, loss’s meaning under (U) “applies with equal
force” to subparagraph (M)(i). Id. There are several

7
Because the government only charged Singh as removable
under subparagraph (M)(i), we do not reach the question of
whether intended loss satisfies the loss requirement for
attempts or conspiracies to commit a deceit offense under
subparagraph (U).

13
problems with this argument. Subparagraph (U) defines an
aggravated felony as “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offense described in this paragraph.” 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(U). Since subparagraph (U) does not mention
the word loss, it is hardly significant that (U) does not provide
“additional gloss” on the word itself. Further, we question
the premise that subparagraph (U) does not provide any
additional gloss. After all, the reason the BIA interpreted
subparagraph (U) to include intended loss is because (U)
includes the word “attempt,” a word not present in (M). See
Onyido, 22 I. & N. at 553. There is a clear textual reason,
therefore, why loss under subparagraph (U) should not “apply
with equal force” to subparagraph (M)(i). Whereas
subparagraph (U) expressly applies to attempts and
conspiracies to commit crimes of deceit, subparagraph (M)(i)
applies to consummated crimes of deceit. The BIA
determined that intended loss is relevant under subparagraph
(U) because, by definition, an attempt to commit a crime does
not require the crime to be successfully carried out. See id.
This rationale does not apply to completed offenses under
subparagraph (M)(i). In short, the fact that the BIA has held
that actual loss is unnecessary under subparagraph (U), does
not mean that actual loss must be unnecessary under (M)(i).

Along with the Kharana concurrence, the Seventh
Circuit has suggested, in dicta, that subparagraph (M)(i)
should be interpreted to encompass intended loss. See Eke v.
Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh
Circuit suggests that this interpretation would be reasonable
because it is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines’
definition of loss for fraud and deceit crimes under U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1. Id. This argument is also unpersuasive. The statutory
language of subparagraph (M)(i) provides no indication that

14
Congress wanted loss to be defined in accordance with the
Sentencing Guidelines. As the Kharana concurrence
observed, the Guidelines and the INA are like “apples and
oranges.” See Kharana, 487 F.3d at 1287 (Wallace, J.,
concurring). Not only are they written by different bodies
(one by a non-legislative commission, one by Congress), but
they serve distinctly different purposes (one penological, one
civil). 8 Although we have recognized that there might be
occasions where the Guidelines can help “divine Congress’s
intent when passing the INA,” no such guidance is necessary
when the INA’s statutory language “has a clear meaning.”
Valansi, 278 F.3d at 213–14. Indeed, “[w]hen we find the
terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete,
except in rare and exceptional circumstances.” Rubin v.
United States, 499 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (citations omitted).
Here, there are no rare or exceptional circumstances that
compel us to override subparagraph (M)(i)’s plain meaning.

D. The Actual Loss from Singh’s Offense

Having determined that subparagraph (M)(i) requires
actual loss, we now turn to the “specific circumstances” of
Singh’s offense to determine if the government has proved by
“clear and convincing” evidence that his offense involved an
actual loss to a victim, or victims, that exceeds $10,000.
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302–03. We begin by laying out the
parameters of the circumstance-specific approach.

8
It is instructive to note, for example, that the inclusion of
intended loss in the Guidelines’ definition of loss was based
on the Guidelines’ “overall theory of culpability for
attempts.” Kopp, 951 F.2d at 529 (emphasis added).

15
 Although “not an invitation to relitigate the conviction
itself,” Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266, the circumstance-specific
approach goes beyond the “modified-categorical approach”
that is used for determining which elements of a disjunctive
statute an individual was convicted of committing. See
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302 (citing Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13 (2005) and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990)). For example, whereas the modified-categorical
approach is limited to the record of conviction (e.g.,
indictment, plea agreement, criminal judgment, etc) and
judicial findings of fact, Alaka, 456 F.3d at 106, the
circumstance-specific approach may consider “sentencing-
related material,” Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302–03. Accord
Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 306 (BIA 2007).
The guiding principle for the circumstance-specific analysis is
that immigration courts must use “fundamentally fair
procedures, including procedures that give an alien a fair
opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior
conviction involved a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.”
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303.

