[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-10525
AUGUST 31, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-80528-CV-WJZ
ROY DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PALM BEACH COUNTY PARKS
AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 31, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roy Dixon, an African-American Christian male proceeding pro se, appeals
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his employer, the Palm
Beach County Parks and Recreation Department (the County), on his claims of
religious discrimination, racial discrimination, and retaliation, raised pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),
2000e-3(a).
Dixon raises three arguments on appeal, which we address in turn. After de
novo review, we affirm the district court.1
I. Religious Discrimination
First, Dixon argues he presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment based on his religion and to show that the County
failed to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs in order to withstand
summary judgment on his religious discrimination claim.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect to
an employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
1
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Galvez v. Bruce, 552
F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we may
affirm on any legal ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court relied
on that ground. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001).
2
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When Title VII claims are supported by circumstantial
evidence, we apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Brooks v. County Com’n of
Jefferson County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006).
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII with
circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a member of a protected
class; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) his employer treated
similarly situated employees who were not members of his protected class more
favorably; and (4) he was qualified for the job or benefit at issue. Gillis v. Georgia
Dept. of Corrs., 400 F.3d 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2005).
Title VII also requires an employer “make reasonable accommodation for
the religious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship.”
Lake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 837 F.2d 449, 450 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation and
quotation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination
based on a failure to accommodate religious beliefs, a plaintiff must present
sufficient evidence to prove: (1) he had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted
with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his employer of his belief; and
(3) he was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment
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requirement. Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317,
1321 (11th Cir. 2007).
Although evidence showed Dixon was given a written record of counseling,
was initially denied his requests for Sundays off, and was transferred from the
bicycle patrol unit, these were not adverse employment actions because they did
not result in a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, and privileges
of Dixon’s employment. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232,
1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring a showing of “a serious and material change in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to prove an adverse
employment action); see also Doe v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441,
1452 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting a transfer to a different position may be adverse if it
involves a reduction in pay, responsibilities, or prestige). Because Dixon was not
subject to an adverse employment action, he failed to demonstrate a prima facie
case of disparate treatment based on his religion. Likewise, Dixon also failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to provide a
reasonable religious accommodation because he was not disciplined for failing to
comply with an employment requirement that conflicted with his religious beliefs.
See Morrissette-Brown, 506 F.3d at 1321. Accordingly, the district court did not
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err in granting summary judgment to the County on Dixon’s religious
discrimination claim.
II. Racial Discrimination
Dixon next contends the district court erroneously dismissed his racial
discrimination claim because he adequately demonstrated that race was a
motivating factor in his inability to obtain a religious accommodation and a
transfer to his preferred day-shift schedule.
Claims of racial discrimination based on circumstantial evidence are
evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and generally
require the same elements of a prima facie case that are involved in religious
discrimination claims. See Gillis, 400 F.3d at 888. Dixon did not demonstrate he
was subject to an adverse employment action, thus the district court properly
granted summary judgment to the County on his racial discrimination claim.
Davis, 245 F.3d at 1238-39 (explaining not all conduct by an employer that
negatively affects an employee constitutes adverse employment action, rather “the
employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in
the circumstances”).
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III. Retaliation
Finally, Dixon argues he was subjected to an adverse employment action for
filing a race discrimination complaint and, thus, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on his retaliation claim.2
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee for opposing an unlawful employment practice
or a making charge of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he engaged in protected
activity under Title VII; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there
was a causal connection between the two events. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator
Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2410-16 (2006)). To constitute a materially
adverse action, the employer’s actions must be “harmful to the point that they
could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
2
Dixon also made references in his complaint to being intimidated and harassed by his
employer. However, in his response to the County’s motion for summary judgment, Dixon
clarified that he was not asserting a separate hostile work environment claim. Because the
district court granted summary judgment as to all of Dixon’s claims, and he does not raise a
hostile work environment claim on appeal, any issues in this regard are deemed abandoned. See
United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that issues not raised on
appeal are generally considered abandoned).
6
As with his discrimination claims, Dixon failed to demonstrate that the
alleged retaliatory actions were materially adverse. Moreover, even if Dixon
established a prima facie case, the County proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for denying Dixon’s requests for Sundays off and transferring him to the
motor vehicle unit and Dixon failed to demonstrate that these reasons were pretexts
for retaliation. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The
inquiry into pretext requires the court to determine, in view of all the evidence,
whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its
conduct.”) (citation and quotation omitted).3 Dixon did not demonstrate the
alleged retaliatory actions were materially adverse, nor did he present evidence to
demonstrate the County’s articulated reasons were false, and that the real motive
was retaliatory, thus the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
this claim.
3
Even if a district court does not go beyond the prima facie case analysis, we may still
affirm the decision based on a failure to demonstrate pretext. See Cuddeback v. Florida Bd. of
Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1236, n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (considering pretext in the first instance
because the record was “clear as to the final outcome” and “sufficiently developed” to decide the
issue).
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IV.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on all of
Dixon’s Title VII claims because he was unable to establish a prima facie case of
religious discrimination, racial discrimination, or retaliation. Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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