No. 20-3835
United States of America v. Chappelle
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2021
No. 20-3835
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
DAMON CHAPPELLE, AKA D,
Defendant-Appellee,
TYRONE DAVIS, CHARLES BONNER, AKA H,
JAMIL SPELLER, RAHEEM JEFFERSON, ZYKIA SPELLER,
Defendants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
ARGUED: DECEMBER 2, 2021
DECIDED: JULY 21, 2022
Before: CALABRESI, CHIN, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.
This appeal requires us to decide whether Hobbs Act robbery
is a “crime of violence” under the career offender provision of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Applying
the categorical approach, we now hold—joining the seven other
Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue—that Hobbs Act
robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)
because it can apply to violence against property, not just against
people. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Laura Taylor
Swain, Judge).
JACOB R. FIDDELMAN (Edward B. Diskant,
Won S. Shin, on the brief), Assistant United
States Attorneys, for Audrey Strauss, United
States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, New York, NY, for Appellant.
STEVEN Y. YUROWITZ, Newman &
Greenberg LLP, New York, NY, for
Defendant-Appellee.
WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether Hobbs Act robbery
is categorically a “crime of violence” under the career offender
provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a) (Nov. 2018)
2
(U.S.S.G.). 1 Joining the seven other Courts of Appeals that have
considered the issue, 2 we conclude that it is not. That is because
Hobbs Act robbery can be committed based solely on violence against
property, whereas a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2 must be based
on violence against people.
Chappelle was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery. Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 provides that, among other
things, a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of
violence. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Laura Taylor Swain, Judge) held that it was not obligated
to defer to Application Note 1 because it was inconsistent with
1 Because Chappelle was sentenced pursuant to the 2018 version of the
Guidelines Manual, our holdings in this case apply to the provisions in that
Manual.
2 United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Prigan,
8 F.4th 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176, 179 (4th Cir.
2021); Bridges v. United States, 991 F.3d 793, 802 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Eason, 953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Camp, 903 F.3d 594, 604
(6th Cir. 2018); United States v. O’Connor, 874 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2017).
3
§ 4B1.2(a). 3 It therefore held that Chappelle’s conspiracy conviction
was not a “crime of violence,” calculated Chappelle’s advisory
Sentencing Guidelines without reference to the career offender
provisions, and sentenced him to time served followed by supervised
release. The Government appealed.
We need not rule upon the validity of Application Note 1 in this
context because the object of Chappelle’s conspiracy offense (Hobbs
Act robbery) was not a crime of violence as defined by § 4B1.2. And
if the object of the conspiracy is not a crime of violence, then the
conspiracy itself cannot be one either (at least, not by virtue of
Application Note 1). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
3 The court concluded that in United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.
1995), we decided only that Application Note 1 was not inconsistent with
§ 4B1.2(b) (“controlled substance offense”), and that we did not address whether
Application Note 1 was inconsistent with § 4B1.2.(a) (“crime of violence”).
4
I. Background
On December 18, 2013, Chappelle was charged in a three-count
indictment with conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count One), conspiracy to commit
Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count Two), and
possession of a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking
offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Three). On
December 23, 2014, Chappelle pled guilty to Counts Two and Three
of the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement specifying that the
§ 924(c) charge was predicated solely on Count Two. In the plea
agreement, Chappelle stipulated that he was a career offender under
§ 4B1.1 and waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack any
sentence of 327 months in prison or less.
Prior to Chappelle’s original sentencing, the United States
Probation Office calculated Chappelle’s Guidelines range to be 262 to
327 months of imprisonment, just as the parties had stipulated in the
plea agreement. During Chappelle’s original sentencing hearing on
5
September 21, 2015, the district court agreed and determined that
(under the 2014 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) Chappelle’s conviction
for Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy qualified as a crime of violence
under § 4B1.2, and therefore (in conjunction with certain of
Chappelle’s prior convictions) triggered application of the career
offender Guideline in § 4B1.1. As a career offender, Chappelle’s total
offense level would normally have been 29 and his criminal history
category would have been VI by virtue of § 4B1.1(b) (yielding an
advisory range of 151 to 188 months), but his § 924(c) conviction
triggered a higher range of 262 to 327 months under § 4B1.1(c)(3). The
defense did not object but requested a below-Guidelines sentence for
certain reasons unrelated to Chappelle’s status as a career offender.