Here, the government argues that the circumstance-
specific approach proves the existence of a loss that exceeds
$10,000. The government’s primary argument is that, on its
face, the restitution order is clear and convincing evidence of
actual loss because restitution orders are limited to “actual
losses that resulted from the offense of conviction.” Gov’t
Br. at 28. The government also argues that the circumstances
of the case prove that Singh caused an actual, if temporary,
deprivation of $54,000 of assets to the bankruptcy trustee.

1. The Restitution Order

16
 According to the government, the very fact that the
sentencing court issued a restitution order of $54,000 is proof
positive that the requisite actual loss occurred. 9 The
government reaches this conclusion based on a misapplication
of the federal statutes governing restitution orders by federal
courts: the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18
U.S.C. § 3663A, and the Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663. 10 Under the MVRA, a federal
sentencing court “shall order” restitution for certain offenses,
but only if the court finds that “an identifiable victim or
victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss” as a
“direct[] and proximate[]” result of the offense. §§
3663A(a)(2), (c)(1)(B). Offenses involving “fraud or deceit”
are included under the MVRA, § 3663A(c)(1)(A), and, as the
government notes, violations of § 152(3) have “generally”

9
The BIA made this argument in its opinion as well.
However, in contrast to the BIA (which devoted just one
sentence to the issue), the government made this the
centerpiece of its case. Accordingly, we focus our analysis
here on the government’s argument.
10
As set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3556, “[t]he court, in imposing a
sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of an
offense shall order restitution in accordance with section
3663A [the MVRA], and may order restitution in accordance
with section 3663 [the VWPA]. The procedures under section
3664 shall apply to all orders of restitution under this
section.” Thus, if an offense qualifies under the MVRA, the
sentencing court must order restitution. Only if the offense
does not qualify under the MVRA does a court have
permissive authority to grant restitution under the VWPA.

17
qualified as such. 11 Further, as the government points out,
courts ordering restitution under the MVRA are limited to
remedying the actual loss caused by the defendant’s “offense
of conviction.” Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413
(1990). 12 Ergo, the government concludes that the sentencing
court’s restitution order of $54,000 here is ipso facto evidence
that Singh caused an actual loss to a victim exceeding
$10,000.

The government’s argument fails, however, for three
reasons. First, its reliance on the MVRA is misplaced
because the record shows that the sentencing court issued
restitution pursuant to an express agreement by the parties,
not the MVRA. Second, the law governing restitution issued
pursuant to a party agreement shows that such orders are not
limited to actual losses from the offense of conviction. Third,
even if the court’s restitution order reflected a judicial finding
of loss, Nijhawan and our own precedent make clear that we

11
Gov’t Br. at 27–28 (citing Feldman, 338 F.3d at 219–20;
United States v. Waldner, 580 F.3d 699, 709–10 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Lovell, 256 F.3d 463, 464 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Grice, 419 Fed. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir.
2011) (unpublished)).
12
Although Hughey was decided before the MVRA was
enacted, the Second Circuit (the circuit in which Singh was
convicted) has applied Hughey’s interpretation of the VWPA
to the MVRA. See United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310,
319 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Local # 46 Metallic
Lathers Union, 568 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009) and United
States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Other federal circuits do so as well. E.g., United States v.
Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 661 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007).

18
need not take the order at face value for removal purposes,
particularly when, as here, it conflicts with undisputed facts in
the sentencing material. We will address each of these three
reasons in turn.

