[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 24, 2009
No. 09-10398 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-60818-CV-AJ
JUDY COPELAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CARL SHELL,
as friend,
Plaintiff,
versus
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF HOLLYWOOD,
TIM SCHWARTZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 24, 2009)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Judy Copeland is back before us again. This time, she appeals the district
court’s orders denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the denial of
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to recover terminated federal housing benefits and
denying her motion for rehearing.
In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment against
Copeland on res judicata grounds in the case underlying this appeal, we noted that
“[t]he rationale of the doctrine of res judicata is that there must be an end to
litigation.” Copeland v. Hous. Auth. of Hollywood, No. 08-10744, slip. op. 1, at 6
(11th Cir. Nov. 25, 2008) (quotation omitted). That rationale has not changed.
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion only for an abuse
of discretion. Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir.
2000). We also review the denial of a motion for rehearing for an abuse of
discretion. Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 507 (11th Cir. 1996).
Copeland contends that we erred in holding that her claims were barred by
res judicata because her earlier lawsuits in state courts were not decided on the
merits. She argues that the decisions were not on the merits because she lacked
standing to bring her claims in state court. Copeland is wrong. There is nothing in
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the record to indicate that the state court dismissed either lawsuit for lack of
standing or lack of jurisdiction or that there was any such basis for doing so.
Instead, the record shows exactly the opposite. As we recognized in Copeland’s
earlier appeal, both of the state-court judgments against her were on the merits.
See Copeland, No. 08-10744, slip. op. at 6. In Copeland’s first state court lawsuit,
the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. In the second one, the
court dismissed Copeland’s complaint with prejudice, which operated as an
adjudication on the merits under Florida law. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b) (“Unless
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision . . . , other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable part, operates as an adjudication on the
merits.”).
Copeland’s earlier state court actions ended in decisions on the merits and
res judicata was properly applied to her claims. The district court properly denied
her motions here. We agree with the district court that Copeland’s opportunity to
litigate this matter is “at an end.”
AFFIRMED.
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