The district court sentenced Chappelle to 120 months in prison on
Count Two, plus 60 months on Count Three, to run consecutively,
followed by five years of supervised release. The court also granted
6
the Government’s motion to dismiss Count One of the indictment (the
drug trafficking charge).
On May 18, 2020, this Court vacated Chappelle’s conviction on
Count Three under § 924(c) in light of our intervening decision in
United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), which held that
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of
violence for purposes of § 924(c). We remanded the matter to the
district court to determine whether to resentence Chappelle on Count
Two—for Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy—in light of the vacatur of
the § 924(c) conviction. On remand, the district court and the parties
agreed that resentencing was appropriate.
At resentencing, the district court considered the Probation
Office’s updated Guidelines calculation. The Probation Office again
concluded—this time under the 2018 Guidelines—that Chappelle was
a career offender. Applying those Guidelines (this time without a
§ 924(c) conviction), the Probation Office suggested (and the
7
Government agreed) that Chappelle’s advisory Guidelines range was
now 151 to 188 months, based on an offense level of 29 and a criminal
history category VI.
Chappelle asserted on remand, however, that he was no longer
a career offender because his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery is not
a crime of violence under § 4B1.2. This argument hinged on the fact
that the 2018 career offender Guideline was narrower than the 2014
version because in 2016, the residual catch-all provision had been
removed. 4 Specifically, Chappelle argued that Application Note 1,
4 The 2014 career offender Guideline defined a “crime of violence” as “any
offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2014)
(emphasis added). This latter phrase was removed in 2016, see U.S.S.G. Supp. to
App’x. C, amend. 798, and thus the 2018 Manual applicable to Chapelle’s
resentencing provided instead that a “crime of violence” was defined as “any
offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is murder, voluntary
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery,
arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm described in 26
U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).” U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a) (2018).
8
which provides that the definition of a “crime of violence” “include[s]
the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to
commit such offenses,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 1 (2018), is now
inconsistent with the Guidelines and therefore invalid. Accordingly,
using the non-career offender Guidelines, Chappelle argued that his
offense level should be 24 and his criminal history category should be
III (based on his six criminal history points), resulting in a Guidelines
range of 63 to 78 months.
During the resentencing hearing on September 9, 2020, the
district court agreed with Chappelle that Application Note 1 was
invalid to the extent it incorporated conspiracy offenses into § 4B1.2.
The district court reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36 (1993), Application Note 1 is inconsistent
with the Guideline it purports to interpret—§ 4B1.2—because it
improperly expands the definition of a “crime of violence” under that
section by adding certain inchoate offenses not otherwise
9
encompassed by the definition set forth in the Guideline. Therefore,
according to the district court, Application Note 1 is not entitled to
the controlling weight afforded to Guidelines commentary that
merely interpret or explain a Guideline provision. Accordingly,
under the 2018 Guidelines, the district court determined that
Chappelle was no longer a career offender. His adjusted offense level
was therefore five points lower than at his original sentencing because
ten points were subtracted by removing his status as a career
offender, while five points were added under § 2B3.1(b)(2) because a
firearm was used in connection with the offense. The district court
reduced Chappelle’s offense level by an additional point without
objection from the parties because of a clerical error, resulting in a
total offense level of 23. As a result, the district court determined that
Chappelle’s Guidelines range was 57 to 71 months, based on an
adjusted offense level of 23 and a criminal history category III, and
10
resentenced him principally to time served (about 82 months). The
Government now appeals.