First, the government’s reliance on the MVRA is
misplaced because it is doubtful the sentencing court issued
restitution under the MVRA. The sentencing court was only
required to issue restitution under the MVRA if, and only if,
the court determined that Singh’s offense caused “a physical
injury or pecuniary loss” to a “victim.” § 3663A(c). This is
significant because it is unlikely that the bankruptcy trustee
here actually qualified as a victim under the MVRA.
Although the government cites United States v. Holthaus, 486
F.3d 451, 457–58 (8th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that
bankruptcy trustees can be victims of § 152(3) violations, it
omits the fact that Holthaus limited this holding to trustees
whose “compensation” has been “negatively impacted.” Id.
(adopting rule set forth by the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Lowell, 256 F.3d 463, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2001)); see
also United States v. Paradis, 219 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding that trustee is not a victim of bankruptcy fraud under
MVRA where defendant concealed funds that would go to the
creditors). Here, the government agreed at sentencing that the
trustee “did not expend any substantial additional resources as
a result of the defendant’s fraud.” App. at 298–99. It is
unlikely, therefore, that the sentencing court determined the
trustee to be a victim with an actual loss under the MVRA,
particularly since there is nothing in the record of conviction
indicating it deliberated on this otherwise novel ruling.

Another factor suggesting that the MVRA was not the
statutory framework for the restitution order is the fact that

19
the court expressly stated that it issued the order “pursuant to
[the] plea agreement.” App. at 195. This suggests the order
was issued under § 3663(a)(3) of the VWPA, since that
provision allows sentencing courts to order restitution “in any
criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea
agreement.” § 3663(a)(3) (emphasis added). Supporting this
view is the fact that the sentencing court does not appear to
have demonstrated its consideration of the statutory factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), as courts in the Second Circuit are
required to do when issuing restitution in the absence of an
agreement. See United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 232–33
(2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we do not agree with the
government’s argument that the sentencing court was
required to, or did in fact, issue restitution pursuant to the
MVRA. 13

Second, the fact that the sentencing court issued its
order “pursuant to [the] plea agreement” is significant
because, in the Second Circuit, restitution is not limited to
actual loss caused by the offense of conviction when issued
pursuant to an agreement. United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d
682, 688–89 (2d Cir. 1994). This Court and several other
courts of appeals have recognized this prevailing rule. United
States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 140 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“Restitution is limited to amounts ‘directly caused by the
conduct composing the offense of conviction,’ or those
amounts that defendant ‘expressly agree[s] to’ pursuant to the

13
The restitution provision in the plea agreement references
both “18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A.” App. at 225. This
suggests that the parties either (a) did not determine which
statute applied to their agreement, or (b) deferred to the
court’s determination.

20
plea agreement.” (quoting Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 689)); United
States v. Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. Schrimsher, 58 F.3d 610, 611 (11th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 533 (9th
Cir. 1992). The government is thus incorrect when it asserts
that “[u]nder either the MVRA or the VWPA, the restitution
award can encompass only actual losses that resulted from the
offense of conviction.” Gov’t Br. at 28 (citing Hughey, 495
U.S. at 420; United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 190–91
(2d Cir. 2004); Feldman, 338 F.3d at 220; United States v.
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 942 (3d Cir. 1992)). Importantly,
all of the cases the government cites to support its position are
cases where the court ordered restitution in the absence of an
agreement by the parties. 14 See Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413–15;
Zakhary, 357 F.3d at 188–89; Feldman, 338 F.3d at 214–15;
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 930. Accordingly, because the
sentencing court ordered restitution pursuant to Singh’s
express agreement, the government’s argument is based on
inapposite law.

Third, to the extent that the restitution order reflects
the sentencing court’s determination of actual loss, Nijhawan
and our precedent make clear that immigration courts are not
bound to accept this determination at face value. Under

14
The BIA made the same error. In its opinion, it cites
United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2001), for
the proposition that “a court’s power to order restitution is
limited to actual loss.” App. at 4. As with the cases cited by
the government, the sentencing court in Diaz did not issue the
restitution order pursuant to the parties’ express agreement.
See Diaz, 245 F.3d at 296.

