IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 94-60040
Summary Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT CLYDE TUBWELL, a/k/a
Robert Earl Tubwell, Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
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(October 24, 1994)
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Pro se Defendant-Appellant Robert Clyde Tubwell ("Tubwell")
appeals the district court's denial of his petition for habeas
corpus. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 13, 1976, Tubwell was charged with two counts of making
false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and § 924(a). At the time he
was charged and taken into federal custody, Tubwell was in state
custody awaiting trial on unrelated state charges. He subsequently
pleaded guilty to the first count in federal court and was
sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. He was returned to
state custody in Mississippi where he was sentenced to ten years
for armed robbery. On February 10, 1986, Tubwell completed his
state prison sentence and was delivered to a federal prison in
Texas to complete his five-year term.
While in federal custody, Tubwell filed motions pursuant to
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he argued that
his federal sentence should have run concurrently with his state
sentence. The district court denied both motions, and this Court
affirmed the denial of the motions on appeal. On December 9, 1986,
he was released on federal parole. While still on federal parole,
Tubwell was arrested by the State of Mississippi and subsequently
convicted of grand larceny and armed robbery. In August 1991 he
received a "Notice of Action" from the United States Parole
Commission notifying him of the scheduling of his federal parole
revocation hearing in July 1993.
In August 1992, Tubwell filed a Motion to Show Cause. He
contended that his state sentence was imposed to run concurrently
with his federal sentence and any sentence arising from his federal
parole violation. He requested that his federal parole revocation
proceedings be initiated so that he could complete his federal
sentence. Tubwell also argued that he was entitled to credit for
time served, and that his federal sentence should be declared
completely served because the federal authorities refused to
proceed with his parole revocation hearing. The district court
denied the motion, and this Court affirmed on appeal, concluding
that Tubwell was not entitled to an immediate parole revocation
hearing.
On September 21, 1993, Tubwell filed a "MOTION FOR ORDER TO
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SHOW CAUSE OR FOR RELIEF FROM SENTENCE," which is before this Court
on appeal. He contended that his intervening state sentence
expired on May 6, 1993, thereby requiring the Parole Commission to
execute its parole revocation warrant even though he remains in
state custody for a sentence imposed for another offense prior to
February 1986. However, the Commission took no action to execute
the warrant. Tubwell also argued that the Parole Commission denied
him due process by sending him notice that a dispositional
revocation hearing would be conducted in July 1993 and not acting
on it.
Addressing Tubwell's motion as a § 2255 motion, the district
court determined that Tubwell's argument concerning his entitlement
to a parole revocation hearing at the time of the expiration of the
intervening state sentence was previously addressed and ruled on in
response to a prior motion, and that the issue was barred under
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Proceedings. The
court further determined that Tubwell had "cause" for failing to
raise the notice issue in his prior motion because the scheduled
hearing date had not matured at the time he filed the motion.
However, the court also found that the notice did not create a
liberty interest, and that the Parole Commission's failure to hold
a parole revocation hearing did not result in a denial of due
process.
DISCUSSION
The district court and the Government characterize Tubwell's
"MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR FOR RELIEF FROM SENTENCE" as a
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§ 2255 motion. However, Tubwell's motion is more properly
construed as a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 because he is challenging the manner in which his sentence is
being executed rather than the validity of his conviction and
sentence. United States v. Brown, 753 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir.
1985). Therefore, we will address Tubwell's motion as a habeas
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Federal Custody
Tubwell argues that the issue of the Government's obligation
to take immediate custody upon the termination of his intervening
state sentence has not been previously addressed, and therefore
constitutes a "new ground" for habeas relief. In support of his
argument, Tubwell relies upon this Court's refusal to review the
issue during the appeal of his prior Motion to Show Cause filed in
August 1992. In that appeal, this Court declined to review the
issue because it was raised for the first time in Tubwell's reply
brief.
Tubwell's reliance on this Court's statement concerning the
issue raised in his reply brief in his August 1992 Motion to Show
Cause is in error because he has raised the same legal issue that
this Court addressed and resolved in the prior motion. Section
2244(a), which applies to a § 2241 habeas petition, provides:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to
inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a
judgment of a court of the United Sates if it appears
that the legality of such detention has been determined
by a judge or court of the United States on a prior
application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition
presents no new ground not heretofore presented and
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determined, and the judge of the court is satisfied that
the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). In his August 1992 motion, Tubwell argued
that he was entitled to be taken into federal custody for parole
revocation proceedings at the time of his detention by state
authorities in May 1988 because his state sentence had been imposed
to run concurrently with the federal sentence. In his instant
motion, he argues that the federal authorities were required to
hold a revocation hearing at the time that his state sentence was
completed in 1993. However, he acknowledges that he remains in
state custody on another charge. Although Tubwell's argument is
based on an additional factual development, the termination of his
intervening state sentence, the legal issue remains the same as the
issue raised in his August 1992 motion, that is, whether the Parole
Commission is required to initiate parole revocation proceedings
while a defendant remains in state custody. This issue was
addressed in the resolution of Tubwell's prior appeal. See Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86-88, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976).