II. Discussion
On appeal, the Government argues that the district court’s
ruling about Application Note 1 is contrary to controlling precedent
and incorrect on the merits. In response, Chappelle argues that: (1)
the district court correctly held that Application Note 1 is inconsistent
with the plain language of § 4B1.2(a); (2) the Government’s argument
ignores the distinction between a controlled substance offense and a
crime of violence, certain Supreme Court case law, and the
substantive changes to § 4B1.2(a) that occurred in 2016—after many
of the cases cited by the Government; and (3) any error by the district
court is harmless because substantive Hobbs Act robbery is not a
“crime of violence” as that term is defined in § 4B1.2(a) and so, even
assuming the applicability of Application Note 1, a conspiracy to
commit that crime is not itself a crime of violence.
11
For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Chappelle’s
third argument that substantive Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of
violence as that term is currently defined under the career offender
Guideline. It follows that conspiracy to commit that offense cannot
be considered a crime of violence under Application Note 1.
Accordingly, we need not—and do not—consider the district court’s
determination regarding whether Application Note 1 is consistent
with § 4B1.2(a).
A. Standard of review
Appellate review of a district court’s sentence “encompasses
two components: procedural review and substantive review.” United
States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). “A district
court commits procedural error” when, among other things, “it
makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation.” Id. At 190. We review
de novo a “district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines,” including
“whether a particular crime is a ‘crime of violence.’” United States v.
Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2009).
12
B. Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2
On appeal, Chappelle argues that even if the district court erred
as to the validity of Application Note 1, any such error is harmless
because substantive Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence”
under § 4B1.2, and it therefore follows that Hobbs Act robbery
conspiracy is also not a “crime of violence.” That is so, Chappelle
argues, because Hobbs Act robbery’s force element can be satisfied by
force against property (and not just persons), and so Hobbs Act
robbery is categorically broader than § 4B1.2’s definition of crime of
violence. The Government argues that we should decline to decide
this question on the merits (to allow the district court to address it in
the first instance), and, alternatively, argues that Hobbs Act robbery
is categorically a crime of violence because it is no broader than the
enumerated offenses of robbery and extortion. 5
5In the alternative, the Government urges us to consider Chappelle’s
underlying conduct to determine whether his Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy is a
13
We are free to affirm a district court’s ruling on any basis that
appears in the record. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753
F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2014). Both parties have adequately briefed the
question of whether substantive Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of
violence under the 2018 version of § 4B1.2, and so we exercise our
discretion to reach that issue now.
A defendant is a “career offender” if (1) he was at least eighteen
years old at the time of the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant
crime of violence. The Government relies on our reasoning in United States v.
Barrett, 903 F.3d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 2018), to argue that such an inquiry is permissible.
But Barrett, as the Government acknowledges, was abrogated by United States v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), which foreclosed the use of this “conduct-specific”
approach, id. at 2327–29; see also United States v. Watkins, 940 F.3d 152, 162–63 (2d
Cir. 2019) (“As a result of Davis, . . . it appears that courts may no longer avail
themselves of this ‘conduct-specific’ approach [even] in cases . . . where the statute
focuses only on present offense conduct, not prior conduct.”). Further, our prior
use of the conduct-specific approach was applied “to current-offense statutes to
determine whether a predicate offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the
residual clause.” Id. at 162. The 2018 career offender Guideline does not contain
such a residual clause, and so the application of a conduct-specific approach to
§ 4B1.2’s definition (by elements and by enumerated offenses) is not permissible
in any case. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 916 F.3d 231, 237–39 (2d Cir. 2019)
(applying the categorical approach to determine whether federal bank robbery “by
force and violence, or by intimidation” under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a crime of
violence under § 4B1.2’s enumerated clause).