21
Nijhawan, a restitution order must be assessed in the context
of “conflicting evidence.” 129 S. Ct. at 2303. Since the
petitioner in Nijhawan did not point to “any” conflicting
evidence, the Court ruled that a restitution order for $683
million coupled with the defendant’s stipulation that his
offense caused more than $100 million in loss was sufficient
to meet the government’s burden. Id. at 2298, 2303.
Consistent with Nijhawan, we have taken the position that a
restitution order “may be helpful” to the loss inquiry, but is
not definitive. Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225, 227 (3d
Cir. 2003). In Munroe, the sentencing court issued an
amended restitution order of $9,999 in a thinly veiled attempt
“to alter the effect of the conviction for immigration
purposes.” Id. at 226–27. Because we found it “abundantly
clear” from the record (e.g., the indictment, guilty plea, and
initial restitution order) that the defendant’s offense caused a
loss exceeding $10,000, we refused to let the amended
restitution order be controlling. Id. As with Munroe, the
circumstances here—which we discuss below—make it
“abundantly clear” that the restitution in the court’s amended
judgment does not reflect the actual loss resulting from
Singh’s offense. In other words, there is sufficient
“conflicting evidence” to justify looking past the restitution
order.

Despite Nijhawan and Munroe, the government
contends that Singh is collaterally estopped from challenging
the validity of the order. The government bases this argument
on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d
800 (5th Cir. 2008). Patel, however, was decided before
Nijhawan, and its current viability appears tenuous to us. In
Nijhawan, the Court stated that petitioners, including those
challenging restitution orders, “have at least one and possibly

22
two opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the
earlier sentencing and the second at the deportation hearing
itself.” 129 S. Ct. at 2303. Further, the Nijhawan Court sided
with the government, not because the petitioner was estopped
from challenging his restitution order, but because he failed to
point to sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon it. See id.
Unlike the petitioner in Nijhawan, the petitioner here has
pointed to undisputed facts in the sentencing material that
undermine the restitution order’s reliability as a measure of
actual loss. 15 We will now discuss this evidence.

2. Specific Offense Circumstances

At the time Singh committed his offense of conviction
(i.e., knowingly making a false statement in relation to
Raeback’s bankruptcy petition), the money that he failed to
disclose was in the custody of the Port Authority and beyond
his control. While Singh may have subjectively believed his
criminal act would enable him to obtain this money, in reality
this was just as impossible as the failed attempt in Onyido,

15
This applies to the restitution agreement as well. Although
this Court has previously stated that an amount agreed to in a
plea agreement provides the definitive measure of loss, we
did so in the context of a modified-categorical analysis. See
Alaka, 456 F.3d at 108; see also Nijhawan v. Att’y Gen., 523
F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Alaka for proposition that
where defendant pleads to a specific loss amount, “that
amount is controlling”). Since the Supreme Court has
rejected using the modified-categorical approach for
determining loss under subparagraph (M)(i), Nijhawan, 129
S. Ct. at 2302–03, the Alaka rule does not limit our inquiry
here.

23
where the BIA accepted that the loss was only intended, not
actual. See 22 I. & N. Dec. 552. In Onyido, the DHS sought
to remove the petitioner based on his conviction for filing a
false claim with the intent to defraud an insurance company.
Id. at 553. Onyido was convicted for signing paperwork to
process a fraudulent $15,000 claim in the presence of people
he believed were insurance agents, but were in fact
undercover officers. Id. Although the facts are somewhat
more complicated here, we find them to be functionally
equivalent to Onyido. For starters, both cases involve
situations where, at the moment the crime was consummated,
a government sting operation made any intended benefit
impossible. Since the Port Authority had custody of the
funds, basic principles of property law precluded Singh from
having any capacity to use this money for his benefit. 16 The

16
Based on the facts in the record, Singh would have had no
means for obtaining the $54,000 from the Port Authority (the
defrauded party) for his personal benefit because a
wrongdoer’s interest in fraudulently obtained property is
voidable, In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir. 2000);
S.E.C. v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1176 (2d Cir. 1989), and
subject to a constructive trust, see In re Am. Motor Club, Inc.,
109 B.R. 595, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). Although the Port
Authority transferred the money to the trustee, this was not
for the benefit of Singh. Instead, under the unique rules of
bankruptcy, a debtor’s estate is deemed to include
fraudulently obtained property, so long as the property was
not impressed with a constructive trust prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. See generally
In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994). The
inclusion of fraudulently obtained property in the debtor’s
estate is not for the debtor’s benefit. Id. at 1452; see also In

24
fact that Singh “agreed” to have this money transferred to the
trustee as restitution was thus only a formality—one in which
he had nothing to lose, but potentially much to gain. 17

