[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-17100 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 1, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-20442-CR-ASG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE ANTONIO RAMIREZ-CASTILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 1, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Antonio Ramirez-Castillo appeals the district court’s denial of his 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 706 to
the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels applicable to
crack cocaine offenses. Upon review, we affirm.
Ramirez argues that Amendment 706 lowered his guideline range and that
he qualified for safety valve relief, which enabled the court to reduce his sentence
below the statutory minimum term of imprisonment. He asserts that, even though
he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum, he is still eligible for relief under
United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). He
further argues that the district court incorrectly blurred the requirements for
acceptance of responsibility with the requirements for safety valve relief,
erroneously relying on the face that Ramirez went to trial and did not accept a plea
as reasons for denying safety valve relief. Finally, Ramirez argues that the district
court had the authority to consider safety valve relief at resentencing even though
Ramirez did not raise it at the original sentencing.
We review “a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on a subsequent change in the sentencing
guidelines, for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343
(11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). However, in the § 3582(c)(2) context, “we
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review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its
authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. White, 305 F.3d
1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “We [also] review de novo questions of
statutory interpretation.” United States v. Maupin, 520 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam).
A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has been lowered subsequently by the Sentencing Commission. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). However, we have held that when a defendant is subject to a
statutory mandatory minimum that replaces his guideline range, that defendant is
ineligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 706. Williams, 549 F.3d at
1342. This is true even where the defendant was granted, at his original
sentencing, a substantial assistance departure below the mandatory minimum. Id.
(“Because Williams was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum that replaced
his original sentencing guideline range, he was not sentenced according to the base
offense level in § 2D1.1, even taking into account the § 5K1.1 downward
departure. He thus would not fall within the scope of Amendment 706.”).
Because proceedings under § 3582(c) and § 1B1.10 of the Sentencing
Guidelines “do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant,” U.S.
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S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.10(a)(3) (2008), “all original sentencing
determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of the guideline range
that has been amended since the original sentencing.” United States v. Bravo, 203
F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, § 3582(c)(2) “does not grant to the
court jurisdiction to consider extraneous resentencing issues.” Id. at 782.
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we discern no error.
Because Ramirez’s sentence was ultimately based on the statutory mandatory
minimum rather than the offense level calculation under § 2D1.1, Ramirez was
ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 706.
Further, although Ramirez’s original sentencing range fell below the mandatory
minimum, he did not seek safety valve relief at that time. Ramirez correctly points
out that in Williams we noted, albeit in dicta, that a “substantial assistance”
departure was distinct from a “safety valve” departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
Williams, 549 F.3d at 1341. Williams, however, concerned a defendant who was
granted a departure at his original sentencing proceeding. Here, Ramirez neither
sought nor received a substantial assistance departure at his original sentence,
much less a safety valve reduction. Thus, because all guideline application
decisions made during the original sentencing must remain intact and the court
may not consider extraneous sentencing issues, the district court did not err in
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denying safety valve relief during Ramirez’s § 3582(c)(2) resentencing.
AFFIRMED.
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