14
offense of conviction is a “crime of violence” or a “controlled
substance offense”; and (3) he has at least two prior convictions of a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
For purposes of the 2018 career offender Guideline, a “crime of
violence” is defined as any federal or state offense, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that:
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person
of another, or
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery,
arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of
a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or
explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Paragraph 1 is commonly called the “elements
clause,” and paragraph 2 is commonly called the “enumerated
offenses clause.” See Nunez v. United States, 954 F.3d 465, 468 (2d Cir.
2020).
15
We begin the analysis by applying the categorical approach to
determine whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a predicate “crime
of violence” as that term is defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. See United
States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2020 (2022). This analytical framework
requires us to look “not to the facts of the particular . . . case,” but to
the statutory definition of the crime of conviction. Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But if “the least culpable conduct that is punishable under [the Hobbs
Act],” Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 2019), would not be
a crime of violence under the Guidelines, then any “conviction under
that law cannot count as a[ ] [crime of violence] predicate,” Descamps
v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013). Under the categorical
approach, “a prior crime [will] qualify as a predicate offense in all
cases or in none.” Id. at 268.
16
1. Elements Clause
Turning first to the “elements” clause, a plain reading of
§ 4B1.2(a) demonstrates that the definition of “crime of violence” in
that section covers the use of force or threats of force only against
people. Specifically, that section defines a crime of violence as an
offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(1) (emphasis added.). By contrast, Hobbs Act robbery is
defined more broadly to include crimes that can be based on threats
against either people or property:
The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or
obtaining of personal property from the person or in the
presence of another, against his will, by means of actual
or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,
immediate or future, to his person or property, or property
in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a
relative or member of his family or of anyone in his
company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added). Because the elements of
Hobbs Act robbery sweep more broadly than the “elements clause,”
17
that offense is not a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1). See Scott,
14 F.4th at 195. 6
The Government contests this reading of the Hobbs Act,
arguing that robbery cannot be committed through the use or threat
of force against property alone because there is no “realistic
probability” that the statute would be invoked in any case that lacked
the use or threat of force against a person. We disagree. The plain
text of the Hobbs Act robbery definition makes clear that it will apply
to force or threats against property, even in the absence of “proximity
between the person from whom the taking occurs and the threat to
property.” Eason, 953 F.3d at 1190–91; see also Green, 996 F.3d at 180
(same). Where the plain statutory language is so abundantly clear,
Chappelle need not identify an actual Hobbs Act robbery prosecution
involving only a threat of force against property to establish the
6 Accord Prigan, 8 F.4th at 1120; Green, 996 F.3d at 180; Bridges, 991 F.3d at
801; Eason, 953 F.3d at 1193; Camp, 903 F.3d at 600; O’Connor, 874 F.3d at 1158.
18
requisite “realistic probability.” See Hylton v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 57, 63
(2d Cir. 2018) (“There is no . . . requirement . . . [to identify a specific
case] when the statutory language itself, rather than the application
of legal imagination to that language, creates the realistic probability
that” the Government would apply the Hobbs Act robbery statute to
conduct beyond the generic definition of robbery (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also O'Connor, 874 F.3d at 1154; Eason, 953 F.3d at
1191.
2. Enumerated Offenses Clause
The next question is whether Hobbs Act robbery is
categorically broader than generic “robbery” and “extortion,” which
are two offenses listed in the “enumerated clause,” under
§ 4B1.2(a)(2). We conclude that Hobbs Act robbery is broader than
both.
In determining whether a crime categorically constitutes the
enumerated offense of “robbery,” we compare the elements of the
19
crime at issue (here, Hobbs Act robbery) to the “generic” definition of
robbery, i.e., the “sense in which the term is now used in the criminal
codes of most States.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
As we have previously noted, “all fifty states define robbery,
essentially, as the taking of property from another person or from the
immediate presence of another person by force or by intimidation.”