The impossibility of Singh’s intended 18 outcome does
not end our inquiry, however, because it is obviously possible
that Singh’s offense could have still caused actual losses. It is
conceivable, for example, that Singh’s offense could have
produced incidental losses for the bankruptcy trustee by
forcing him to spend additional money and time accessing the

re Quality Holstein Leasing, 752 F.2d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir.
1985). It is designed, instead, to ensure equal treatment of
creditors, each of whom “has suffered disappointed
expectations at the hands of the debtor.” Omegas Group, 16
F.3d at 1452.
17
Singh stood to gain because the restitution agreement
increased his chances of getting a non-incarceratory sentence,
which was his “fervent” objective. App. at 264. Singh was
well aware of this during the sentencing proceedings as he
cited the restitution agreement as a factor that “strongly
favors a non-incarceratory” sentence. App. at 292.
18
It bears noting that Singh was only convicted of having an
intent to deceive, not an intent to defraud. It is possible,
therefore, that Singh’s intent may have been based on other
considerations besides defrauding the estate; for example,
preventing detection of his illicit business arrangement with
U.S. Rebar. While this distinction may have a bearing on the
tethering analysis, see Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 118 n.12,
we need not decide the issue here because there is no actual
loss to tether. See generally Alaka, 456 F.3d at 106–08
(describing requirement that loss be tethered to actual offense
of conviction, not general or acquitted conduct).

25
$54,000. The record, however, does not demonstrate any
such loss. Indeed, as the U.S. Attorney conceded in the
sentencing memorandum, the trustee “did not expend any
substantial additional resources as a result of the defendant’s
fraud.” App at 298–99. Thus, under the metric that federal
courts of appeals have used for determining if bankruptcy
trustees have suffered pecuniary harm, Holthaus, 486 F.3d at
457–58; Lowell, 256 F.3d at 465–66; Paradis, 219 F.3d at 25,
the trustee in this case suffered no identifiable loss.

It is also conceivable that Singh’s offense may have
resulted in actual losses for the creditors. Had the Port
Authority, for example, not learned of Singh’s bankruptcy
proceedings, the trustee may never have learned about the
$54,000, and, consequently, the creditors could have had a
smaller estate from which to recover on their claims. Again,
however, the record shows that this potential loss did not
actually occur, since the Port Authority transferred the funds
to the trustee prior to the distribution of Raeback’s assets. As
noted in the U.S. Attorney’s sentencing memorandum, “the
bankruptcy trustee will receive the funds which the defendant
attempted to secrete,” and thus, “the defendant’s crime will
not affect the ultimate outcome of the bankruptcy
proceedings.” App. at 298 (emphases added).

Although Singh’s offense did not deprive the creditors
of assets, the government argues that Singh’s offense caused
an actual loss by depriving the trustee. To support this
argument, the government contrasts this case with the
intended loss at issue in Pierre, where the petitioner was
convicted of bank fraud for submitting fraudulent documents
to obtain a $500,000 loan from a bank. 588 F.3d at 770. As
the government notes, the bank in Pierre detected the fraud

26
before loaning any money, and was thus never deprived of
any property for any period of time. By contrast, the
government argues that Singh’s offense deprived the trustee
of $54,000 from Raeback’s estate. 19 What the government
omits, however, is that the trustee, unlike the bank in Pierre,
was not a party that stood to lose from the deprivation itself
(as compared to the incidental effects thereof). Instead, the
only people who stood to lose were Raeback’s creditors, and
thus the deprivation should be assessed against them, not the
trustee. Accordingly, because the creditors were not deprived
of any property for any length of time, the fact that the trustee
was temporarily unable to access all of Raeback’s assets does
not constitute an actual loss to an actual victim.

