[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-17044 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 30, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00061-CR-3-LAC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMEL SHIELDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 30, 2009)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jamel Shields appeals his 168-month sentence for conspiracy to possess and
distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine and five grams or more of cocaine base.
He contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
We review the reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing
determination only for an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191
(11th Cir. 2008). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and
the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th
Cir. 2005). The district court need not state that it has explicitly considered each
factor and need not discuss each factor. Id. at 786. Instead, “an acknowledgment
by the district court that it has considered the defendant's arguments and the factors
in section 3553(a) is sufficient.” Id. “In this Circuit, we presume that a sentence
within the guidelines range is reasonable, but the presumption may be rebutted by
the circumstances of a particular case viewed in light of the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Sarras, No. 08-11757, slip op. at 57 (11th Cir. June 16, 2009).
Shields was sentenced to 168 months imprisonment, the low-end of his
guidelines range of 168–210 months. He argues that the district court’s sentence
was substantively unreasonable because it over-represented his criminal history
and failed to take into account the disparity in the sentencing guidelines between
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crack and powder cocaine offenses. Those arguments fail. The district court stated
that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors and it did not treat the guidelines
as mandatory. The district court concluded that a sentence at the low-end of the
guidelines range was “reasonable and necessary in [Shields’] case.” It noted that
the sentence “meets the goals of punishment and, hopefully, would deter anyone
else who might consider similar criminal conduct” but that, given the mitigating
circumstances that Shields raised at the sentencing hearing, “a greater sentence is
not required.” Additionally, Shields’ argument that the district court found that “it
was unable to consider the disparity between guideline sentences for crack versus
powder cocaine” is simply untrue. There is nothing in the record to support that
argument. Under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, ___, 128 S. Ct. 558,
564 (2007), the district court may consider the sentencing disparity between crack
and powder cocaine, but it is not required to. Here it did not. That decision is
within the district court’s discretion.
Shields was significantly involved in a major drug distribution scheme. The
record reflects that the district court considered the § 3553 factors in light of the
facts of Shields’ case. Shields has not rebutted our presumption that the district
court’s within-guidelines sentence is reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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