United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10, 18 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Consequently, there are at least two ways in which Hobbs Act
robbery sweeps broader than generic robbery under the categorical
approach. First, as already discussed, Hobbs Act robbery includes
“threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury” to property alone;
generic robbery does not. Second, Hobbs Act robbery encompasses
conduct involving force that is “immediate or future,” while generic
robbery encompasses only “immediate” danger to the victim.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), with Jones, 878 F.3d at 18; accord Scott,
20
14 F.4th at 196 n.2. Because Hobbs Act robbery is broader than generic
robbery, it does not fall within the scope of the enumerated offense of
“robbery” in § 4B1.2(a)(2). See Scott, 14 F.4th at 196. 7
The Government resists this conclusion by arguing that Hobbs
Act robbery’s use of the term “property” must be read in light of its
antecedent phrase, that is, “the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property from the person or in the presence of another,
against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence,
or fear of injury, immediate or future . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).
When so read, the Government contends that the “emphasis of
§ 1951(b)(1) on proximity to the victim means that the offense
effectively requires actual or threatened force against a person, not
7 Accord Prigan, 8 F.4th at 1120–21; Green, 996 F.3d at 181–82; Bridges, 991
F.3d at 801; Eason, 953 F.3d at 1193–5; Camp, 903 F.3d 600–02; O’Connor, 874 F.3d
1153–55.
21
merely property.” Gov’t Supp. Br. at 3. Accordingly, the Government
argues that this difference in language is an “inconsequential
variation from generic robbery” such that § 1951(b)(1)’s use of the
term “property” is, in effect, superfluous. Id. The Government
further points out that the “robbery” Guideline—§ 2B3.1—expressly
includes Hobbs Act robbery. The Government argues that it would
therefore be incongruous to interpret “robbery” as including Hobbs
Act robbery in § 2B3.1, but as not encompassing it in § 4B1.2.
These arguments fail for three reasons. First, adopting the
Government’s view that the difference in language between the
Hobbs Act and generic robbery is insignificant would require that we
ascribe no meaning at all to § 1951(b)(1)’s inclusion of the language as
to property, and the consequent differences between Hobbs Act
robbery (which includes certain actions against property alone) and
generic robbery (which is limited to offenses against persons).
Second, the Government’s arguments do not address the temporal
22
distinction between Hobbs Act robbery and generic robbery
discussed above, which independently requires the conclusion that
Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the career offender
Guideline. Third, as for the Government’s observation that the
“Robbery” Guideline of § 2B3.1 covers a wide array of robberies
including Hobbs Act robbery, it does so by means of specific statutory
cross-references, see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 Commentary, the career offender
Guideline does not adopt the same cross-references, and we have
elsewhere held that “robbery” as used in § 4B1.2 is to be read as a
generic robbery offense, see United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10, 18 (2d
Cir. 2017).
The same logic applies to the enumerated offense of
“extortion.” Unlike the term “robbery,” the term “extortion” is
specifically defined for purposes of the career offender Guideline.
Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 defines “extortion” to mean “obtaining
something of value from another by the wrongful use of (A) force,
23
(B) fear of physical injury, or (C) threat of physical injury.” We agree
with the Third Circuit’s reasoning that:
The most natural reading of “physical injury” is as a
single term that excludes harm to property. That is
because “physical” operates as an adjective, modifying
the word “injury,” and together they connote “bodily
injury,” meaning “physical damage to a person’s body.”
