[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 13, 2009
No. 08-11941 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00018-CR-3-DHB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TYRONE BOYNTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 13, 2009)
Before CARNES, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Boynton, who conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing with intent
to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), appeals
the denial of his motion to suppress. Boynton argues that police officers violated
the Fourth Amendment when they searched his residence without a warrant. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1998, Boynton was sentenced in a Georgia court to ten years of
supervised probation following his conviction for two counts of possessing cocaine
with intent to distribute. As a term of his probation, Boynton agreed to attend a
boot camp and undergo a period of intensive supervision that required him to
“submit to a search of his person, residence, papers, and/or effects . . . at any time
of the day or night with or without a search warrant whenever requested to do so
by a Probation Supervisor or any law enforcement officer.” Boynton also agreed
that after he completed the intensive supervision, he would abide by general
conditions of probation. The general conditions included the following search
clause:
Defendant shall submit his person, place of residence, vehicle or any
area in which he claim[ed] a reasonable expectation of privacy, to
search and seizure at any time of the day or night without regard to
existence or non-existence of probable cause, with or without a search
warrant, whenever requested to do so by a Probation Supervisor, a
Probation Surveillance Officer or any law enforcement officer.
In 2004, after Boynton had tested positive for cocaine, officers in the
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Sheriff’s Department of Treutlen County, Georgia, received complaints that
Boynton was involved in drug activities. Police officers and Boynton’s probation
officer observed a large number of people, including known drug users, visiting a
house at 807 Wells Street, and Sheriff Thomas Corbin was told that drugs were
being sold at the residence. Boynton’s probation officer later learned that Boynton
was living at 807 Wells Street, although Boynton had provided the officer a
different home address. When questioned, Boynton told the probation officer that
he stayed at the Wells Street residence on weekends. Sheriff Corbin also received
complaints that Boynton was traveling to Atlanta on a weekly basis to purchase
large quantities of cocaine. In March 2004, a police officer stopped Boynton’s
father and brother as they left the Wells Street residence and discovered in the
father’s possession a crack pipe and crack cocaine. Based on his belief that
Boynton was selling crack cocaine, Sheriff Corbin decided to search Boynton’s
residence.
At 2:30 a.m. on April 2, 2004, officers knocked on the front door of 807
Wells Street. When they received no response, Sheriff Corbin walked inside and
saw Boynton walk out of a bedroom in the back of the house. Sheriff Corbin read
to Boynton the search clause in the general conditions of his probation. Sheriff
Corbin searched the bedroom and discovered a black tote bag that contained crack
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cocaine. Officers searched the whole house and discovered large quantities of
cocaine and currency.
Boynton was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or
more of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Boynton moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the search of the house. He argued that officers conducted
an illegal search of the Wells Street residence without a warrant and without
Boynton’s consent. Boynton argued that the search clause was “invalid” and did
not “operate as a waiver of [his] Fourth Amendment rights.” Boynton interpreted
the clause to require him to “make . . . a waiver [of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment] in the future if so requested” for which he would face a revocation of
his probation if he “fail[ed] to make the waiver.” Boynton also argued that he was
no longer subject to the search clause after he was released from intensive
probation.
After an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended that the
district court deny Boynton’s motion to suppress. The magistrate found that
Boynton had agreed that he would be subject to the search clause for the duration
of his probation. The magistrate ruled that Boynton had waived the protections of
the Fourth Amendment and, in the alternative, that the search was valid because the
officers had a reasonable suspicion that Boynton was engaged in criminal activity.
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Boynton objected to the recommendation.
The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge. The
district court ruled that the “Fourth Amendment only protects objectively
reasonable expectations of privacy” and Boynton had diminished expectations so
long as he was “on probation” and “ subject to a search clause.” The district court
rejected as “spurious” Boynton’s “argument that he was either unaware of the
search clause or that the search clause was no longer in effect at the time of the
search.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On denial of a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error
and the application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Ramirez, 476
F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007). We construe all facts in the light most favorable
to the government. Id. at 1235–36.
III. DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Because “[t]he
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, . . . the reasonableness of a
search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
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upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118–19, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999)). The Supreme Court has recognized
that a probationer may be subject to restrictions that diminish his reasonable
expectations of privacy. Id. at 119–20, 122 S. Ct. at 591–92.
Boynton agreed to a term of probation that “significantly diminished [his]
reasonable expectation of privacy[,]” id. at 120, 122 S. Ct. at 592, and made him
subject to warrantless searches of his place of residence. The information acquired
by officers gave them reason to suspect that Boynton was trafficking in crack
cocaine. The district court did not err when it denied Boynton’s motion to
suppress.
Boynton’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
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