concurring in part and dissenting in part. With the exception of.that portion of the majority opinion dealing with the retroactive award of compensation for permanent total disability, I concur in the majority opinion.
The record demonstrates that the commission based its award of permanent total disability particularly upon the report of Dr. Brennan, who stated: “In view of the continuing progression of his symptomology, I think Mr. Factor could be considered completely and permanently disabled because of his recurrent episodes of thrombophlebitis and the progression of venous insufficiency.”
Additionally in support of the order for the starting date of August 1, 1986 for the award, the commission referred to evidence of frequent hospitalizations of claimant at Mt. Carmel East during 1980, 1981, 1985 and 1987 as set forth in a discharge summary dated November 12, 1987. Even if some of the hospital confinements were excluded from consideration, taking the remaining hospitalizations into account, in conjunction with the report of Dr. Brennan of June 27,1988, there is certainly some evidence that claimant was permanently and totally disabled as of August 1, 1986. Moreover, the commission took into consideration the factors set forth in State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946, in concluding that claimant was unable to engage in sustained remunerative employment after August 1, 1986. In view of the fact that there is some evidence in the record to support the commission’s finding, there was no abuse of discretion and a court should not overturn the decision of the commission. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in its entirety.
F.E. Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.