Scott, 14 F.4th at 197 (alteration omitted) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)); see also United States v. Edling, 895 F.3d
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Guidelines’ new definition of
extortion narrows the offense by requiring that the wrongful use of
force, fear, or threats be directed against the person of another, not
property.”). Further, we agree with the Scott court that “any doubt”
about this conclusion is resolved by looking to the definitions of
“physical injury” throughout the Guidelines, which uniformly refer
to “injury” as pertaining to harm to people, not to things. 14 F.4th at
197 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2 (defining “physical injury”)); id. at 197 n.5
(collecting similar definitions in the Guidelines). By contrast, the
24
Guidelines refer to harm to property using the terms “damage,”
“loss,” or “destruction.” See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5 (referring to “property
damage or loss”); id. § 2C1.1(c)(3) (referring to “property
destruction”). Accordingly, we conclude that Hobbs Act robbery
does not constitute generic “extortion” as that offense is listed in the
enumerated offenses clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 8
The Government counters that the Guidelines’ definition of
extortion, which was added in 2016, “did not alter the long-standing
common law understanding that extortion includes actual or
threatened violence to property.” Gov’t Supp. Br. at 5. The
Government acknowledges that the Guidelines defines extortion with
respect to “physical injury,” and that the Guidelines’ usage of that
8 Accord Prigan, 8 F.4th at 1121; Green, 996 F.3d at 182–83; Bridges, 991 F.3d
at 802; Eason, 953 F.3d at 1194–95; Camp, 903 F.3d at 602–04; O’Connor, 874 F.3d at
1155–58.
25
term in the definition “provides some support for the suggestion that
. . . [extortion] do[es] not encompass robberies achieved by threat to
property.” Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the Government maintains—
notwithstanding the more natural reading of the term “physical
injury” as excluding harm to property—that such a reading “would
essentially merge the enumerated crimes of robbery and extortion.”
Id. at 7. But this argument fails because (1) we find no ambiguity in
the Guidelines’ use of the term “physical injury,” for the reasons we
already discussed, and (2) our reading does not subsume the
definition of extortion into that of robbery. The two offenses as
defined under the Guidelines remain distinct for at least one of the
same reasons that Hobbs Act robbery and generic robbery are
distinct, that is, that generic robbery encompasses only “immediate”
danger to the victim whereas extortion is not so temporally (or
geographically) limited. Compare Jones, 878 F.3d at 18, with U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
26
It follows from the above discussion that because Hobbs Act
robbery is not a crime of violence under the career offender Guideline,
a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery would not be a crime of
violence by operation of Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2, which
provides that a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is itself a
crime of violence. We therefore express no view on the district court’s
conclusion regarding the validity of Application Note 1. Even
applying Application Note 1, Chappelle’s conviction for conspiracy
to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence for purposes
of the 2018 version of the career offender Guideline.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court has previously noted that the categorical approach
can produce strange results. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 36 F.4th
431, 444 (2d Cir. 2022); Chery v. Garland, 16 F.4th 980, 990–92 (2d Cir.
2021); United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2021 (Park, J.,
concurring). Chappelle’s case presents just such a situation. The
object of the conspiracy here was the armed robbery of drug dealers
27
whom Chappelle and his coconspirators expected would be carrying
roughly 29 kilograms of cocaine and seven kilograms of heroin.
Chappelle and his coconspirators were captured on multiple
recorded conversations describing in detail how they would carry out
the robbery, making clear that they and the rest of the crew would be
armed and prepared to kill the victims if necessary. When Chappelle
and his coconspirators were arrested en route to what they believed
would be the location of the robbery, agents found a total of five
firearms, four of which were loaded, along with ski masks, plastic
gloves, a pair of handcuffs, and plastic “zip ties” or “flex cuffs” to be
used as restraints. On these facts, were a court tasked with looking at
Chappelle’s underlying conduct as a whole, it might well conclude
that he committed a crime of violence. But that is not our task under
the categorical approach. And in any event, we recognize that the
district court would have had broad discretion to impose a sentence
above the advisory Guidelines range, had it determined that the
28
suggested range did not fully capture the severity of the crime. The
district court here, which was well versed in the facts of this case and
fully aware of its sentencing discretion, made no such determination.
In sum, we hold as follows:
(1) Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence,” as that term
is defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2018).
(2) Chappelle’s conviction for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery is therefore also not a “crime of violence” under the
career offender Guideline by operation of Application Note
1 to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2018). Accordingly, the district
court did not err by calculating Chappelle’s advisory
Guidelines range without reference to the career offender
Guideline in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
29