Therefore, we find that Tubwell has failed to raise a new ground
for habeas relief, thereby constituting an abuse of the writ under
§ 2244(a).
Parole Commission's Revocation Hearing Scheduling Notice
Tubwell contends that under federal regulations he was
entitled to a review of his federal parole violation warrant within
a specific time, and that the Parole Commission had the authority
following the dispositional review to issue the notice he received
scheduling a revocation hearing. He argues that the Commission's
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October 1993 memorandum letter stating that the scheduling notice
Tubwell received was erroneous is contrary to federal regulations,
and that the regulations and notice itself create a liberty
interest in having his parole revocation hearing in accord with the
notice.
We find that because Tubwell did not argue that he was
entitled to a revocation hearing based on his receipt of the
scheduling notice in his prior motion, he has raised a new ground
for habeas relief. The Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v.
Zant1, guides our analysis. In McCleskey, the Court addressed the
"abuse of the writ" test in context of a § 2254 petition, holding
that although a second or subsequent habeas petition which raises
a claim for the first time is generally regarded as an abuse of the
writ, failure to raise the ground in an initial petition will be
excused if the petitioner can show cause for his failure to raise
the claim and prejudice from the errors which form the basis of his
complaint; or that refusal to hear the claim will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 1470. The Court also
noted that the language of § 2255 has been construed "to be the
'material equivalent' of the abuse standard in § 2244." Id. at 1465
(quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1076,
10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963)). This Court has already extended the
McCleskey test to § 2255 motions. See United States v. Flores, 981
F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1993). We have not decided whether the
McCleskey "cause" and "prejudice" test applies to § 2244 motions,
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499 U.S. 467, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)
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but we now hold that it does.
The district court properly determined that Tubwell
demonstrated "cause" for failing to raise the issue concerning the
Parole Commission's scheduling notice in his prior motion.
Although Tubwell received the notice in August 1991, prior to
filing his previous motion in August 1992, he could not argue that
he had been deprived of any rights arising under the notice until
the Commission failed to hold a hearing in July 1993.
However, Tubwell has failed to demonstrate prejudice. He
argues for the first time on appeal that federal regulations
further support his argument that the notice gave rise to a liberty
interest in a parole revocation hearing. A regulation may create
a protected liberty interest if it uses mandatory language to place
a substantive limit on official discretion. See Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). The
provision Tubwell relies upon provides:
If a prisoner is serving a new state...sentence, the
Regional Commissioner, following a dispositional record
may:...Order a revocation hearing to be conducted by a
hearing examiner or an official designated by the
Regional Commissioner at the institution in which the
parolee is confined.
28 C.F.R. § 2.47(c)(ii) (1993). The language of the regulation
reflects that the decision whether to conduct a revocation hearing
following a review is discretionary. Therefore, the regulation
does not create a liberty interest in receiving a parole revocation
hearing at any particular time in the review process.
Nor does the Parole Commission's notice contain language
creating a liberty interest in a hearing in July 1993. Dated
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August 1, 1991 and sent by the Commission to the state penitentiary
and Tubwell, the notice stated, "LET THE DETAINER STAND AND
SCHEDULE FOR A DISPOSITIONAL REVOCATIONAL HEARING 7/93." On its
face, the notice did not contain mandatory language placing limits
on the discretion of the Commission with respect to the scheduling
of the parole revocation hearing. Tubwell has not demonstrated
that the notice itself, or in conjunction with the regulations,
creates a liberty interest in an immediate revocation hearing.
Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in denying
Tubwell habeas relief based on this claim.
Evidentiary Hearing
Tubwell contends that the district court erred in failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing and in failing to appoint counsel. He
argues that a hearing is necessary to challenge the factual dispute
arising from the Parole Commission's October 1993 memorandum letter
stating that the scheduling notice Tubwell received was erroneous.
"To receive a federal evidentiary hearing, the burden is on
the habeas corpus petitioner to allege facts which, if proved,
would entitle him to relief." Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 840
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970, 110 S.Ct. 419, 107 L.Ed.2d
384 (1989). An evidentiary hearing is not required if the record
is complete or the petitioner raises only legal claims that can be
resolved without the presentation of additional evidence. Id.
Tubwell has not alleged any facts which, if proved at a
hearing, would entitled him to habeas relief. He has failed to
submit any evidence demonstrating that the Parole Commission's
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interpretation of its regulations is erroneous or that the
regulations have been interpreted to require a parole revocation
hearing upon the issuance of a scheduling notice. We find that
Tubwell has not demonstrated that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. Nor has he demonstrated that the interests of justice
would be served by the appointment of counsel. See Schwander v.
Blackburn, 750 F.2d 494, 502 (5th Cir. 1985).
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons articulated above, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.
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