While the government is correct that the creditors may
have suffered a loss if Singh was never caught, the same is
equally true for the potential victim in Pierre. Indeed, the
government’s argument that Singh should not benefit from
the fortuitous fact that he was caught before his creditors
were harmed overlooks the reality that such fortuitous facts
are inherent to all intended loss. While an intended loss may

19
The government supports this result by applying the test we
established in United States v. Feldman, 338 F.3d 212 (3d
Cir. 2003) for calculating actual loss for restitution purposes.
Under Feldman, actual loss is measured by comparing “what
actually happened with what would have happened if [the
defendant] had acted lawfully.” 338 F.3d at 221. We need
not address Feldman here, however, because even if we
assume it is appropriate in the removal context, it would not
change the result in this case for the reasons stated above.

27
itself provide grounds for removal, 20 we are bound here to
follow the statutory language of subparagraph (M)(i), which
requires actual loss.

Finally, we wish to make clear that our conclusion
does not mean, as the government contends, that an alien
defendant can avoid a finding of actual loss for removal
purposes simply by paying restitution after getting caught.
Indeed, we agree with the government that payment of
restitution should not, and does not, negate a loss that actually
occurred. Our holding here is a narrow one, involving an
offense that at no point resulted in an actual loss to any victim
for any length of time. To highlight the narrowness of this
rule, consider the result in a situation like Pierre had the bank
not detected the fraud. If a bank gives a person a loan under
false pretenses, then no matter how soon afterwards it detects
the fraud, whether one minute or one year, an actual loss
results because the person obtains possession of the loan at
the direct deprivation of the bank. It doesn’t matter how
fleetingly the person obtains control. If the person’s offense
deprives the defrauded party of property, an actual loss occurs
to an actual victim under subparagraph (M)(i).

Contrary to the government’s suggestion at oral
argument, therefore, nothing in this opinion will change the
result in Nijhawan and other cases where restitution was paid
after the petitioner’s offense caused an actual loss. In
Nijhawan, the petitioner was convicted of a fraudulent
scheme that deceived banks into giving over $100 million

20
As noted earlier, we need not decide today whether
intended loss satisfies the loss requirement for deceit offenses
charged under subparagraph (U). See supra note 7.

28
dollars to the petitioner and his co-defendants. 523 F.3d 387,
389 (3d Cir. 2008). Unlike the situation here, there was no
government sting operation that doomed the scheme from its
inception, the petitioner obtained control of the money, and
the victims that stood to directly lose from being deprived of
the money (i.e., the banks) were in fact deprived.
Irrespective, therefore, of whether the petitioner in Nijhawan
paid full restitution for his crime, nothing in this opinion
would change the outcome of that case, nor others like it.

In summary, the undisputed circumstances of this case
show that a government sting operation (a) doomed any
intended benefit when the crime was committed, and (b)
prevented any potential or incidental losses from in fact
occurring. This observation is the same whether we focus our
inquiry at the time the court ordered restitution; at the time
Singh was charged; or, as, the government implores us, at the
time Singh committed the offense. At any of these times, the
record shows that: (a) a government entity (the Port
Authority) had custody of the money; (b) Singh had no
capacity to obtain this money for his personal benefit; (c) the
trustee’s personal compensation had not been affected; and
(d) the creditors had not been deprived of any property for
any length of time. Under this set of circumstances, we find
that no actual loss occurred.

E. Additional Considerations

Since the government has failed to provide clear and
convincing evidence that Singh’s offense caused an actual
loss exceeding $10,000, Singh is not removable under
subparagraph (M)(i). Although it is possible that Singh may
be removable under subparagraph (U), the DHS only charged

29
him under (M). This is important because Singh has a due
process right to receive notice of “[t]he charges against [him]
and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated.” 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a); see also United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d
92, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that, under the Constitution,
aliens have right to receive “notice of the charges” against
them and a “fair opportunity to be heard”). Further, since
removability under (U) would involve questions that neither
Singh nor this Court have had an opportunity to address, it
appears that a sua sponte invocation of (U) at this late stage in
the litigation would prejudice Singh’s rights. See Pierre, 588
F.3d at 776–77 (holding that BIA’s sua sponte invocation of
subparagraph (U) as basis for removal violated petitioner’s
due process rights); see also Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 113–
19 (addressing questions unique to a removability analysis
under subparagraph (U)). Our inquiry here, therefore, is at its
end.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Singh’s
petition for review and vacate the BIA’s order of removal.

30